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THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:
ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF A SECONDGENERATION CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTE

Robert L. BurgdorfJr.*

Martin Luther King, Jr. once wrote that our nation's civil
rights laws were a "sparse and insufficient collection of statutes
... barely a naked framework."' On their faces, many federal
civil rights statutes constitute little more than broad directives that
"Thou shalt not discriminate." Broadly worded statements outlawing discrimination were the optimal approach to statutory draftsmanship in light of the controversial nature of the civil rights laws
passed in the 1960s and 1970s. The drafters of these statutes
needed to craft language that would be palatable to a majority of
the members of Congress while still having a meaningful impact
in proscribing discriminatory actions. More detailed standards regarding the application of nondiscrimination principles were left
to be developed by regulatory agencies and court decisions.
On July 26, 1990 the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA") was signed into law.2 In his remarks before the more

than 3000 people, predominantly individuals with disabilities, gathered on the South Lawn of the White House for the signing ceremony, President Bush described the Act as an "historic new civil
rights Act . . . the world's first comprehensive declaration of
* Associate Professor of Law, District of Columbia School of Law. Professor Burgdorf

was the staff author for the National Council on the Handicapped's report Toward Independence, in which the concept of an Americans with Disabilities Act was first proposed,
and he drafted the original Americans with Disabilities Act bill introduced in Congress in
1988.
The author would like to thank the Dole Foundation for its support of this Article, as
well as the staff of the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, especially Guy
Wallace, Arti Rai, Cathy Bendor, Dave Hackney, Scott McElhaney, Mark McGoldrick,

Joe Metcalfe and Chris Steskal, for their editorial assistance.
I MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE Do WE Go FROM
NITY? 10 (1967).
2 Pub.

L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).

HERE: CHAOS OR COMMU-
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equality for people with disabilities." '3 The Executive Director of
the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights has described the
Americans with Disabilities Act as "the most comprehensive civil
rights measure in the past two and a half decades." '4 Senator Edward M. Kennedy has termed the legislation a "bill of rights ' 5 and
"an emancipation proclamation ' 6 for people with disabilities, 7 and
declared that it is "difficult to believe that this Congress will enact
a more far-reaching or more important bill." 8 The Americans with
Disabilities Act, while certainly inspired by, and having many of
the same ultimate goals of, prior civil rights legislation, has intro3President George Bush, Remarks by the President During Ceremony for the Signing
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2 (July 26, 1990) (on file with the Harvard
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review). The President added that "[w]ith today's signing
of the landmark Americans with Disabilities Act, every man, woman, and child with a
disability can now pass through the once-closed doors into a bright new era of equality,
independence, and freedom." Id. at 1-2. He also noted that other countries including
Sweden, Japan, the Soviet Union and each of the 12 member nations of the European
Economic Community had announced their desire to enact similar legislation. Id. at 2.
4Nathaniel C. Nash, Bush and Senate Leaders Support Sweeping Protection for
Disabled, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1989, at Al, col. 4 (quoting Ralrh G. Neas).
- Helen Dewar, Disability Legislation Approved, Wash. Post, Sept. 8, 1989, at Al, col,
6.
6 135 CONG. Rac. S10,789 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989).
7Phraseology is a significant issue with regard to disabilities. Over the past decade
something of a revolution has occurred in the terminological preferences of individuals with
disabilities and organizations representing them. One strain of this revolution is what may
be called a "people first" preference, which recommends that the personhood identifier,
presented as a noun---"individual," "person," "people," "citizen," "American," etc.should precede the designation of differentness from others, which should be tacked on
subsequently as a prepositional phrase---"with a disability," "with mental retardation,"
"with a visual impairment," "with epilepsy," etc. This formulation is preferred over the
traditional adjective/noun phrasing, e.g., "disabled person," "mentally retarded children,"
and "hearing-impaired people," and it is strongly preferred over phrases that turn the
disabling condition into a noun, as "the disabled," "an epileptic," "the blind," etc.
Second, the word "disability" has replaced the word "handicap" as the preferred term.
The ADA committee reports observe that "[m]any individuals with disabilities object to
the use of such terms as 'handicapped person' or 'the handicapped"' and the Congress
decided to use terminology most in line with the sensibilities of the persons protected by
the Act. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 51 (1990). Congress has begun to recognize this change in other
legislation, for example, by changing the name of the National Council on the Handicapped
to the National Council on Disability. Id.
For a discussion of language choices regarding people with disabilities, see RESEARCH
AND TRAINING CENTER ON INDEPENDENT LIVING, GUIDELINES FOR REPORTING AND

WRITING ABOUT PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES (1987); CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE
FOR EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED,

LANGUAGE

GUIDE ON DISABILITY (1987);

AT&T, YOUR LANGUAGE... AND PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES (1982).
This Article uses the currently preferred terminology except in quoted materials where
the now-outmoded wording is used in the original.
8 135 CONG. REC. § 10,789 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989).
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duced some innovative approaches and may provide a somewhat
different model for framing a nondiscrimination statute. The ADA
constitutes a second-generation civil rights statute that goes beyond the "naked framework" of earlier statutes and adds much
flesh and refinement to traditional nondiscrimination law.
This Article analyzes the approach and content of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and its implications for future civil
rights legislation. It describes the Act itself, the statutory framework within which it stands, and the body of disability rights case
law and administrative regulations that will guide its interpretation.
Such exposition of the ADA provides a basis for examining how
the bill differs from other civil rights measures; how it advances
or sets back the conceptualization, drafting, and implementation
of civil rights statutes; and to what extent the ADA may serve as
a model or bellwether for future civil rights legislation.
I. Origins of the Americans with Disabilities Act
A. Status of Americans with Disabilities
By almost any definition, Americans with disabilities are
uniquely underprivileged and disadvantaged. They are
much poorer, much less well educated and have much
less social life, have fewer amenities and have a lower
level of self-satisfaction than other Americans. 9
In testimony to the United States Senate, the President of Louis
Harris and Associates thus summarized the situation of people
with disabilities in this country. 0His conclusions were based upon
a nationwide Harris poll of people with disabilities conducted in
9 Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped, S. HRG. 166, pt. 2, at 9 (1987) (statement
of Humphrey Taylor); quoted in S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1989); also
quoted in H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 31 (1990); see also H.R. REP.
No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 25 (1990).
,o S. REP. No. 116, supra note 9.
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1986.11 The survey documented a high correlation of disability with
poverty, joblessness, lack of education and failure to participate
in social life, shopping and recreation. The National Council on
Disability described the poll's results as "paint[ing] a sobering
picture of an isolated and secluded population of individuals with
' 12

disabilities."

The survey results indicated further that a major cause of the
disadvantaged status of people with disabilities was discrimination
against them. 13 Little wonder that a three-fourths majority of individuals with disabilities indicated that it favored expanded civil
rights protection to protect them from discrimination. 14
The Harris poll conclusions that people with disabilities are
victims of widespread discrimination and constitute a severely
disadvantaged segment of society bring to the attention of a wider
public facts that have long been documented by legal, scholarly
and anecdotal sources.' 5 In 1983 the United States Commission on
Civil Rights made the following official finding:
" Louis HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES, THE ICD SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS:
BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM (1986) [hereinafter THE ICD
SURVEY]. The results of the Harris polls are discussed in NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DIsABILITY, IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL POLICY OF THE 1986 HARRIS SURVEY OF AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES (1988) [hereinafter NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY], and in NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE 11-18
(1988) [hereinafter NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1988].
12 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 11, at 37.

11The poll identified various types of discriminatory practices and barriers encountered
by individuals with disabilities. One-fourth of those interviewed said that they had encountered job discrimination because of their disabilities. THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at
75. Forty-seven percent of those individuals who were not employed or not employed fulltime listed as an important reason why they were not working full-time that employers
would not recognize that they were capable of doing a full-time job due to their disability.
Id. at 70. See infra note 37 and accompanying text for a discussion of a subsequent Harris
poll in which managers of businesses confirmed by an overwhelming margin the prevalence
of job discrimination against workers with disabilities.
In addition to discrimination in the job market, the Harris survey of individuals with
disabilities documented other types of discrimination. Problems identified by a significant
portion of those interviewed included denials of educational opportunities, lack of access
to public buildings and public bathrooms, the lack of accessible transportation and denials
of life and health insurance. Id. at 63-64, 86-90.
14Id. at 112.
1-Committee reports accompanying the ADA catalog many of the sources that document discrimination against people with disabilities and the underprivileged status that such
discrimination causes. See S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6-9 (1989); H.R. REP.
No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 28-32 (1990). Among the official studies cited are:
U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL

ABILITIES (1983) [hereinafter U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS]; NATIONAL COUNCIL
ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE (1986) [hereinafter NATIONAL COUNCIL
ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1986]; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1988, supra
note 11; the two Harris polls-THE ICD SURVEY (see supra note 11) and Louis HARRIS
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Historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate
handicapped people. Despite some improvements, particularly in the last two decades, discrimination against
handicapped persons continues to be a serious and pervasive social problem. It persists in such critical areas as
education, employment, institutionalization, medical
treatment, involuntary sterilization, architectural bar16
riers, and transportation.
In Alexander v. Choate17 the United States Supreme Court
recognized the existence of both "well-catalogued instances of
invidious discrimination against the handicapped," and discrimination that is the product "of thoughtlessness and indifferenceof benign neglect." 18 The Court also quoted previous Congressional declarations that discrimination against people with disabilities is one of America's "shameful oversights" which causes individuals with disabilities "to live among society 'shunted aside,
hidden, and ignored,"' and which constitutes "glaring neglect" by
our society. 19 In testifying on the ADA bill, Attorney General
Thornburgh noted that "many persons with disabilities in this nation still lead their lives in an intolerable state of isolation and
dependence. '20 In its 1986 report to the Congress and the President, the National Council on the Handicapped declared that "[t]he
severity and pervasiveness of discrimination against people with
disabilities is well documented," and that such discrimination constitutes a "major obstacle to achieving the societal goals of equal

AND ASSOCIATES, THE ICU SURVEY II: EMPLOYING DISABLED AMERICANS (1987) [hereinafter THE ICU SURVEY II]; PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN
IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC (1988); TASK FORCE ON THE RIGHTS AND EMPOWERMENT OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES, EQUALITY FOR 43 MILLION AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES: A MORAL AND ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE (1990).

16U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 159. The Commission's report
included an Appendix listing 21 major issue areas (described as "not exhaustive") in which

people with disabilities suffer discrimination. Id. at 165-68.

'7469 U.S. 287 (1985) (upholding state's reduction of days of inpatient hospital care
covered by Medicaid despite claims of disparate-impact discrimination against people with

disabilities).
18

Id. at 295.

19Id. at 296, quoting 117 CONG. REC. H45,974 (daily ed. 1971) (statement of Rep.

Vanik); 118 CONG. REC. S526 (daily ed. 1972) (statement of Sen. Percy).

20 Quoted in S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 32 (1990) (testimony before House Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights, Ser. No. 58, Oct. 11, 1989, p. 91).
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'21
opportunity and full participation of individuals with disabilities."
After conducting sixty-three public fora in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam, and Puerto Rico, and meeting with more
than 32,000 people, the Congressional Task Force on the Rights
and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities made a formal
finding in 1990 of the existence of "massive, society-wide discrimination. '22 Numerous other authorities have recognized the magnitude and pervasiveness of discrimination against people with

disabilities .23

Anecdotal instances of discrimination on the basis of disability
abound. Examples noted in the ADA committee reports include:
(1) Operators of an auction house attempted to remove a
woman who used a wheelchair (as a result of damage by polio to
the use of her legs) because she was deemed to be "disgusting to
look at," and the manager of a movie theater attempted to keep
her out because she could not transfer from her wheelchair to a
regular theater seat; 24

21 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED,

1986, supra note 15, at A-3.

22 TASK FORCE ON THE RIGHTS AND EMPOWERMENT OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILI-

supra note 15, at 8. This finding is quoted in H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 2, at 31-32 (1990). The functions and make-up of the Task Force are described
id. at 27-28.
23See Nathaniel Sorkin, EqualAccess to Equal Justice:A Civil Right for the Physically
Handicapped,78 CASE & COM. 41 (1973) (people with disabilities are "the most discriminated [against] minority in our nation"); Robert Burgdorf & Marcia Pearce Burgdorf, A
History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualificationsof HandicappedPersons as a 'Suspect
Class' under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855 (1975); Judith
Welch Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered:Ensuring Equal Opportunity
Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69
TIES,

CORNELL L. REV. 401, 403, n.2 (1984).

The following passage comes from a law school case book on disability rights:
The history of society's formal methods for dealing with handicapped people can
be summed up in two words: segregation and inequality. Individuals with handicapping conditions have faced an almost universal conspiracy to shunt them aside
from the mainstream of society and to deny them an equal share of benefits and
opportunities available to others .... At every juncture, the handicapped person
has met with attempts to 'push' him or her aside and to withhold that which is
taken for granted by other persons.
ROBERT

L.

BURGDORF JR., THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS: CASES, MA-

51 (1980). See also Harlan Hahn, Paternalismand Public Policy, 20
Soc'Y 3, at 36, 38 (1983) ("the history of disabled persons in America and elsewhere has
been primarily a history of segregation and discrimination").
24S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1989) (statement of Judith Heumann);
H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 29-30 (1990).
TERIALS, AND TEXT
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(2) A New Jersey zoo keeper refused to admit children with
Down's syndrome because he feared they would upset the
chimpanzees ;25

(3) A woman disabled by arthritis was denied a job at a college, not because of doubts that she could perform the job, but
because the college
trustees believed that "normal students
' 26
shouldn't see her;"
(4) A child with cerebral palsy was excluded from public
school, although he was academically competitive and his condition was not actually physically disruptive, because his teacher
claimed his physical appearance "produced a nauseating effect"
27
on his classmates;
(5) A woman was fired from ajob she had held for many 28years
because her son, who lived with her, had contracted AIDS;
(6) A wheelchair user being released from the hospital was
notified at the last minute that the public transit service would not
provide a ride home, even though the ride had been reserved three
29
weeks in advance;
(7) A deaf individual telephoned the police for help using a
telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD), 30 but the police
operator hung up on his call because the police force did not offer
TDD service; 31 and
(8) A man with dyslexia who could perform the job of heavy
equipment operator was denied the position because he could not
pass a written test and the employer would not let him take the
32
test orally.
2 S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 30 (1990).
26S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1989); H.R. REP.No. 485, 101st Cong.,

2d Sess., pt. 2, at 30 (1990). The incident is discussed in School Board of Nassau County
v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283 n.9 (1987), quoting 118 CONG. REc. 36,761 (1972) (remarks of

Sen. Mondale).
27S.REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 30 (1990). See 117 CONG. REC. 45,974 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Vanik),
cited as an example of discrimination on the basis of disability in Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287, 307 n.29 (1985).
28S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 30 (1990).
29H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 38 (1990).
30A simple device that permits typed messages to be transmitted over the phone lines.
See infra text accompanying notes 371-375.
11H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 39 (1990).
32S.REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
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The Committee reports presented the listed incidents as a
sampling of the discrimination described in testimony in Congressional hearings or documented in court decisions; as such they
consitute only a meager representation of the instances of discrimination against people with disabilities that take place daily
33
throughout the United States.
Statistical information indicates how widespread and devastating are the effects of discrimination. President Bush has stated:
"The statistics consistently demonstrate that disabled people are
34
'
the poorest, least educated and largest minority in America.
Certain statistical truths recur in various studies and reviews of
the population with disabilities:
(1) About two-thirds of individuals with disabilitiesof working
age are not working.35 The Louis Harris organization has noted
that this rate of joblessness exceeds that of all other demographic
groups under age sixty-five of any significant size, including young
African-Americans, a group often singled out as having extremely
high unemployment. 36 The extraordinarily high level of unemployment among people with disabilities exists even though studies
show that individuals with disabilities maintain above average
work attendance and productivity. Studies also indicate that em2d Sess., pt. 2, at 71-72 (1990). This incident gave rise to a lawsuit under Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973). See Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d
666 (11th Cir. 1983).
33The report of the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with
Disabilities includes another 15 anecdotal histories of discrimination encountered by individuals with disabilities, some with tragic consequences. TASK FORCE ON THE RIGHTS AND
EMPOWERMENT OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES, supra note 15, at 9-12.

Anecdotal descriptions can be found elsewhere in the legal literature. See, e.g., Amy
Jo Gittler, FairEmployment and the Handicapped: A Legal Perspective, 27 DEPAUL L.
REV. 953, 969 n.52 (1978); Jack Achtenberg, 'Crips' Unite to Enforce Symbolic Laws:
Legal Aid for the Disabled:An Overview, 4 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 178 (1975). The author
of the latter article, Law Professor Jack Achtenberg, was killed by a hit-and-run driver in
1976 after he had been forced to navigate his electric wheelchair in the street because there
were no curb cuts in the sidewalks. See Roberta Achtenberg, Dedication, 50 TEMPLE L.Q.
941, 943 (1977).
The extensive case law developed under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794, includes numerous examples of factual situtations where complainants have successfully proven that they have been the victims of discrimination on
the basis of disability.
3 H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 32-33 (1990).
35THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 47; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED,
1986, supra note 15, at 5 (citing 1980 Census figures); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1988, supra note 11, at 14; TASK FORCE ON THE RIGHTS AND EMPOWERMENT OF
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES, supra note 15, at 9; PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED, OUT OF THE JOB MARKET: A NATIONAL CRISIS 7 (1987).
3

THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 47.
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ployer fears about expensive insurance premiums or modifications

to the worksite have proven unfounded. Instead, the scarcity of
workers with disabilities appears to be largely the result of discrimination. 37 In a second survey on disability issues, the Harris
agency interviewed employers in 1987 and reported that threefourths of business managers affirmed that people with disabilities

"often encounter job discrimination from employers.

'38

In addition, individuals with mobility impairments are forced

to turn down or quit jobs because public transit to the job sites is
39

not accessible.
(2) Two-thirds of those not working want to work.40 The stag-

gering unemployment rate among people with disabilities, then,
does not result from the lack of desire to work. Moreover, studies
indicate that those persons with disabilities who do find jobs tend
to perform as well as or better than their co-workers. 41 The Harris
37The President's Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities reported that
45 different studies it conducted had led to the same conclusion-that discriminatory
attitudes of employers were the number one reason why people with disabilities did not
have jobs. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 37 (1990) (quoting testimony
of Jay Rochlin, Executive Director, before the House Subcommittees on Select Education
and Employment Opportunities, Ser. Nos. 101-51, p. 29). See also supra note 13. The
studies found that the second-most serious problem was inaccessible transportation. Id.
An economist's review of relevant studies led him to conclude that "[t]here is evidence
of substantial employment prejudice related to mental or physical impairments," and that
"[m]ore recent studies suggest that prejudice against impaired persons is more intense than
that against other minorities." William G. Johnson, The RehabilitationAct and Discrimination Against HandicappedWorkers: Does the Cure Fit the Disease?, in DISABILITY AND
THE LABOR MARKET 242, 245 (Monroe Berkowitz & M. Anne Hill eds. 1986), citing, inter
alia, FRANK BOWE, HANDICAPPING AMERICA: BARRIERS TO DISABLED PEOPLE (1978)
(employer attitudes toward workers with disabilities are "less favorable than those...
toward elderly individuals, minority group members, ex-convicts, and student radicals"),
and Harlan Hahn, Paternalismand Public Policy, 20 Soc'Y 3, at 36, 44 (1983) (people with
disabilities are subject to "greater animosity and rejection than many other groups in
society"). Johnson also discusses the results of a study in which he and a colleague found
that workers with disabilities receive lower rates of pay for their work than other persons
of comparable education, experience, and health (measured by amount of sick leave taken).
William G. Johnson and James Lambrinos, unpublished study, discussed in Johnson, supra,
at 245. Various other studies have also documented substantial wage disparities between
workers with disabilites and their peers. See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
supra
note 15, at 31-32.
38
THE ICD SURVEY II,supra note 15, at 12.
39H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 37 (1990).
40THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 50-51; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1988, supra note 11, at 15; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 11, at
23-24; PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED, supra note 35,
at 15; S. REp. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 32 (1990).
41E.g., THE ICD SURVEY II, supra note 15, at 7 ("overwhelming majorities of managers
give disabled employees a good or excellent rating on their overall job performance");
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1988, supra note 11, at 15 ("Disabled em-
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organization called its finding that most non-working people with
disabilities want to work "one of the most important and challenging findings in the survey. '42 The national dimensions of the problem were calculated in two of the ADA committee reports which
people with disabilites want to work
found that "about 8.2 million
43
but cannot find a job.
(3) Over twenty percent of people with disabilitiesof working

age live in poverty. 44 People with disabilities have more than twice
as high a poverty rate as other Americans. 45 Approximately half
of people with disabilities live in households having an annual
income of $15,000 or less-double the proportion of people without
disabilities .46
Conversely, the percentage of people with disabilities living
in families that make more than $35,000 annually is only twelve
percent, less than half the twenty-seven percent rate for other
Americans. 47 In 1988 the average yearly earnings of men with
disabilities were thirty-six percent less than that for other men;
women with disabilities earned thirty-eight percent less than other
women.

48

ployees received very high marks from employers"); U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
supra note 15, at 32 ("studies dating back to a massive 1948 Department of Labor study of
disabled and nondisabled workers have consistently concluded that handicapped and nonhandicapped workers are equally productive").
Studies also indicate that costs associated with employing workers with disabilities are
not substantial. See, e.g., THE ICD SURVEY If, supra note 15, at 9 ("a 75 percent majority
of managers ... said that the average cost of hiring a disabled person is about the same
as the cost of employing a non-disabled person"); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDI-

CAPPED, 1988, supra note 11,-at 15 (view that the cost involved in hiring people with
disabilities is high is a "myth"); U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 15, at

106-08 ("accommodations are frequently minor and inexpensive").
4
2 THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 50.
41 S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 32 (1990).
4

NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1986, supra note 15, at 5 (citing 1980

Census figures); THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 25 (25% of all persons with disabilities,
including persons 65 years of age and older, live in poverty); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE
HANDICAPPED, 1988, supra note 11, at 13-14; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra

note 11, at 24 (one-fourth of all persons with disabilities, including persons 65 years of age
and older, live in poverty); see also U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 15,

at 32 (discussing several other studies reaching compatible results with somewhat different
categorizations).
45 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1986, supra note 15, at 5 (citing 1980
Census figures); THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 25; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE
HANDICAPPED, 1988, supra note 11, at 13; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note

11, at 24.
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 11, at 24.
47THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 23; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra
4

note 11, at 24.
4 H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 32 (1990), citing U.S. DEPART-
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(4) Nearly two-thirds of all Americans with disabilities did
not go to a single movie in the past year 9 three-fourths of all
persons with disabilities did not see live theater or a live music
performance in the past year 50 two-thirds of all persons with
disabilities never went to a sports event in the past year;51 seventeen percent of people with disabilities never eat in restaurants;52
and thirteen percent of persons with disabilities never shop in
53
grocery stores.

People with disabilities participate at similarly low rates in
other types of activities, such as church attendance; 54 involvement
in religious, volunteer and recreation groups; 55 and sexual activMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SPECIAL STUDIES SERIES P-23, No. 160,
LABOR FORCE STATUS AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS WITH WORK DISABILITIES:49 1981-1988, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 5, table D (1989).
THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 37, 39; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1988, supra note 11, at 16; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 11, at

35. In the full adult population, only 22% said that they had not gone to a movie in the
past year. Id. More than half of adults generally (52%) had been to see four or more movies
in the previous year; only 15% of individuals with disabilities had gone to the movies that
often. THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 39; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra
note 11, at 35.
5oTHE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 37, 39; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1988, supra note 11, at 16; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 11, at
35. Among all adults, only slightly more than 4 out of 10 had not been to a live theater or
live music performance. Id.
51THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 37, 39; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1988, supra note 11, at 16; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 11, at
35. In comparison, 50% of American adults generally had not attended a sporting event.

Id.
52THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 38, 40; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1988, supra note 11, at 16; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 11, at
36. People without disabilities eat at restaurants much more frequently; only 5% have not
eaten in a restaurant in the previous year. Id. While one-third of persons with disabilities
report going to a restaurant less than once a month if at all, only 13% of other persons
report that they dine out so infrequently. THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 40; NATIONAL
COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 11, at 36. More than half (51%) of people with
disabilities report that they eat at restaurants on an average only once a month or less,
compared with 25% of other adults. Id. Only 34% of people with disabilities eat at a
restaurant once a week or more, compared with a 58% majority of people without disabilities. THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 38, 40; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1988, supra note 11, at 16.
53 THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 37, 40; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1988, supra note 11, at 17; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 11, at
36. In contrast, only 2% of persons without disabilities do not go to grocery stores. Id.
About six out of ten (62%) individuals with disabilities visit a grocery store at least once a
week, while nearly nine out of ten (87%) other adults shop for food this often. THE ICD
SURVEY, supra note 11, at 37, 40; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 11, at

36.
'4 THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 37, 40; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY,
supra note 11, at 36. Nearly a third of people with disabilities (32%) report that they never
go to a church or synagogue, compared with 19% of other Americans. Id.
SS THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 38, 41; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDI-
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ity. 56

From these data, the Louis Harris organization concluded
that people with disabilities "lead less full and free lives than most
other Americans. '57 Similarly, the National Council on Disability
reported: "The overall picture that emerges from such data is of a
greatly isolated, stay-at-home population of Americans with disabilities. 58 Based on such statistical information and testimony
presented at hearings, ADA committee reports declare that "it is
clear that an overwhelming majority of individuals with disabilities
lead isolated lives and do not frequent places of public
59
accommodation.
(5) Fortypercent ofpeople with disabilitiesdid notfinish high
school.60 The number of individuals with disabilities who have
attended college is also comparatively small. 61 The disparity continues at every level of educational attainment, prompting the
Louis Harris agency to conclude that people with disabilities have
CAPPED, 1988, supra note 11, at 17; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 11, at
36. When asked whether they were active in any community groups, such as a religious,
volunteer, or recreation group, 64% of individuals with disabilities said they were not; in
contrast, six out of ten persons without disabilities say they are somewhat or very active
in such groups. Id.
- THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 42, 44; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY,
supra note 11, at 36. More than half (51%) of persons with disabilities reported that having
a disability had resulted in limitations upon their sexual activity, and more than one-fourth
(26%) reported that they had major limitations upon such activities. Id. One authority has
written that "[d]isabled adolescents and adults who attempt to master the intricate set of
unspoken rules that regulate sexual relationships often discover that feelings aroused by
their disabilities reduce their prospect of finding a mate, establishing a home, and raising a
family." Hahn, supra note 23, at 45. The sexual rights and problems of persons with
disabilities are increasingly the focus of discussion and study. See, e.g., JACK DAHLBERO,
Men, in SPINAL NETWORK 266 (1987); MILTON DIAMOND, Sexuality and the Handicapped,
in SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF DISABILITY: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 439 (1977); YVONNE DUFFY .... ALL THINGS ARE POSSIBLE (1981); JOHN GLIEDMAN
AND WILLIAM ROTH, The Sexuality of the Severely Disabled, in THE UNEXPECTED MINORITY 364 (1980); SARAH F. HAAVIK & KARL A. MENNINGER, SEXUALITY, LAW, AND
THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSON (1981); JOANNE JAMES, Women, in SPINAL
NETWORK 271 (1987); GIOVANNA NIGRO, Sexuality in the Handicapped: Some Observations on Human Needs and Attitudes, in SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF DISABILITY: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 131 (1977); SILAS P. SINGH & ToM MAGNER,
Sex and Self- The Spinal-CordInjured, in SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF DISABILITY: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 451 (1977); ELLEN STOHL, Body Language:
A Statement on Sexual Equality, in SPINAL NETWORK 280 (1987).
57THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 38.
- NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 11, at 35.
59S. REP.No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 34 (1990).
60THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 23, 25; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1988, supra note 11, at 14; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 11, at
31. Only 15% of other Americans lack a high school education. Id.
61While nearly half (48%) of individuals without disabilities have at least some college
education, only 29% of individuals with disabilities have gone to college. Id.
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"far less education" than other Americans. 62 The Congressional
Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with

Disabilities reported that, of all groups in our society, persons with
disabilities receive the least education. 63 And after reviewing available data, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights concluded that
people with disabilities have received "much less education" than
their peers, noting that "the higher one goes on the education
scale, the lower the proportion of [persons with disabilities] one
finds."64
(6) About thirty-six percent of individuals with disabilities of
working age are dependent on government benefits for their sup-

port. 65 Another twenty-five percent get by without public assistance even though they are not working.66 Of those who do receive

benefits, sixty percent are the primary wage earners in their
households. 67
(7) Support programs for people with disabilities cost our
country $60 billion annually at the federal level, 68 and billions more
in state, local, and private funds. 69 Most of the expenditures-

ninety-three to ninety-five percent of those by the federal
government 7 ---were for income support and maintenance proTHE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 23.
61 TASK FORCE ON THE RIGHTS AND EMPOWERMENT OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILI62

TIES, supra note 15, at 9.
64

U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,

supra note 15, at 28.

65 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1986,
(citing 1980 Census figures); THE ICD SURVEY, supra note
ON DISABILITY, supra note 11, at 25.
6 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1986,

supra note 15, at 12, chart 2
11, at 91; NATIONAL COUNCIL
supra note 15, at 12, chart 2

(citing 1980 Census figures). The group that is not working and not receiving public assistance benefits is predominantly (72%) female, and is likely (by a 69% majority) to be in a
household where someone else is the main wage-earner. THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11,
at 93-94; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 11, at 25.
67 THE ICD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 91.
61 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED,
COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1988, supra note

1986, supra note 15, at 2;

NATIONAL

11, at 2; PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON
EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED, supra note 35, at 1; S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 17 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 43 (1990).

69 Thomas N. Chirikos, Aggregate Economic Losses from Disability in the United
States, 67 MILBANK QUARTERLY supp. 2, pt. 1, 59, 71 (1989) (total of $177 billion for 1980);
PERCY, DISABILITY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 4 (1989) (total of $184 billion for

1981); President George Bush, Remarks by the President During Ceremony for the Signing

of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, supra note 3 (total of $200 billion estimated

in 1990).
70 The National Council on the Handicapped estimated that over $57 billion of the

$60 billion spent by the federal government on disability pr.grams in 1986 went to income
support and maintenance. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1986, supra note
15, at 12; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1988, supra note 11, at 2. The
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grams. Such allocation of resources led the National Council on
the Handicapped to report to the President and the Congress in
1986 that federal programs "reflect an overemphasis on income
support and an underemphasis of initiatives for equal
opportunity,
'7 1
self-sufficiency."
and
prevention,
independence,
Three principal themes that emerge from these discussions of
the status of persons with disabilities: (1) individuals with disabilities have been subjected to widespread and severe discrimination;
(2) such persons are an extremely disadvantaged and underprivileged segment of society; and (3) the resulting economic dependency of such individuals is costing the nation tremendous sums
in support expenditures. These factors provided the impetus for
various attempts to prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability, and served as the factual underpinnings for the Americans with
72
Disabilities Act.
B. Conceptual Sources and Statutory Precursors
Efforts to pass laws banning discrimination on the basis of
disability represent a shift in society's conception of its responsibilities to people with disabilities-a shift from charity to civil
rights. 73 The disability activist slogan, "You Gave Us Your Dimes,
Now We Want Our Rights," 74 reflects the civil rights view of
persons with disabilities not as unfortunate, afflicted creatures
needing services and help, but as equal citizens, individually varying across the spectrum of human abilities, whose over-riding
President's Committee on Employment of the Handicapped estimated that in 1985 the
federal government spent 93% of its disability expenditures for support of out-of-work
individuals. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED, supra note

35, at 1.
71 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1986, supra note 15, at 12; NATIONAL
COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1988, supra note 11, at 1.

72See infra notes 117-121 and accompanying text. Many legal scholars argue that
people with disabilities ought to be considered a suspect class protected by the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Burgdorf& Burgdorf, supra note
23, at 900-10; Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification? 83 YALE L.J. 1237 (1974)
(authored by Gary J. Simpson). The courts' treatment of the suspect class argument, as
well as the Supreme Court's rejection of it in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
473 U.S. 432 (1985), are discussed infra at notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
73 See, e.g., RICHARD C. ALLEN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE DISABLED AND DISADVAN-

TAGED 1-4 (1969); RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY 15-40 (1984); Note, Historical Overview: From
Charity to Rights, 50 TEMPLE L.Q. 953 (1977) (authored by Barbara P. Ianacone).
74Terri Schultz, The Handicapped, a Minority Demanding Its Rights, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 13, 1977, at E8. col. 1.
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needs are freedom from discrimination and a fair chance to participate fully in society.75
This civil rights approach was inspired in large part by the
struggles of African-Americans and other minorities in the 1960s
and 1970s to improve their status and treatment in American society. 76 Starting in the early 1970s, the fledgling disability rights
movement borrowed methods such as public protests and
marches, 77 acts of civil disobedience, 78 and court actions, 79 that
75See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 67-101. This approach
to the status of people with disabilities was reflected in the 1975 report of a group of experts
on disability issues convened under the aegis of the United Nations:
[Diespite everything we can do, or hope to do, to assist each physically or mentally

disabled person achieve his or her maximum potential in life, our efforts will not
succeed until we have found the way to remove the obstacles to this goal directed
by human society-the physical barrierswe have created in public buildings,
housing, transportation, houses of worship, centers of social life, and other community facilities-the social barrierswe have evolved and accepted against those
who vary more than a certain degree from what we have been conditioned to
regard as normal. More people are forced into limited lives and made to suffer by
these man-made obstacles than by any specific physical or mental disability.
Report of the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Barrier-FreeDesign, 25 INT'L
REHABILITATION REV. 3 (1975).

76 In his article Uncle Tom and Tiny Tim: Some Reflections on the Cripple as Negro,
38 AM. SCHOLAR 412 (1969), Professor Leonard Kriegel advised people with disabilities to
follow the example set by black Americans in their quest for dignity and equality in society.
In another publication in 1969, Professor Richard Allen noted that people with disabilities
shared many of the same problems as poor people and racial and ethnic minorities, and
suggested a common strategy, including both litigation and legislative changes, to address
such problems. R. ALLEN, supra note 73.
77 On the national level these included a march in the spring of 1972 to the steps of the
U.S. Capitol; a march and all-night vigil at the Lincoln Memorial in the fall of 1972; a
march down Connecticut Avenue in the District of Columbia in the fall of 1973; a candlelight
vigil outside the White House in April of 1977; and demonstrations outside the home of
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Joseph Califano in the spring of 1977. Robert
L. Burgdorf Jr., Applicability of TraditionalCivil Rights Analysis to Handicap Discrimi-

nation Cases, in PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA, EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION UNDER THE REHABILITATION ACT 42 (1985).
7 R. SCOTCH, supra note 73, at 36. In 1977, for example, delays in the promulgation
of regulations implementing § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794,
prompted groups of individuals with disabilities to occupy 10 offices of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare by sit-in demonstrations, some of which continued for 24
days until responsive regulations were issued. N.Y. Times, April 29, 1977; at 1, col. 1;
Kansas City Times, April 29, 1977, at 1, col. 1. Wash. Post, April 7, 1977, at B8, col. 1;

U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 141-42.
7 See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd in part and
remanded in part, Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (patients involuntarily
committed to an Alabama mental hospital held to have been denied constitutional right to
individualized treatment giving them realistic oppurtunity to improve their condition);
Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa.
1971) (denial of public education to children with mental retardation violates equal protection clause); Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (excluding
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had proven effective in the movements for social justice on behalf
of other oppressed groups.
The pattern of prior civil rights activities by African-Americans and other groups paved the way for advocacy efforts by
people with disabilities in another way-the use of federal legislative initiatives. Between 1973 and 1990, Congress passed several
federal laws proscribing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities. The most important of these was the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, which provided:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual ...

shall,

solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.80
Other important nondiscrimination laws include the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act,81 the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act,82 the Voting Accessibility
for the Elderly and Handicapped Act,8 3 the Air Carrier Access
Act,8 4 and the Fair Housing Amendments Act.85 A 1983 report of
the United States Commission on Civil Rights identified twentynine federal laws that prohibited discrimination against persons
with disabilities.8 6 Nearly all of these laws are premised upon

children with disabilities from public school violates due process clause). For an extensive
collection of litigation initiated by and on behalf of people with disabilities, see ROBERT L.
BURGDORF JR., supra note 23.

11Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 701, 794 (1978)). Section 504 was widely heralded as landmark legislation. See, e.g., R.
SCOTCH, supra note 73, at 52; F. BOWE, supra note 37, at 205; Jack Achtenberg, Law and
the Physically Disabled: An Update with ConstitutionalImplications, 8 Sw. U.L, REV.
847, 853 (1976); Note, All Aboard: Accessible Transportationfor Disabled Persons, 63
N.Y.U. L. REv. 360, 361 (1988) (authored by Sharon Rennert).
S Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232, 1401, 14051420, 1453 (1975)).
8 Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486 (1975). The Act has been amended, primarily by
Pub. L. No. 95-602, tit. V, 92 Stat. 3003 (1978). It is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081
(1984).
3 Pub. L. No. 98-435, 98 Stat. 1678 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973ee (1984)).
84 Pub. L. No. 99-435, 100 Stat. 1080 (1986) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 note, 1374,
1374 note (1986)).
81Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341, 2342
(1988), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 notes, 3602, 3602 note, 3604-3608, 3610-3614, 3614a, 3615-3619,
3631 (1986)).
6 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 46, 169-72.
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federal involvement in the programs and activities they cover, i.e.,
the activities covered by the nondiscrimination obligations are
either those conducted by the federal government itself or those
funded in whole or in part by federal grants, contracts or other
forms of federal financial assistance. The two notable exceptions
are the Air Carrier Access Act, which applies to all air carriers,
and the Fair Housing Amendments Act, which applies to the sale
and rental of private housing covered by title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968.87 Thus, almost all activities and programs not
funded by the federal government could freely discriminate on the
basis of disability. In the 1970s and 1980s, the absence of any
federal statutory prohibition on such discrimination outside the
federal sphere led advocates to-propose amendments to other titles
of the civil rights laws. s8
C. Proposaland Passage of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct
Attempts to amend the 1964 Civil Rights Act to include people
with disabilities continued periodically through the mid-1980s.8 9
Such efforts were opposed, privately at least, by traditional civil
rights groups who feared that opening up the 1964 statute to any
substantive amendments might also risk reopening the bill to weakening changes by opponents of civil rights, and thereby endanger
previous hard-fought legislative victories. In addition, it was not
clear that prior civil rights statutes were the best vehicle for addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities, in light
of some unique aspects of discrimination on the basis of disability.
In 1983 the United States Commission on Civil Rights observed
that, while most disability rights laws were explicitly modeled on
prior civil rights statutes and are part of "the general corpus of
discrimination law," 90 "[h]andicap discrimination and, as a result,
1742 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1984).
IsInitial efforts to amend titles of prior civil rights laws included Representative Charles
Vanik's attempts to amend title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit discrimination
on the basis of "physical or mental handicap." H.R. 12154, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., 117 CONG.
REc. 45945 (1971). In 1972 Representative Vanik introduced a bill to amend title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit discrimination because of "physical or mental handicap"
in employment, unless such discrimination was necessitated as a bona fide occupational
qualification. 118 CONG. REC. H9712 (daily ed. 1972).
89See,

e.g., H.R. 370, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).

90U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL

RIGHTS,

supra note 15, at 48 (quoting New York State

Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 621 F.2d 644, 649 (2d Cir. 1979)); see also Cook v.
Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 502 F. Supp. 494, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Note, Mending the
RehabilitationAct of 1973, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 719 (1982).
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its remedies differ in important ways from other types of discrimination and their remedies." 91 One federal judge put it more
bluntly:
[T]he Title VI and Title IX models were not automatically
adaptable to the problem of discrimination against the
handicapped, but involved a very different undertaking.
Indeed, attempting to fit the problem of discrimination against the handicapped into the model remedy for
race discrimination is akin to fitting a square peg into a
round hole .... 92
Problems involved in trying to transfer principles and legal
analysis developed in race and sex discrimination cases wholesale
to disability discrimination were interwoven with other difficulties
and shortcomings of disability nondiscrimination statutes prior
to the ADA. Experience with the application of such prior
statutes, including section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
uncovered or highlighted weaknesses of such laws arising
from their statutory language, 93 the limited extent of their

9' U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 149. The Commission rec-

ommended that legal theories, principles and precedents of traditional civil rights law should
be applied to disability discrimination cases "only when, and to the degree that, they are
equally relevant." Id. at 163.
92Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 206 (D.N.H. 1981). In 1986, the National Council
on the Handicapped outlined some of the problems raised by attempting a straightforward
application oflegal standards from other laws to the disability context. Among the problems
it discussed were that analysis under traditional civil rights standards would not account
for some of the key concepts necessary to redress discrimination against individuals with
disabilities-individualized "reasonable accommodations;" the removal of architectural,
transportation, and communication barriers in buildings and other facilities; and differences
in standards applicable to qualification standards and statistical disparities. NATIONAL
COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1986, supra note 15, at A-35 to A-39. These concepts
appear in the ADA and will be discussed below.
93Section 504 and its progeny prohibit discrimination only if it is "solely by reason of
handicap." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973). This language suggests that discrimination is permissible
so long as it is coupled with some other motivation. The National Council on the Handicapped has observed that "[ihe goal of such laws would most appropriately seem to be to
eliminate from the decision-making process discrimination against persons with disabilities,
not to eliminate such discrimination only when it is found in a pristine, isolated, unadulterated form." NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1986, supra note 15, at A-19.
Commentators have suggested that this problem may be avoided to some degree by interpreting "solely by reason of" as meaning "but for." TUCKER & GOLDSTEIN, LEGAL RIGHTS
OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 6:2 (1991), citing Mt. Healthy City School District Board

of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). Cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 (1989). Ross v. Beaumont, 687 F. Supp. 1115 (E.D. Mich. 1988) was a mixed motive
case. The court held that the plaintiff's abusive conduct was "a more significant factor"
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coverage, 94 inadequate enforcement mechanisms, 95 and erratic
judicial interpretations. 96 Legal commentators have extensively
described and lamented the flaws in the wording, interpretation,
and implementation of federal disability nondiscrimination statutes
prior to the ADA. 97
than her narcolepsy in her being discharged from employment. Id. at 1118. The ADA avoids
this issue by not including the "solely by reason of" wording.
Another problem with the language of disability nondiscrimination statutes is the
concept that protection is afforded only to "otherwise qualified individuals with handicaps."
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973). Difficulties raised by this formulation, including intermingling the
issue of discriminatory qualification standards with the issue of coverage, and establishing
a protected class (creating serious preliminary evidentiary burdens for victims of alleged
discrimination), are inherent in the language of titles I and II of the ADA, and will be
discussed infra notes 154-164.
Other problems with the statutory language of prior federal disability rights laws involve
their brevity and omissions. Such matters as reasonable accommodation, discriminatory
qualification standards, removal of architectural, transportation and communication barriers, mentioned supra note 92, generally had no statutory basis in disability rights law
prior to the ADA, and were therefore left to regulations and court decisions to establish
and interpret. One exception was the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, which
established compliance with certain accessibility standards as an element of a broad obligation not to discriminate on the basis of disability, and was the first federal disability rights
law to incorporate in statutory language an obligation to make "reasonable accommodations" for individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(3)(C) and 3604 (f)(3)(B) (1988).
94 The focus of these statutes was upon: (a) "programs and activities" conducted by
federal executive agencies, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973); (b) "programs and activities" receiving
federal financial assistance, id.; and (c) employment under contracts with the federal
government, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1973). Problems with a restrictive interpretation of "programs
and activities" by the Supreme Court in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984),
were largely ameliorated by enactment of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub.
L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified in relevant part at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1989 Supp.)).
But the more basic problem remained-that aspects of society without federal governmental
involvement, including public accommodations, private employers, and state and local
governments, were not covered by these laws.
95E.g., a major problem with § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1973),
which covers employment under federal contracts, is that it is not enforceable in court.
Numerous decisions have ruled that the statute creates no private right of action for victims
of discrimination. E.g., Hodges v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 728 F.2d 414
(10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 822 (1984); Ernst v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co.,
Inc., 717 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 (1984).
96 An example is the Supreme Court's struggle with disability nondiscrimination concepts in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410-13 (1979), discussed
in more detail in the text accompanying note 154, infra. The Court became entangled in an
unenlightened attempt to distinguish between "evenhanded treatment" and what it termed
"affirmative efforts to overcome the disabilities caused by handicaps," and to figure out
where reasonable accommodation fit in regard to this distinction. Id. Revealingly, the
Court's opinion in Davis discusses accommodation as an affirmative action requirement
and then, two pages later, describes it as a nondiscrimination requirement. Id. at 411, 413.
Eventually, the Court issued a retraction of its analytic confusion in Davis. In Alexander
v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), the Court clarified that reasonable accommodation was a
nondiscrimination, not an affirmative action, obligation, and acknowledged that its analysis
in Davis had "been severely criticized." Id. at 300-01 n.20. If the high court has had some
trouble figuring out how to apply broadly worded nondiscrimination mandates, the lower
courts have often fared at least as poorly.
91E.g., Janet Flaccus, DiscriminationLegislationfor the Handicapped:Much Ferment
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The first proposal in the legal literature of a comprehensive
federal statute prohibiting discrimination against people with disabilities other than by simply adding "handicap" to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 appears to have been in a 1984 article 98 by this author
and Mr. Christopher Bell. 99 This article presented a "statutory
blueprint" for the future drafting of such a law, describing the
proposed legislation in some detail. It recommended broadening
the scope of anti-discrimination laws:
To date, laws prohibiting discrimination against handicapped people have applied only to federal agencies and
recipients of federal grants, contracts, and other forms of
federal assistance. Discrimination against handicapped
persons should be prohibited in all the contexts where
Congress has seen fit to outlaw other forms of discrimination. Congress should invoke its interstate commerce
authority to expand the coverage of handicap discrimination laws to all entities that affect interstate
commerce. 100

Subsequent recommendations in Toward Independence described
in relatively great detail what such a statute should include.' 0 ' The
National Council on the Handicapped even suggested a name for
the statute it was proposing-the Americans with Disabilities

Act. 0

2

and Erosion of Coverage, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 81 (1986); Janet Flaccus, HandicapDiscrimination Legislation: With Such Inadequate Coverage at the Federal Level, Can State

Legislation Be of Any Help? 40 ARK. L. REV. 261 (1986); Wegner, supra note 23; Note,

Accommodating the Handicapped:The Meaning of Discrimination under Section 504 of
the RehabilitationAct, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 881 (1980); Note, Employment Discrimination
Against the Handicappedand Section 504 of the RehabilitationAct: An Essay on Legal
Evasiveness, 97 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1984); Note, Mending the RehabilitationAct of 1973,
supra note 90; U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 102-40.

In an Appendix to Toward Independence, its 1986 report to the President and Congress,
the National Council on the Handicapped devoted some 34 pages to describing the deficiencies of existing civil rights measures for people with disabilities, including problems
with their scope of coverage, wording, interpretation, and enforcement. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1986, supra note 15, at A-6 to A-39.
93Robert Burgdorf & Christopher Bell, Eliminating DiscriminationAgainst Physically
and Mentally Handicapped Persons: A Statutory Blueprint, 8 MENTAL AND PHYSICAL
DISABILITY LAW REPORTER 64 (1984).

99Special Assistant, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
,00Id. at 71.

101NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED,

,02Id. at 18.

1986, supra note 15, at 19-21.
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Toward Independence was received with considerable excitement in the disability community and drew warm responses from
the President and members of Congress. However, the proposal
for an Americans with Disabilities Act did not result in any prompt
legislative response. Impatience with Congressional inaction on
this issue led the council to take the unusual step of publishing its
own draft bill in the Council's statutorily mandated 1988 followup report, On the Threshold of Independence.10 3 After the bills
were introduced in the House't 4 and Senate, 10 5 joint Congressional
hearings on the bills were held on September 27, 1988, but the
100th Congress expired without either house of Congress having
taken action on the proposed legislation.
A revised ADA bill was introduced in the 101st Congress on
May 9, 1989.106 A substitute bill, reflecting certain compromises
and clarifications, was reported unanimously by the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, on August 2, 1989.107 The

bill was subsequently reported out with some amendments by the
three other House committees to which it was assigned-the Committee on Public Works and Transportation,10 8 the Committee on
Energy and Commerce,10 9 and the Committee on the Judiciary.110
On May 22, 1990, the bill passed the House by a vote of 403 to
20.111 After differences between the House and Senate versions of
the ADA were worked out in two different conferences on the
bill,112 the House approved the final version of the bill by a vote
103
NATIONAL
104See

COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1988, supra note 11, at 27-39 (1988).
H.R. 4498, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. E1307 (daily ed. Apr. 29,

1988).
,o5 See S. 2345, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S5110 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1988).
106S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S4978 (daily ed. May 9, 1989); H.R.

2273, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H1690 (daily ed. May 9, 1989).
107See S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989). The changes made in the
substitute bill are discussed at 135 CONG. REC. S10701-23, 10732-63 (daily ed. Sept. 7,

1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
103The bill was reported out of the committee favorably by a vote of 40 to 3 on March

13, 1990. See H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 4, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1990).
109The bill was reported out of the committee favorably by a vote of 45 to 5 on April
3, 1990. See H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 1, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 52, 46 (1990).
1,0 The bill was reported out of the committee favorably by a vote of 32 to 3 on May
2, 1990. See H.R. REp. No. 485, pt. 3, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1990).
M 136 CONG RHC. H2638 (daily ed. May 22, 1990).
112H.R. CONF. REP. No. 558, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 569,

101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). Two major sticking points prevented easy reconciliation of
the differences between the Senate and House versions. The first was that the Senate bill
made the ADA applicable to the Congress in the same way, with the same rights and
remedies, as it applied to other entities covered by the Act, while the House bill authorized

the House and the instrumentalities of Congress to choose their own internal mechanisms
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of 377 to 28 on July 12, 1990,113 and the Senate followed suit on
July 13, 1990, by the lopsided margin of 91 to 6.114
II. Analysis of the Americans with Disabilities Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 is captioned "An
Act to establish a clear and comprehensive prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability.""' 5 The Act is composed of five
titles: I-Employment; II-Public Services; III-Public Accommodations and Services Operated by Private Entities; IV-Telecommunications Relay Services; V-Miscellaneous Provisions.
The substantive titles are preceded by preliminary sections providing the short title of the Act, a table of contents, Congressional
6
findings and purposes, and certain definitions."
A. Findings and Purposes

The findings section reports that 43 million Americans live
7 Congress notes that discrimination
with one or more disabilities. 11
for enforcement of the Act's requirements in regard to their activities. Compare S. 933,
amend. 720, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S10780 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) with
H.R. 2273, § 509, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. H2652-53 (daily ed. May 22,
1990). The resolution of this dispute, in favor of internal administrative mechanisms, is
discussed infra notes 483-484 and accompanying text.
The second disagreement, which proved very difficult to resolve, centered on what
became known as the "food handlers' amendment," which had been offered by Representative Jim Chapman and adopted by the House durinj floor consideration of the bill. H.R.
2273, amend. 5, 101st Cong., 136 CONG. REC. H2478 (daily ed. May 17, 1990). This provision
would have allowed employers to transfer employees with HIV infection from food handling
positions so long as the transfer entailed no loss of pay or benefits. Id. The Senate bill had
no comparable provision, but the Senate approved a motion by Senator Helms directing
the Senate conferees to accept the foodhandlers' amendment. 136 CONG. REc. 57436, 7449
(daily ed. June 6, 1990). The Senate conferees viewed this motion as purely advisory,
refused to abide by its instruction, and convinced the House conferees to delete the
foodhandlers' amendment. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 558, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1990).
Eventually, after several procedural maneuvers had produced an impasse in the Senate,
Senator Hatch offered an amendment under which the application of the foodhandling
provision was limited to conditions appearing upon a list, to be published by the Department

of Health and Human Services, of diseases that can be transmitted by handling food. 136
CONG. REC. S9532 (daily ed. July 11, 1990). This proposal was adopted by a vote of 99 to
I in the Senate, and then adopted by the conference committee. 136 CONG. REC. S9556
(daily ed. July 11, 1990); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 569, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1990).
1,3136 CONG. REC. H4629 (daily ed. July 12, 1990).

"4 136 CONG. REC. S9695 (daily ed. July 13, 1990).
1"'42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
11642 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-102 (West Supp. 1990).
,,7
The versions of the bill introduced in 1988 quoted a figure of 36 million, based upon
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against persons with disabilities Continues to be a serious and
pervasive problem."l8 The findings catalogue some of the major
forms of such discrimination-"outright intentional exclusion, the
discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to
make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation

to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other
opportunities." ' 19 When faced with such discrimination, people

with disabilities "have often had no legal recourse to redress" it,
a situation that Congress finds to be in contrast with "individuals
who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color,
120
'
sex, national origin, religion, or age.
Regarding overall social standing, Congress declares that people with disabilities "occupy an inferior status" and are "severely
the National Council on the Handicapped's conclusion that this was "the most commonly
quoted estimate." NATIONAL COUNCIL ON TIE HANDICAPPED, 1986, supra note 15, at 3.
The Council's report discusses the variations in estimates and the difficulty in arriving at
a single, reliable overall number of individuals with disabilities. Id. at 3-4. See S. 2345,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., DIGEST OF DATA

ON PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 5 (1984). The 43 million figure was not presented by its

source as a number of persons with disabilities, but rather as a figure representing the
number of persons with impairments or chronic conditions. The author has elsewhere
discussed the dubious derivation of this figure, along with his reasons for concluding that
it is nonetheless a useful, rough estimate. See Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., Changes in the Workforce, Changes in the Workplace: Employment Policy and People with Disabilities, 2-3
1990) (monograph to be published by the National Commission for Employment Policy).
118The specific language of the findings provides that:
(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem;
(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas
as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to
public services.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1990).
"9 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(5) (West Supp. 1990).
M42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(4) (West Supp. 1990). The 1988 version of the bill included
a statement that the bill intended "to provide a prohibition of discrimination against persons
with disabilities parallel in scope of coverage with that afforded to persons on the basis of
race, sex, national origin, and religion." S.2345, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC.
S5110 (daily ed. April 28, 1988); H.R. 4498, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. E1307
(daily ed. April 29, 1988). When the bill was revised so that coverage of public accommodations, telecommunications relay services, and the Congress differed from other civil
rights statutes, the "parallelism" purpose was deleted, and the present finding was
substituted.
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disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally," as documented by "census data, national polls, and other
studies.' 1 21 A related finding, whose cumbersome wording is the
result of language drawn from several different Supreme Court
decisions, is that:
individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics
that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative
of the individual ability of such individuals to participate
in, and contribute to, society ....

122

This wording is an amalgam of phrases used by the Court to denote
the qualifications of a constitutionally "suspect" classification for
equal protection purposes. 2 3 The finding is, in effect, a Congressional endorsement of the idea that classifications which disadvantage people with disabilities should be subjected to heightened
judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause. This contention
has been made by some disability advocates' 24 and accepted by a

few lower courts, 25 but it was rejected by the Supreme Court, at
least in regard to individuals with mental retardation, in City of

12142 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(6) (West Supp. 1990). Census data regarding people with
disabilities, and the problems with and limitations upon such data, are discussed in NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1986, supra note 15, at 3-5. The "national polls"
reference is primarily to polls conducted by Louis Harris and Associates. See supra note
11.
11 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(7) (West Supp. 1990).
123See, e.g., U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 311, 372 (1971); Webber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S.
164, 175 (1972); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4-18 (1973);
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).

124See supra note 73.
125The Supreme Court

of North Dakota ruled that handicapped children were a suspect
class. See In Interest of G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441, 447-48 (N.D. 1974). Several other courts
have indicated their willingness to make such a finding upon an appropriate showing. See,
e.g., Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 958-59 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Lora v. Board of
Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1275 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). In Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp.
832, 835-36 (E.D. Pa. 1976), the court applied the moderate or mid-level scrutiny test of
equal protection, as did the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984), rev'd in part, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.126 While far from a direct
statutory reversal of the Court's rejection of heightened scrutiny
in Cleburne, this Congressional finding may be useful to plaintiffs
with disabilities who are seeking to invoke heightened equal protection scrutiny in future litigation.
The statutory findings also include a statement that "the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to
assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals .

,"127 In

previous federal legislation regarding individuals with disabilities,
these four concepts have evolved as goals of the national policy
towards Americans with disabilities. Each of the phrases has its
own history and significance.128 The inclusion of this finding establishes these concepts as guiding stars to illuminate the interpretation of the Act's provisions.
The final finding posits an economic rationale for the Act by
declaring that discrimination and prejudice against people with
disabilities "costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity."' 29 As the ADA bill moved forward, the long-term economic
benefits of eliminating discrimination on the basis of disability were
propounded on behalf of the bill by President Bush, Attorney
General Thornburgh, and others.130
The purposes section of the Act is concise and straightforward. The first two stated purposes paraphrase the language of
the original proposal of the National Council on the Handicapped:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;

473 U.S. 432 (1985).
N 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(8) (West Supp. 1990).

126

'2 See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 67-69, 82-83 (full
participation); id. at 83-84 (independent living); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1986, supra note 15, at 7-9 (equality of opportunity and independence); id. at 2,
12-13, 22, 27 (economic self-sufficiency); 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988) (equal opportunity and
independent living); Matter of Richard M., 110 Misc. 2d 1031, 443 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1981)
(self-sufficiency); Note, Accommodating the Handicapped:The Meaning of Discrimination
Under Section 504 of the RehabilitationAct, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 898-99 (1980) (full
participation).
'2 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(9) (West Supp. 1990).
110See S. REp. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1989).
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(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
131
disabilities;
The third "purpose" simply declares a Congressional intent that
the federal government play "a central role" in enforcing the re32
quirements of the Act.'
The last stated purpose describes the sources of authority
provided in the Constitution which Congress exercised in enacting
the statute. The subsection declares that Congress is "invok[ing]
the sweep of congressional authority," but adds that this authority
includes its powers to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to
regulate commerce. 33 These are the two principal founts of
congressional power that have been used to enact previous federal
nondiscrimination laws.
Section five of the fourteenth amendment gives Congress
power to enact "appropriate legislation" to enforce the amendment's provisions. Section five has been interpreted as an expansive grant of authority, that provides Congress "the same broad
powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause."'13 4 The
Supreme Court has written that the exercise of section five power
is appropriate if a statute "may be regarded as an enactment to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause .... ",135 The Court has
indicated that the existence of congressional authority to regulate
under section five does not depend upon whether the judiciary
would find a denial of equal protection to exist in the absence of
legislation. Rather, the judgment that a particular measure is an
appropriate way of implementing fourteenth amendment guarantees is constitutionally delegated to Congress.136 Further, the Court
has observed that to uphold a statute as an exercise of section five
authority, the Court must "be able to discern some legislative
purpose or factual predicate that supports the exercise of that
13142 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b) (West Supp. 1990); cf. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1986, supra note 15, at 18-19.
13242 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(3) (West Supp. 1990).
13342 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (West Supp. 1990).
"3 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966) (citing US. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.

18).

135
Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651 (upholding sections of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
as a valid exercise of congressional authority under section five of the fourteenth
amendment).
136Id. at 653.
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power. 137 Title II of the ADA expressly regulates the activities of
state and local governments; such activity constitutes state action
and thus clearly falls within the scope of congressional authority
to enact legislation that Congress deems appropriate to implement
138
the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment.
Congress' power over interstate commerce also provides
strong support for congressional authority to enact the ADA. Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution gives Congress power
to "regulate commerce ...among the several States. 1

39

Since the

New Deal, this provision has been an extremely expansive source
of Congressional authority, particularly in regard to laws prohibiting various types of discrimination. 140 The modern test applied
137EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983). The Court upheld the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 as an exercise of the interstate commerce power.
In dicta the Court described the appropriate standards when section five had been proffered
as an alternative source of authority for the statutes at issue: "That does not mean, however,
that Congress need anywhere recite the words 'section 5' or 'Fourteenth Amendment' or
'equal protection,' . . . for '[t]he ... constitutionality of action taken by Congress does
not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise."' Id. at 243-44 n.18
(quoting Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948)). The ADA explicitly
telies upon section five. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (West Supp. 1990).
118
One constitutional commentator has written: "Congress, in the field of state activities and except as confined by the Bill of Rights, has the power to enact any law which
may be viewed as a measure for correction of any condition which Congress might believe
involves a denial of equality or other fourteenth amendment rights." Archibald Cox, ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Promotionof Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 107
(1966). He adds that "the Court has long been committed both to the presumption that
facts exist which sustain congressional legislation and also to deference to congressional
judgment about questions of degree and proportion." Id. at 107.
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 3.
In remarks during House consideration of the bill, House sponsor Steny Hoyer asserted
that the exercise of commerce authority by the Congress was clearly justified:

The extensive hearings on the ADA amply demonstrate how discrimination against
persons with disabilities has made it difficult for them to participate in the commercial life of this country. The Harris polls, cited in a number of the committee
hearings, set forth clearly the myriad of ways that people with disabilities have
been precluded, through various forms of discrimination, from using public accommodations, from traveling, and from gaining employment.
136 CONG. REC. E1913-14 (daily ed., June 13, 1990).
,40
See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(upholding title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to public accommodations as
valid exercise of commerce clause authority); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)
(upholding title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to restaurants as valid exercise
of commerce clause authority); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (extending the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act as applied to state and local governments as valid
exercise of commerce clause authority). See also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
118 (1941) (includes intrastate activities which so affect interstate commerce as to make
regulation appropriate); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125-29 (1942) (extends to local
activity even if its effects are trivial, if, together with others similarly situated, the effect
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by courts to determine whether a particular legislative provision
is a valid exercise of commerce authority was summarized in
Hodel v. Indiana.14 1 The Court declared: "A Court may invalidate
legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is clear
that there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that the
regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is no
reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and
1 42
the asserted ends."'
Each of the pertinent provisions of the ADA regulates only
employers that are "in an industry that affects commerce,' 143 facilities "whose operations affect commerce,"' 144 and public accommodations "if the operations of such entity affect commerce.1145
By definition, therefore, the requirements of titles I and III of the
ADA apply only to activities that affect commerce. Federal statutory authority is therefore clearly linked with constitutional authority and precedent.
Even if the words of the statute did not provide such a clear
linkage to the effects upon commerce, Congressional findings in
the ADA provide ample support for the connection between the
regulated activities and effect upon interstate commerce. The findings regarding the economic effects of discrimination against people with disabilities, taken with the testimony of witnesses and
other evidence of the impact on commerce of such
discrimination 46 appears greatly to exceed that which was held
sufficient to establish a sufficient "nexus" with commerce in prior
cases. 147
on interstate commerce is substantial); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981) (requiring courts to defer to any rational congressional
finding that commerce is affected).
141452 U.S. 314 (1981) (upholding provisions of Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 as valid exercise of commerce clause authority despite fact that the
Act protected only .006% of prime farmland).
142Id. at 323-24.
14342

U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(A) (West Supp. 1990) (defining "employer" for purposes of

title I of the ADA). This language is patterned upon title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
'4442 U.S.C.A. § 12181(2) (West Supp. 1990) (defining "commercial facilities" for the

purposes of title I of the ADA).
'45

42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (West Supp. 1990) (defining "public accommodation" for the

purposes of title III of the ADA). This language is based upon title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1988).

46See S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 9-18 (1989); H. REP. No. 485, pt.
2, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 28-47 (1990).
147See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252 (1964) see also supra notes 140-142 and accompanying
text.
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B. Who Is Protected?

1. Approach

While it is common to speak of "protected classes" under civil
rights laws, such statutes generally protect all individuals from
discrimination on the grounds prohibited, whether it be age, race,
sex, religion, or national origin.1 48 Disability nondiscrimination
laws, in contrast, have historically protected only a particular class
of persons-individuals with disabilities. Some authorities, including the United States Commission on Civil Rights, have argued
that the concepts of disabilities and handicaps are largely socially
determined and that virtually everyone is "handicapped" for one
149
purpose or another.
Nevertheless, federal laws have generally assumed that a distinct class of disabilities or handicapping conditions exists, and
have targeted individuals with such conditions as the principal
14s42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-07. See, e.g., 18 C.F.R. § 1039.1, where "age" is defined to
include any chronological age. An exception to the general rule is provided by the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, whose application is limited to persons who have
attained at least 40 years of age. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). Prior to 1986, the Act applied to
individuals who were at least 40 but less than 70 years of age; Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100
Stat. 3342 (1986) eliminated the upper age limit, with exceptions for mandatory retirement
of certain executives, high polibymakers and employees of institutions of higher education
having unlimited tenure. 29 U.S.C. § 631(c) & (d).
"o See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 89-97. The Commission
argued that the underlying reality is actually that different individuals have infinitely varied
abilities ranging across a "spectrum of abilities" for various physical and mental functions,
and that the significance of such differing traits is largely determined by the social context
and degree of accommodation. Id. at 87-89, 91-93. A federal district court judge observed:

Most citizens would be handicapped in playing baseball as compared to Carl
Yastrzemski, in singing as compared to Beverly Sills, in abstract thinking as
compared to Albert Einstein, and in the development of a sense of humor as
compared to Woody Allen. Human talent takes many forms and within each talent
is a continuum of achievement. While one individual might be on the high end of
the scale of achievement in one area, that same individual might rank very low in
another area. Woody Allen will probably never win the Triple Crown, and Carl
Yastrzemski is not likely to perform "Aida." In sum, the identification of various
graduations of handicap is not an easy task, especially if such is attempted in a
vacuum. Assessing the capabilities of various individuals to perform without
knowledge of the particular task under consideration and its various requirements,
or without an individualized determination of their strengths and weaknesses
would appear to be impossible.
Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 206 (D.N.H. 1981), aff'd, 697 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1983).
See also E.E. Black Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1100 (D. Haw. 1980).
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beneficiaries of federal services, benefits, and protection. 50 Before
the ADA, federal statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of disability have followed one of two basic approaches. Some
simply prohibit discrimination "on the basis of" or "on grounds
of" a disability. 15' Others, primarily section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 152 and statutes patterned on it,'5 3 prohibit discrimination
"on the basis of" disability but expressly limit such protection to
otherwise qualified persons with disabilities.
The somewhat circular section 504 approach, therefore, creates a protected class of individuals who must prove that they are
"otherwise qualified individuals with handicaps." Arguably, the
notion of otherwise qualified should be subsumed in the question
of discrimination on the basis of disability: if an individual is denied
an opportunity because of a failure to meet qualifications standards, then that individual is not being disadvantaged on the basis
of disability, but rather because of a failure to meet applicable job
standards. In contrast, other types of civil rights laws do not
require establishing membership in a protected class. These statutes focus on the discriminatory acts that occur, not the qualities
of the person discriminated against.
Under the section 504 formulation, statutory coverage is intermingled with the substantive issue of whether discrimination
actually occurred. A lawsuit may proceed through various stages
of litigation and appeals centering on issues of discrimination,
qualifications standards, and the extent to which a disability inter15oFederal vocational rehabilitation services, for example, are provided to eligible
"individuals with handicaps." 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(A) (1988). Educational rights under the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act are provided to "handicapped children." 20
U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) (1988). Under the Developmental Disabilities and Bill of Rights Act,
federally funded services are provided to "persons with developmental disabilities." 42
U.S.C. § 6001(5) (1988). The protections of the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and
Handicapped Act are available to "handicapped individuals" and "handicapped voters." 42
U.S.C. § 1973ee (1988).
151See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 3905(b)(1) (1988) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
"handicapping condition" in the Foreign Service); 15 U.S.C. § 3151(a) (1988) (prohibiting
discrimination on the ground of handicap in any program or activity funded under the Full
Employment and Balanced Growth Act); 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(4) (1988) (prohibiting labor
organizations representing federal employees from discriminating on the basis of handicapping condition); 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)-(2) (1988) (prohibiting discrimination because of a
handicap in the sale or rental of housing).
152 29 U.S.C. § 7949(a) (1988) (prohibiting recipients of federal financial assistance and
federal agencies from discriminating on the basis of handicap against otherwise qualified
indiwiduals with handicaps).
153 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1374(c)(1) (1988) (prohibiting air carriers from discriminating
against any otherwise qualified handicapped individual by reason of such handicap).
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feres with job or program performance, only to culminate in a
finding that the complainant was not covered by section 504.
The Supreme Court's decision in Southeastern Community
College v. Davis1 54 demonstrates this problem. In Davis, a woman
with a serious hearing disability had been excluded from a clinical
registered nurse training program. The Court concluded that there
were no modifications that the college could reasonably make in
its program to enable Ms. Davis to participate successfully in the
program. 155 The logical conclusion, therefore, should have been
that Ms. Davis was not unfairly discriminated against. But, because of the way that Section 504 is worded, the Court concluded
that Davis was not an "otherwise qualified handicapped individ56
ual," and section 504 did not cover her.1
To establish a prima facie case under section 504, a complainant must show that he or she satisfies the threshold requirement
of being an individual with a handicap. 57 Proving membership in
the statutory protected class is not necessarily a minor hurdle.
The National Council on the Handicapped has noted:
For persons who have spent many years of their lives
stressing their abilities rather than their limitations, and
who have strenuously objected to their being assigned
labels such as "handicapped," the need to prove that one
is a "handicapped individual" can be very undesirable.
Moreover, the showing that one is "handicapped" often
tends to depend upon a medical model of disability-the
necessary proof is often a doctor's certification that the
individual has a mental or physical handicap according to
medical standards. For many persons with disabilities,
this medical approach to disabilities is objectionable.1 58
The National Council concluded that future disability rights laws
should deviate from the section 504 model:
1- 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
155
Id. at 409-10.
,36
Id. at 406, 414.
17To establish a prima facie case under section 504, a plaintiff must also demonstrate

that the handicap substantially limits one or more major life activities, and that the plaintiff
is "otherwise qualified" to perform the job or participate in the activity in question. See
Note, Defining "Handicap"forPurposes of Employment Discrimination,30 ARMZ. L. REV.

633, 643 (1988).

158
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1986, supra note 15, at A-22 to A-23.
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Proof of class membership is not required under other
types of nondiscrimination laws, and statutes guaranteeing equal opportunity for persons with disabilities need
not have such a requirement either. Such laws should
focus upon a demonstration of discrimination "on the
basis of handicap" rather than requiring proof of mem159
bership in a protected class.
In formulating the concept of the ADA, the Council declared: "The
statute should straightforwardly prohibit 'discrimination on the
basis of handicap,' without establishing any eligibility classification
for the coverage of the statute.' 60 In the form in which it was
introduced in 1988, the ADA bill prohibited discrimination on the
basis of handicap, but did not create a protected class of individuals covered by the Act.
As enacted, the ADA follows both the section 504 and the
"on the basis of" models. The first two titles are variations on the
section 504 approach. Title I prohibits employment discrimination
"against a qualified individual with a disability because of the
disability of such individual,"' 6' and title II prohibits discrimination
by a public entity against a "qualified individual with a disability"
if the discrimination is "by reason of such disability."'' 62 In contrast,
title III, the public accommodations title, simply provides that
"[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of
disability .... "163 The legislative history of the Act offers little
explanation for the divergent approaches in the different titles,
except for the fact that different titles vary in their relation to the
section 504 model. Title I adopts the section 504 model for many
provisions, but varies from it to some degree, particularly in adding
a greater level of specificity. According to the Senate Committee
report, title II of the Act was largely an attempt to apply the
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of disability set out
in the section 504 regulations to all programs, activities, and ser-

159Id. at
0

1

A-25.

Id. at 19.

16142
16242

U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West Supp. 1990).

U.S.C.A. § 12132 (West Supp. 1990) (tracking Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973). Section 12132's language proscribes exclusion, denial of benefits and discrimination. Id.
16 42 U.S.C.A § 12182(a) (West Supp. 1990).
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vices of state and local governments. 164 The language of this title
appears to be the most completely tied into the wording of section
504. Title III of the Act varies most from section 504 in its structure
and wording (except for title IV [telecommunications] which is not
worded as a nondiscrimination provision at all). Title III is in many
ways the most innovative of the first three titles, and the least
bound to the approaches and wording of section 504.
2. Definition of Disability
Differences in the wording of the nondiscrimination requirement notwithstanding, the various titles of the Act operate under
a single definition of "disability":
The term "disability" means, with respect to an
individual(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 165
The Senate Committee report noted that this definition is "comparable to the definition of the term 'individual with handicaps' in
section 7(8)(B) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and section 802(h)
of the Fair Housing Act. ' 166 Further, the Committee noted its
intent that regulations and analysis of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (DHEW) under section 504 and the Department of Housing and Urban Development under the Housing
Act should apply to the definition of the term "disability."' 1 67
Since the tripartite definition was first enacted in 1974, each
of the three prongs of the statutory definition has been the subject
of considerable regulatory and judicial analysis under the Reha16
'6

S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1989).
42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West Supp. 1990).

16 S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1989); H. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, 50 (1990); H. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 51 (1990); H. REP.

No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, 28 (1990).
167 Id.
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bilitation Act.1 68 The first prong has two elements-a physical or
mental impairment, and a requirement that the impairment must
limit one or more major life activities. The DHEW regulations
expanded upon the notion of physical or mental impairment by
defining physical impairment to mean a "physiological disorder or
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss" affecting
any of a list of body systems, 169 and defining a mental impairment
to be "any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and
specific learning disabilities.' 170 The ADA bills in the 100th Congress incorporated these definitions of physical impairment and
mental impairment into the proposed statutory language. 17' This
inclusion was deleted from the bills introduced in the 101st Congress, apparently simply in the interest of brevity. The ADA Committee reports recite the same language verbatim as the Committees' understanding of the meaning of the terms "physical or
' 72
mental impairment."'
When originally published, an appendix providing an "Anal173
ysis of Final Regulation" accompanied the DHEW regulations.
The analysis of the definition of physical or mental impairment
noted that it would not be feasible to provide a list of all the
specific conditions and diseases included in the definition, but did
provide a list of some conditions included. 74 The ADA Committee
reports repeated the identical list of conditions, with one addition-infection with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
("HIV"). 75 The Committee noted that "[t]he term 'physical or
168 See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988). Prior to
the 1974 amendment which established a new definition under titles IV and V, the Rehabilitation Act had a single definition phrased in terms of employability and ability to benefit
from vocational rehabilitation services. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(A) (1988).
69 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A) (1990). These systems include the neurological, musculoskeletal, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive,
genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, and endocrine systems as well as the skin and one's
special sense organs. Id.
170 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(B) (1990).
171 See S. 2345, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. S5110 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1988).
172 S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 22 (1989).
1742 Fed. Reg. 22685-94 (May 4, 1977).
'74Id. at 22685. These conditions include orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing
impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart
disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, drug addiction and alcoholism. Id.
,75
S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 22 (1989). H. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, 51 (1990); H. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, 28 (1990).
Although the issue was initially not without some controversy, most courts have agreed
that presence of HIV constitutes a handicap under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
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mental impairment' does not include simple physical characteristics, such as blue eyes or black hair. ' 176 They also concurred with
the DHEW Analysis that several particular attributes-age, homosexuality, having a prison record, and environmental, cultural, and
economic disadvantages-do not constitute a disability.177
The second element of the impairment prong of the statutory
definition of disability is that the impairment must substantially

limit one or more major life activities. The section 504 regulations
defined "major life activities" to mean "functions such as caring
for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working. 1' 78 The ADA Committee reports expressly endorse this definition.1 79 As a rationale
for the major life activity limitation, the Committee reports describe the need to clarify that "disability" does not include "minor,

trivial impairments, such as a simple infected finger.' 180 It should
be noted, however, that the DHEW analysis of the section 504
regulations expressly rejected suggestions that only "traditional"
disabilities were included and that the scope of the definition
should be limited to "severe, permanent, or progressive conditions.1 18' Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated that the mere
fact that an individual has been hospitalized for a condition is
''more than sufficient" to establish that the condition substantially
82
limits major life activities.

Chalk v. District Court of Central District of California, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988); AFGE
Local 1812 v. State Dept., 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987); Thomas v. Atascadero Universal
School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987); District 27 Community School v. Board
of Education, 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S. 2d 325, 336 (N.Y. Sup. 1986); Doe v. Dalton
Elementary School Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (preliminary
injunction) (AIDS-related complex); Ray v. School Dist. of DeSoto County, 666 F. Supp.
1524, 1536 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (preliminary injunction). In Baxter v. City of Bellevue, 720 F.
Supp. 720, 729-30 (S.D. Ill. 1989), HIV-positivity was held to be a "handicap" under the
Fair Housing Amendments Act. The ADA committee reports declare explicitly that infection with HIV is a disability. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1989); H. REP.
No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, 28 (1990).
176 Id. at 22. Under section 504, left-handedness has been ruled not to constitute a
"handicap." De la Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir. 1986).
1nS. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989); H. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, 51-52 (1990); H. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, 28 (1990).
,78
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1990).
,79
S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989); H. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, 52 (1990); H. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 28 (1990).
'1 S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1990); H. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, 52 (1990).
181
42 Fed. Reg. 22685-86 (May 4, 1977).
,82
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987).
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The necessity for a major life activity limitation is not selfevident. Indeed, such a limit was not included in either the original
ADA bill proposed by the National Council on Disability or in the
ADA bills introduced in the previous Congress. Even with some
"traditional" disabilities, it may not be easy to show that a condition significantly limits a major life activity. Conditions such as
epilepsy, controlled by medication; diabetes, in which insulin treatment is progressing routinely; cancer, multiple sclerosis and other
conditions during periods of remission; cosmetic disfigurements
such as facial scars or deformities; lower-leg amputations where
the individual has a properly fitted prosthesis; and many other
conditions traditionally considered to be "disabilities" may not
have a substantial impact on performance of major life activities. 8 3
Thus the person alleging discrimination under the protected class
approach may be placed in a Catch-22 situation. 114 The first task
is to prove that he or she has a condition that is a serious limitation-it substantially limits one or more major life activities. If
that hurdle is cleared, then the individual must turn around and
prove that the condition is not really a serious limitation in the
context of the particular job or opportunity at issue, i.e., that she
or he is "qualified." Conversely, the employer that denies opportunities because of a physical or mental impairment may take a
position reminiscent of the Roman god Janus who had two faces
looking in opposite directions. Under section 504, an employer
can fire or deny a job to a person because of a physical or mental
impairment, and then fight the claim of a section 504 violation by
claiming that the impairment is not serious enough to constitute a

"8

The National Council on the Handicapped noted:

Conditions that do not inherently interfere with major life activities may become
serious "handicaps" because of employers' and agencies' reactions to them. Individuals have been denied employment and excluded from participation in programs and activities because of such conditions as glaucoma in an arrested state,
cancer of the uterus that has been successfully treated, minor degrees of back
impairment, a missing kidney, absence of a part of a finger, or double vision.
Many of these conditions do not of themselves entail a substantial limitation upon
major life activities, so a person with such a condition has a hard time meeting
the statutory definition for Section 504 protection. Yet they may have been excluded precisely because of discrimination against them on account of their
disabilities.
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, 1986, supra note 15, at A-24.
194Id.

at A-25.
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handicap.

85

The ADA should ameliorate such problems with the

concept of "major life activities" because of evidence that Congress intended that the denial of opportunities to an individual
because of a physical or mental impairment shall in itself qualify
186
as a substantial limitation on a major life activity.
The second prong of the definition of "disability" includes
individuals who have a record of an impairment, even though they
currently do not have such an impairment. The requisite "record"
may result either from a prior condition from which the individual
,81See, e.g., Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that an individual
fired from ajob explicitly because of acrophobia was not a handicapped individual); Jasany
v. U.S. Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that an individual who lost a
job as a result of mild strabismus (crossed eyes) was not a handicapped individual); Doe
v. New York University, 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981) (medical student denied readmission
because of psychiatric problems held to meet definition as one "regarded as having" a
handicap; inability to handle stresses of medical training constituted a substantial limitation
on major life activity); Doe v. Centinela Hospital, 57 U.S.L.W. 2034, No. CV87-2514 PAR
(C.D.Cal. 1988) (individual excluded from alcohol and drug treatment program because of
seropositivity to the AIDS virus held to be regarded as having an impairment affecting
major life activity of "learning"): Thornhill v. Marsh, 866 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989) (individual discharged from job because of erroneous interpretation of implications of spinal
deformity held to meet definition of individual with handicaps without showing impact
beyond particular position from which he was discharged).
'86S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1989); H. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, 53-54 (1990); H. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, 30-31 (1990).
This approach represents a Congressional rejection of court decisions that hold that exclusion from a particular job was not sufficient to establish a substantial limitation on the
major life activity of working. See, e.g., E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088,
1099-1100 (D. Haw. 1980) (holding that a back defect that interfered with an individual's
ability to be a carpenter was not a substantial limitation on a major life activity because it
did not affect his employability in general); Forrisi, 794 F.2d at 933; Jasany, 755 F.2d at
1249.
For a discussion of contrary precedents-New York University, Centinela Hospital,
and Thornhill-andthe endorsement by the ADA of the concept that exclusion of a person
from a job or activity because of an actual or perceived mental or physical impairment
establishes that the excluded individual has been "regarded as having" a disability, see
Robert Burgdorf, Legal Analysis, in BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT: A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE TO IMPACT, ENFORCEMENT,
AND COMPLIANCE

99-104 (1990).

Proposed regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission take the
harsh position that inability to perform a particular job does not constitute a substantial
limitation, and that "substantially limits" in the context of working requires a complainant
to show that he or she is restricted in ability to perform "either a class of jobs or a broad
range of jobs in various classes." 56 Fed. Reg. 8587 § 1630.2 (j)(3)(i). Where a worker has
been discharged from or refused employment expressly because of a physical or mental
impairment, it is inequitable to require that person to shoulder the burden of establishing
(presumably by expert testimony) that he or she would be unable to perform other jobs. A
fairer approach would accept showing that an employer has based a negative employment
decision upon an individual's physical or mental impairment as establishing a prima facie
case that the individual has been "regarded as having" a disability, and would estop an
employer who has taken a disability-based job action from contesting the substantiality of
the underlying actual or perceived impairment.
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has recovered or from an erroneous report that the individual has
or had such a condition that, in fact, he or she never had. To
illustrate the two categories, the Senate Committee report draws
upon the same examples presented in the DHEW analysis under
section 504. For history of impairment, the report includes histories of mental or emotional illness, heart disease or cancer; for
misclassification as having an impairment, it suggests a misclassification as mentally retarded.187 In School Board of Nassau County
v. Arline,188 the Supreme Court ruled that hospitalization of a
woman for tuberculosis twenty-one years prior was sufficient to
establish that she had "a record of . . . impairment" and was
entitled to protection from discrimination under section 504.189
The third prong of the definition of disability applies to a
person who is regarded as having an impairment. This prong includes individuals who may not have a condition included in the
first prong's delineation of physical or mental impairments that
substantially limits a major life activity, but who are treated by a
covered entity as having such an impairment. Under this branch
of the definition, a person may be protected even though he or she
has no physical or mental impairment. For example, this prong
covers situations where mistakes or rumors lead an employer or
place of public accommodation to the erroneous belief that a person has a mental illness, cancer or epilepsy. Alternatively, the
individual may have a physical or mental impairment, such as a
limp, facial scars or mild acrophobia, that does not substantially
affect any major life activity, but may be treated as if she or he
did have a seriously disabling condition. 90 The Senate Committee
report explains this third prong as addressing limitations upon
individuals that result primarily from "negative reactions," "myths
and fears," "misinformation" and "negative attitudes towards disability," rather than from any inherent impairment.' 9' As examples
of "stigmatic conditions" that frequently generate negative percep1s7 S.

REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1989). See also 42 Fed. Reg. 22686

(May 4, 1977).
1- 480 U.S. 273 (1987).

199Id. at 281. See also Mahoney v. Ortiz, 645 F. Supp. 22, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding
that a man with a surgically repaired shoulder had a record of impairment under section
504 because of his "history of dislocations").
190See S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1989); 42 Fed. Reg. 22686 (May
4, 1977).
,91S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1989) (quoting Arline, 480 U.S. at
283).
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tions and prejudices despite the absence of real limitations, the
report mentions severe burn victims, persons with controlled diabetes or epilepsy, individuals with back abnormalities, people who
wear hearing aids and persons whose cerebral palsy affects their
192
physical appearance.
3. Specific Exclusions
The ADA expressly excludes several conditions or attributes
from the definition of "disability." These resulted from last-minute
amendments adopted by voice vote on the floor of the Senate as
it struggled into the late evening on September 7, 1989, to complete
Senate approval of the bill. 193 Precipitated by the conservative trio
of Senators Jesse Helms, William Armstrong and Gordon Humphrey, the amendments grew out of a broad attack on the breadth
of individuals afforded protection under the bill. The Senators
expressed outrage at a variety of characteristics they charged
would cause an individual to be protected from discrimination
under the Act. Specifically targeted at various points in oratorical
diatribes were: pedophilia, schizophrenia, kleptomania, manic
depression, significantly low I.Q., psychotic disorders, homosexuality, transvestitism, AIDS and HIV infection, drug use, bisexuality, voyeurism, alcoholism and compulsive gambling. At one
point, Senator Armstrong stood on the Senate floor and pointed
to a long list of conditions in the Diagnosticand StatisticalManual
of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association as
an example of all the conditions included. His remarks raised the
specter of a potential roll call on individual amendments to remove
each of these conditions. 194
Attacks upon certain conditions provoked a strong response
from other Senators who rose up to defend their inclusion in the
Act's protection; Senator Kennedy led a defense of the inclusion
of HIV infection, 195 and Senator Domenici gave a spirited speech
on behalf of individuals with manic-depression and schizophrenia,
suggesting that Winston Churchill and Abraham Lincoln suffered

192S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1989).
193See 135 CONG. REC. S10765-86 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989).
194Id. at S 10773, S 10785 (remarks of Sen. Armstrong); see also id. at S 10772 (remarks
of Sen. Kennedy).
195Id. at S10768-72 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
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from such disturbances.1 96 Other conditions did not have the advantage of such Senatorial advocacy.
Ultimately, a series of compromises produced three major
amendments to title V of the Act restricting the definition of disability established in section 3(2). Section 508 of the Act provides
that the terms "disabled" or "disability" shall not apply to an
individual solely because that individual is a transvestite. Section
510 states that an individual who is "a current user of illegal drugs"
is not included as an individual with a disability. 97 And section
511 specifies that the term disability does not include:
(a) homosexuality or bisexuality;
(b) transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting
from physical impairments or other sexual behavior
disorders;
(c) compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania; or
(d) psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from
current use of illegal drugs. 198

These exclusions seem wholly inconsistent with the overall
tenor of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which encourages
participation and decision-making based upon individualized determinations of actual ability and not preconceived assumptions
and stereotypes.
196Id. at S 10779 (remarks
19742 U.S.C.A. § 12210(a)

of Sen. Domenici).
(West Supp. 1990). Subsection (b) clarifies that this exclusion
does not apply to persons who are successfully rehabilitated from using drugs, are participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and are not currently using drugs, and to
individuals erroneously regarded as illegal drug users. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12210(b) (West Supp.
1990). Subsection (c) provides that drug users shall not be denied health or social services
to which they are otherwise entitled. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12210(c) (West Supp. 1990).
Previously, the issue of inclusion of drug addiction in the protection of section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act had been a controversial one. See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 8 n.29. The Rehabilitation Act definition was amended in 1978
to specify that for purposes of employment discrimination requirements, the term "handicapped individual" does not include an individual whose current use of alcohol or drugs
prevents job performance or constitutes a direct threat to the property or safety of others.
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1978 § 122(a)(7) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)
(1988)). Section 512 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12211 (West Supp. 1990), amends the
Rehabilitation Act to totally exclude from its coverage any individual who is a current user
of megal drugs.
19 42 U.S.C.A. § 12211 (West Supp. 1990).
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C. NondiscriminationRequirements
The converse of the question of who is protected by the Act
is the issue of who is regulated by the statute-who is subject to
its nondiscrimination obligations? The statement of Congressional
desire in the Act "to invoke the sweep of congressional authority
• . .to address . . .discrimination,"''

99

suggests that the statute

seeks to inhibit discrimination by a broad array of individuals and
entities; this is indeed the case. The Americans with Disabilities
Act has the broadest scope of coverage of any single civil rights
measure enacted to date; the 1964 Civil Rights Act is the only
statute even comparable in the breadth of its nondiscrimination
coverage. Each of the five titles of the ADA creates one or more
classes of covered entities whose activities are subject to the Act's
nondiscrimination duties. The sections which follow discuss, in
turn, each category of individuals and entities subject to the mandates of the ADA, the obligations imposed on them and the remedies made available when the statutory requirements are not met.
Another innovative feature of the Americans with Disabilities
Act is its specificity and length. While prior federal laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of disability generally consisted of a
few sentences ,200 the ADA comprises some fifty-two pages of the
United States Statutes. 20 l The legislation thus addressed one of the
concerns articulated by the National Council on the Handicapped
when it originally proposed the legislation. The Council had complained that existing disability nondiscrimination laws "prohibit
discrimination on the basis of handicap in general terms, but they
do not further define or delineate the 'discrimination' that is prohibited. ' 20 2 The Council called for a statute that would set "clear,
consistent, and enforceable standards," and would delineate "specific enforcement standards, procedures, and timeliness for the
implementation of equal opportunity requirements. ' 203 The legislation enacted contains such increased specificity. As a result, the
Act is extensive in length and detailed in content.
Given the ADA's level of detail and breadth of scope, an indepth examination of all the various requirements and applications
199
42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(4) (West Supp. 1990).
2o0See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
201 104 Stat. 327-78 (1990).
202 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED,
203

Id. at 20.

1986, supra note 15, at A-17 (1986).
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set out in the Act is beyond the scope of this Article. The discussion which follows seeks merely to outline in general terms the
principal requirements imposed by the ADA in the major substantive areas to which it applies.
1. Employment

a. Coverage
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act applies to employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, and joint labor-management committees. 204 Congress declared that the terms
"labor organization" and "employment agency" have the same
meaning as in section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.205 These
terms have been the subject of some judicial interpretation, 2 6 and
the precedents analyzing these terms will be influential in applying
42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(2) (West Supp. 1990).
21542 U.S.C. § 12111(7) (West Supp. 1990). In section 701 of title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the term "employment agency" is defined as "any person regularly
undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for an employer or to
procure for employees opportunities to work for an employer and includes an agent of such
a person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c) (1988). Title VII defines the term "labor organization" as
204

a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce, and any agent of
such an organization, and includes any organization of any kind, any agency, or
employee representation committee, group, association, or plan so engaged in
which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part,
of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment, and any conference,
general committee, joint or system board, or joint council so engaged which is
subordinate to a national or international labor organization.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(d) (1988).
216 Regarding employment agencies, see Shrock v. Altru Nurses Registry, 810 F.2d 658
(7th Cir. 1987) (nurse referral agency held not to be an employment agency where it only
referred nurses to individual patients and doctors acting on individual patients' behalf);
Dumas v. Town of Mount Vernon, 612 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1980) (county administration
board which administered civil service system held to be an employment agency); Brush
v. San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., 315 F. Supp. 577 (N.D.Cal. 1970), aff'd, 469
F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973) (newspaper that published
advertisements related to employment held not to be an employment agency). As to labor
organizations, see Renfro v. Office and Professional Employers International Union, 545
F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1977), reh'g denied, 549 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1977) (for a union to qualify
as a labor organization, it must deal with an employer with fifteen or more employees);
Local No. 293, v. Local No. 293-A, 526 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that a union local
with fewer than fifteen members was not a labor organization under title VII); Vogler v.
McCarty, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. La. 1968), aff'd, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1968)
(holding that a union which effectively controlled employment and training opportunities
in local insulation and asbestos trade held to be a labor organization).
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the same terms under the ADA. The phrase "joint labor-management committee" is not specifically defined in the Civil Rights Act,
although the term is used in other portions of that law. 20 7 Furthermore, the ADA and the bill's committee reports fail to give an
official definition of the phrase.

The Act defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for

each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in
the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such
person. '208 For the first two years after the employment title of
the Act becomes effective, however, an entity that employs fewer

20 9
than twenty-five employees is exempt from statutory coverage.

This is essentially identical to the definition of "employer" in title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The terms "person," "commerce," and "industry affecting
commerce" have the same meaning that they have in section 701
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.210 This cross-reference presumably
will make the judicial interpretations and applications of these
211
terms in title VII cases applicable in litigation under the ADA.

2 See 42 U.S.C. § 20003-2(d) (1988).
42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(A) (West Supp. 1990).
2
w Id.
21042

U.S.C.A. § 12111(7) (West Supp. 1990). The title VII definition of "person" is
extremely broad. It includes: "one or more individuals, governments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions, labor unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal
representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in cases under title 11, or receivers." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1988).
"Commerce" is defined as "trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States; or between a State and any place outside thereof; or
within the District of Columbia, or a possession of the United States; or between points in
the same State but through a point outside thereof." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g) (1988). "Industry
affecting commerce" means "any activity, business, or industry in commerce or in which
a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce and
includes any activity or industry 'affecting commerce' within the meaning of the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 ...and further includes any governmental industry, business, or activity." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (1988).
211For applications of the term "person," see Solin v. State Univ. of New York, 416
F. Supp. 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Henry v. Link, 408 F. Supp. 1204 (D.N.D. 1976), amended,
417 F. Supp. 360 (D.N.D. 1976); United States v. City of Milwaukee, 395 F. Supp. 725
(E.D. Wis. 1975).
As to "industry affecting commerce," see Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v.
Eazor Express Co., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 1377 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Dumas v. Town of Mount
Vernon, 436 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Ala. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
612 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1980); Lewis v. Philip Morris, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Va.
1976); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Rinella and Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175
(N.D. Ill. 1975); Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. La. 1968), aff'd, 407
F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
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Of particular importance are the title VII precedents indicating
that the provisions and terms of the Act, especially the term "employer, 21 2 are to be construed liberally
to effectuate the broad
2 13
remedial purposes of the statute.
b. Requirements
Title I establishes the "general rule" that "no covered entity
shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment. ' 21 4 To guide the application of this general prohibition of discrimination, title I provides
several rules of construction, based largely upon the language of
regulations issued under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 .215 In construing and applying the nondiscrimination mandate,
the following forms of discrimination are prohibited under the
statute: (1) limiting, segregating, or classifying an applicant or
employee in a way that affects the individual adversely because
of his or her disability; (2) participating in contracts or other arrangements or relationships that have the effect of subjecting an
applicant or employee to discrimination; (3) using standards, criteria, or methods of administration that have a discriminatory
effect or perpetuate the discrimination of others under common
administrative control; (4) excluding or disadvantaging an employee or applicant because of that individual's relationship to or
association with another individual known to have a disability;
(5) not making "reasonable accommodations" to known physical
or mental limitations of a qualified individual with a disability, or
denying employment opportunities to an individual because of the
need for a reasonable accommodation; (6) using qualifications stan212See Quijano v. University Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1980); Baker
v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1977).
213See, e.g., Hart v. J.T. Baker Chem. Corp., 598 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1979); Silver v.
KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1978); Bell v. Brown, 557 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1977);

Davis v. Valley Distributing Co., 522 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1090

(1977); Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971); Parham v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
21442 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West Supp. 1990).
215See supra note 81.
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dards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out
or tend to screen out individuals because of their disabilities unless
the standard, test or criterion is "shown to be job-related for the
position in question and is consistent with business necessity;"
and (7) selecting and administering employment tests that discriminate against persons with disabilities that impair sensory, manual,
216
or speaking skills.
Among these forms of discrimination, the ADA's incorporation of those relating to "qualifications" and to "reasonable accommodations" represents a major advance over prior statutory
standards.
(i) Qualifications
The nondiscrimination requirements of title I apply only to
employees or applicants who are "qualified;" it is not unlawful to
exclude or disadvantage a person because that individual is not
qualified for a job. A "qualified individual with a disability" is
defined as "an individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of
the employment position that such individual holds or desires. 217
The "essential function" concept, drawn from section 504 regulations, 218 refers to job tasks that are "fundamental and not
219
marginal."
The Supreme Court has indicated that determining whether
an individual is "qualified" involves an individualized inquiry into:
(a) whether the particular individual can perform the essential
functions of the job despite his or her disability; and (b) if the
individual cannot perform essential functions, whether a reasonable accommodation would enable the individual to do so. 220 Regarding this second consideration, the United States Court of Ap21642

U.S.C.A. § 12112(b) (West Supp. 1990).
Supp. 1990).

21742 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West
21845 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1990).
219 S.REP. No. 116, 101st Cong.,

Ist Sess. 26 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 55, reprintedin 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 267, 337; H.R.
REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 33, reprintedin 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &

ADMIN. NEWS 267, 455. The marginal/essential distinction had been recognized by a few
courts prior to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See Bevan v. N.Y. State Teachers' Retirement
Sys., 74 Misc. 2d 443, 447-48, 345 N.Y.S.2d 921, 926 (1973) (quoting Chavich v. Board of
Examiners, 23 A.D.2d 57, 67-68, 258 N.Y.S.2d 677, 687 (1965) (Rabin, J., dissenting),
aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 810, 210 N.E.2d 359, 263 N.Y.S.2d 7).
22

School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 275, 288 (1987).
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peals for the Fifth Circuit has noted that "the 'reasonable
accommodation' question" is "part of the 'otherwise qualified'
inquiry. '221 The interrelationship between qualifications and the
obligation of making reasonable accommodations ensures that employers may not summarily determine what qualifications they
wish to impose 2 22 and then hold individuals with disabilities to
them. Even after accurately delineating the essential functions of
the job, an employer must consider whether there are alternative
ways of doing things that would enable the individual with a disability to perform the essential tasks.
Moreover, whenever the use of qualification standards, tests,
and eligibility and selection criteria would screen out or tend to
screen out individuals on account of their disabilities, such standards, tests, and criteria may be used only if they are shown to
be job-related and consistent with business necessity. 223 The jobrelatedness requirement, previously imposed in regulations issued
under the Rehabilitation Act,224 and the business necessity standard, derived from title VII analysis of criteria having a disparate
impact on the basis of race and gender, 225 are stringent tests of
legal validity.
The interplay between the "essential functions," "job-relatedness," "business necessity," and "reasonable accommodations"
concepts is analyzed in the committee reports as follows:
The interrelationship of these requirements in the selection procedure is as follows. If a person with a disability
applies for a job and meets all selection criteria except
one that he or she cannot meet because of a disability,
the criteria must concern an essential, non-marginal as22

Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1262 (5th Cir. 1988).

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West Supp. 1990), "consideration shall be given
to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer
has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job,
this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job." The use
of the words "consideration" and "evidence" make it clear that the employer's views on
these matters are not determinative or binding upon a court or enforcement agency.
22

22

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12112(b)(6), 12113(a) (West Supp. 1990).

=4 29 C.F.R. § 1613.705 (1990).
2' See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Williams v. Colorado Springs Colorado School Dist., 641 F.2d

835, 842 (10th Cir. 1981); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1982) (requirement
must have "'a manifest relationship to the employment in question"') (quoting Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
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pect of the job, and be carefully tailored to measure the
person's actual ability to do an essential function of the
job. If the criteria meets this test, it is nondiscriminatory
on its face and it is otherwise lawful under the legislation.
However, the criteria may not be used to exclude an
applicant with a disability if the criteria can be satisfied
by the applicant with a reasonable accommodation. A
reasonable accommodation may entail
adopting an alter226
native, less discriminatory criterion.

In further delineating standards governing the use of qualifications criteria, the Act specifically permits employers to impose
"ca requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to
the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace. 227 Other
provisions expressly permit religious organizations to give a preference in employment to members of their religion, and to impose
requirements that "all applicants and employees conform to the
religious tenets of such organization; '228 and allow employers to
exclude current users of illegal drugs, and to prohibit alcohol
229
intoxication or use of illegal drugs at the workplace.
Specific restrictions upon inquiries about disabilities and medical examinations are imposed upon covered entities. 2 0 These permit employers to make preemployment inquiries into the ability of
applicants to perform job-related functions, but prohibit inquiries
226S. REP. No.
Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
227 42 U.S.C.A.
analysis in applying

116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 37-38 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st
2, at 105 (1990).
§ 12113(b) (West Supp. 1990). Committee reports suggest the following
the direct threat language:

The employer must identify the specific risk that the individual with a disability
would pose. The standard to be used in determining whether there is a direct
threat is whether the person poses a significant, [sic] risk to the safety of others
or to property, not a speculative or remote risk, and that no reasonable accommodation is available that can remove the risk .... Making such a determination
requires a fact-specific individualized inquiry resulting in a "well-informed judgment grounded in a careful and open-minded weighing of the risks and alternatives." Hall v. U.S. Postal Service, 857 F.2d 1073, 1079 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting
School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline 480 U.S. 273 (1987)). See also
Mantolete v. Bolger, 757 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985) and Strathie v. Dept. of Transportation, 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983).
S. REP. No. 101-116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 56-57.
= 42 U.S.C.A. § 12113(c) (West Supp. 1990).
29 42 U.S.C.A. § 12114 (West Supp. 1990).
3042 U.S.C.A. § 12112(c) (west Supp. 1990).
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as to whether an applicant has a disability or about the nature or
severity of the applicant's disability. 231 Employers are permitted
to require post-job-offer, pre-entrance medical examinations, but
only if the results are kept confidential, the exams are required of
all entering employees, and the results are used only in accordance
with other restrictions set out in the Act. 232 After an individual has
been hired and begins work, medical examinations and inquiries
about the existence, nature or severity of disabilities are permitted
only if such exams or inquiries are shown to be job-related and
233
consistent with business necessity.
(ii) Reasonable Accommodation
One major type of discriminatory employment practice delineated in the Act is that of "not making reasonable accommodations
to the known physical or mental limitations" of a qualified person
with a disability, unless such accommodation "would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of the business" of the covered
entity.234 The "reasonable accommodation" concept has been a
major element of disability nondiscrimination regulations 235 and
case law236 under the Rehabilitation Act. In a 1983 report tracing
the purpose and history of the reasonable accommodation concept,
the United States Commission on Civil Rights defined the term as
"providing or modifying devices, services, or facilities or changing
practices or procedures in order to match a particular person with
a particular program or activity. Individualizing opportunities is
this definition's essence. '237 The Commission identified the basic
purpose of this requirement as follows:
Discrimination against handicapped people cannot be
eliminated if programs, activities, and tasks are always
231 42

U.S.C.A. § 12112(c)(2) (West Supp. 1990).

23242 U.S.C.A. § 12112(c)(3) (West Supp. 1990).
21342 U.S.C.A. § 12112(c)(4) (West Supp. 1990).
-4 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1990).
23 28 C.F.R. 88 41.32(a), 41.53; 45 C.F.R. § 84.12; 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d); 29 C.F.R.

§ 1613.704.
236See, e.g., School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 (1987); Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287, 301 (1985). In Arline the Court declared bluntly: "Employers have an affirmative
obligation to make a reasonable accommodation for a handicapped employee." 480 U.S.
at 289 n.19.
237U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 102.
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structured in the ways people with "normal"
mental abilities customarily undertake them.
or modifications of opportunities to permit
people to participate fully have been broadly
' 238
sonable accommodation."

physical and
Adjustments
handicapped
termed "rea-

The ADA recognizes the need for individualized adjustments
to facilitate one-to-one matching of jobs and people with disabili239
ties that the concept of reasonable accommodation represents.
The Act declares that reasonable accommodation includes:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities;
and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials
or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals
with disabilities.240

The committee reports suggest steps for arriving at an appropriate reasonable accommodation in particular circumstances.
Both the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee and the
House Education and Labor Committee declare that employers
should consult with the individual with a disability in deciding on
the appropriate accomodation. Where such preliminary discussions between the employer and the employee or applicant are not
sufficient to identify a needed accommodation, the reports go on
to discuss further steps for identifying barriers to equal opportunity, identifying possible accommodations, assessing the reasonableness and effectiveness of potential accommodations, and se-

238 Id.

239S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 31 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,

2d Sess., pt. 2, at 62 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 39 (1990).
The first two reports both declare that reasonable accommodation involves a "fact-specific,
case-by-case approach;" the latter report, that of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
states that "[a] reasonable accommodation should be tailored to the needs of the individual
and the requirements of the job."
240 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(9) (West Supp. 1990).
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lecting and implementing an appropriate accommodation. 24' As an
element of the process of determining and implementing a reasonable accommodation, one court has ruled that "an employer has a
duty ...

to gather sufficient information from the applicant and

from qualified experts as needed to determine what accommodations are necessary to enable the applicant to perform the job
242
safely.
A covered entity is not required to implement any job accommodation that the entity can demonstrate would impose an "undue
hardship" on the operation of its business. 243 The term "undue
hardship" is defined as "an action requiring significant difficulty or
expense," when considered in light of certain factors-including
the nature and cost of the accommodation; the overall financial
resources and workforce of the facility involved; the overall financial resources, number of employees, and structure of the covered
entity; and the type of operations of the covered entity, including
the composition and functions of its workforce, and the administrative and fiscal relationships between the facility and the covered
entity. 244
According to the committee reports, "an action requiring significant difficulty or expense" means "an action that is unduly
costly, extensive, substantial, disruptive, or that wil fundamentally alter the nature of the program." 245 In defining "undue hardship," Congress rejected the notion of any "per se" level of diffi'246 It
culty or expense that would constitute "undue hardship.
voted down an amendment that would have created a presumption
that a suggested accommodation would involve undue hardship if
it exceeded ten percent of the annual salary for the position in
question, 247 and indicated that undue hardship is intended to be a
"much higher standard" than the "readily achievable" requirement
applied in title III of the Act 248 and "a significantly higher standard"
241S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 34-35 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st

Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 66 (1990).
242Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original).
24 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1990).
24442 U.S.C.A. § 12111(10) (West Supp. 1990).

24 S. REP.No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 67 (1990); see also H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at
40-42 (1990).
246H.R.

REP.No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 41 (1990).
247
136 CONG. REc. H2470, H2475 (daily ed. May 17, 1990).
2m H.R. Rap. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 40 (1990).
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than the obligation to accommodate religious beliefs under title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.249 The resolution of these
issues and the statutory list of factors to be considered make it
clear that "undue hardship" is a concept that varies according to
the impact of particular proposed accommodation on a particular
business, with more accommodation being required of larger entities with more resources.2 °0
c. Remedies
Title I of the Act becomes effective on July 26, 1992, two
years after the date of its enactment. 1t For employers having
fifteen to twenty-four employees, the requirements of the employment title are deferred for two further years, until July 26, 1994.252
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is directed to promulgate regulations for carrying out title I by July 26,
1991.2a The EEOC, the Attorney General and the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs are directed to develop and issue,
by January 26, 1991, regulations containing "coordinating mechanisms" to avoid duplication and inconsistency with the requirements and enforcement of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 254 The
"powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 705, 706,
707, 709, and 710 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"2 5 are available
to enforce the employment provisions of the Act and the regula-

29

H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 68 (1990). The choice of the

word "significant" to describe the degree of difficulty or expense that constitutes an undue
hardship may have its origin in a 1979 report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources in which the committee sought to substitute the phrase "significant hardship"
for "undue harship" to clearly distinguish the limits on reasonable accomodation in the
disability context from those on religious accommodation. S. REP. No. 316, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., 8 n.5 (1979). The committee explained that a hardship should excuse making an
accommodation if it was one that was "exceeding or violating propriety or fitness: excessive,
immoderate, unwarranted." Id.
20 The report of the House Judiciary Committee cites with approval Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983), in which the court ruled that various accommodations (including the use of readers, brailled forms, and a computer that stores and
retrieves information in braille) needed by employees with visual impairments would not
impose an undue hardship even though their costs would be substantial, because the
additional dollar burden of the accommodations would represent only a small fraction of
the agency's budget. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 40 (1990).
21 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111 (West Supp. 1990).
25242 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(A) (West Supp. 1990).
253 42 U.S.C.A. § 12116 (West Supp. 1990).
z4 42 U.S.C.A. § 12117(b) (West Supp. 1990).
255 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9 (1988).
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tions promulgated under it.256 Relief available pursuant to these
provisions includes injunctive relief and back pay.257 Administrative complaints of discrimination are to be filed with and investigated by the EEOC. 258 In addition to EEOC administrative determinations of probable cause and attempts to resolve alleged
unlawful employment practices by conciliation agreements, the
referenced provisions authorize various types of court actionsby the EEOC, aggrieved individuals and the Attorney General in
certain circumstances-to redress discrimination. 259 ADA committee reports expressly declare congressional intent that the "futile
gesture" doctrine recognized by the courts in actions under title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964260 should also apply to actions
26 1
under this Act.
2. Public Services
a. Coverage
Title II of the ADA, styled "Public Services," prohibits discrimination by any "public entity. ' 262 The term "public entity" is
defined as:
(A) any State or local government;
(B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or
other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and
(C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and
any commuter authority (as defined in section 103(8) of
the Rail Passenger Service Act). 263
U.S.C.A. § 12117(a) (West Supp. 1990).
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
21142 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
29 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1988).
260See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365242

2.742

67 (1977) (where a worker's attempt to obtain a promotion would be a "futile gesture"
given the discriminatory environment of the place of employment, the worker need not
have applied for the promotion to maintain an action for discrimination).
261
S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 43 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 82-83 (1990).
= 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132 (West Supp. 1990).
w 42 U.S.C.A. § 12131 (West Supp. 1990).
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By incorporating not only states and local governments, but also

all of their departments, agencies and instrumentalities, the statute
provides extremely broad coverage of state and local government
activities. 264 In its ADA report the House Committee on Education

and Labor expressly noted that "[t]he term 'instrumentality of a
'
state and local government' includes public transit authorities ,

265

but the statutory terminology encompasses a wide range of other
"instrumentalities," including zoning boards, school boards, planning commissions, park and recreation authorities, courts, county
or city councils, health departments, traffic bureaus and departments of transportation, police departments, state legislatures,
mayoral commissions, and any other department, agency, board,
commission, office, council, authority, committee, ministry, tribunal, chamber, bureau, administration- or other structure or
means by which a state or local government takes action or in266
volves itself in activities and programs.
"' In contrast, the employment provisions of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
include as "persons" who may be subject to regulation as employers, "governments,
governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1988).
The public accommodations provisions of the 1964 Act prohibit discrimination in places
of public accommodation if such discrimination is "under color of" a statute, law, or
ordinance; if the discrimination results from a "custom or usage" that is required or enforced
by an official of any state or political subdivision of a state; or if the discrimination is
required by an action of a state or political subdivision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(d) (1988). See
Wesley v. City of Savannah, Ga., 294 F. Supp. 698 (S.D. Ga. 1969), where this provision
was held to apply to a golf tournament that was sponsored by a private association, because
it was played on the public links of a city, and was announced by the association as a city
championship tournament.
Another provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination or segregation
that "is or purports to be required by any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule, or order
of a State or any agency or political subdivision thereof." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-I (1988).
Additionally, another section of the Act authorizes the Attorney General to initiate civil
actions to redress deprivations of the right to equal protection resulting when a person is
"denied equal utilization of any public facility which is owned, operated, or managed by
or on behalf of any State or subdivision thereof." 42 U.S.C. § 2000b(A) (1988).
265H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 86 (1990).
266Since the statutory language does not limit its application to executive activities of
state and local governments, judicial and legislative actions may also be subject to the
nondiscrimination requirements of the Act. For example, if a jurisdiction refuses to permit
deaf individuals to serve on juries, or ifa legislative committee has a policy against allowing
people with cerebral palsy or mental retardation to testify as witnesses at its hearings, these
practices may be subject to scrutiny under the ADA as activities of an agency or instrumentality of state or local government. Arguably, the coverage of the Act may extend even
to substantive legislative and judicial actions of state and local governments. A state law
or local ordinance that blatantly discriminates against a class of individuals with disabilities
presumably would be subject to challenge under the statute. Likewise, a judge whose
rulings evince prejudice or malice against litigants on account of their disability would be
within the purview of the statute. Of course, such scrutiny of judicial and legislative acts
must be tempered by constraints of federalism inherent in the Constitution of the United
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The third branch of "public entity" in the ADA includes the
National Railroad Passenger Corporation, commonly known as
Amtrak, 267 and "any commuter authority (as defined in section
103(8) of the Rail Passenger Service Act)." The Act defines "commuter authority" as "any State, local or regional authority, corporation, or other entity established for purposes of providing
commuter service .... ,,268 "Commuter service" is defined, in turn,
as "short-haul rail passenger service operated in metropolitan and
suburban areas,

. .

.usually characterized by reduced fare, mul-

tiple-ride, and commutation tickets and by morning and evening
peak period operations. 2 69 Commuter authorities that are "an instrumentality of a State or States or local government" were already included in part (B) of the public entity definition, but the
third branch makes it clear that corporations and other entities
that provide commuter service, even if private in nature, are
covered.
b. Requirements
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act subjects all the
activities, programs, and services of states and local governments,
and their instrumentalities, to the prohibition of discrimination on
the basis of disability, i.e., that "no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,
or activities of a public entity." 270 Previously, such nondiscrimination requirements had been applicable pursuant to section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act only to those activities, programs, and
States, and must be carried out with due regard for principles of legislative and judicial
immunity where applicable. While not expressly stated in the ADA or its legislative history,
the Act's use of the term "state" is presumably meant to be broadly interpreted to include
United States territories and the District of Columbia. Under title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, for example, the term "state" is applied to the 50 states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, Wake Island, the
Canal Zone, and the Outer Continental Shelf lands. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(i) (1988).
26745 U.S.C. § 502(1) (1988).
- 45 U.S.C. § 502(8) (1988). The definition also includes "any successor agencies, and
any entity created by one or more such agencies for the purpose of operating, or contracting
for the operation of, commuter service." Id.
945 U.S.C. § 502(9) (1988). It does not matter whether such service is "within or
Across the geographical boundaries of a State." Id.
270 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132 (West Supp. 1990).
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services of those governmental entities that received federal financial assistance.27 '
All state and local government facilities, services, and communications must meet the accessibility requirements established
under section 504.272 In addition, such entities shall be subject to
requirements consistent with other parts of the Act,2 73 including,
specifically, obligations to make "reasonable modifications to
rules, policies, or practices," to achieve "the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers," and to ensure
"the provision of auxiliary aids and services." 274
Title II also includes detailed provisions applicable to public
transportation systems, Amtrak and commuter authorities. These
provisions resolve some of the contentious issues that arose from
the ambiguity and inconsistency in prior statutes regarding the
extent of accessibility obligations for public transportation systems. 275 For public entities providing bus transportation, the following major obligations are established: (1) new or remanufactured buses ordered on or after August 26, 1990, must be readily
accessible to individuals with ,disabilities;276 (2) public transit authorities must provide paratransit service, comparable to fixed
route service, for individuals with disabilities who are unable to
use fixed route bus service, unless such paratransit services would
impose an undue financial burden;2 77 (3) new bus stations must be
accessible;2 78 and (4) alterations to existing stations must comply
with accessibility requirements "to the maximum extent
279
feasible.
Regarding rail systems, the Act imposes the following major
requirements: (1) new or remanufactured vehicles ordered on or
27
27

29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).

42 U.S.C.A. § 12134(b) (West Supp. 1990).

mId.
27442 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131(2), 12132 (West Supp. 1990). These obligations will be discussed infra with regard to the public accommodations provisions of the ADA.
275See, e.g., Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977); Dopico
v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982); American Pub. Transit Ass'n v. Lewis, 655

F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981); ADAPT v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184 (3d Cir. 1989).
276 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12142(a), 12142(c)(1) (West Supp. 1990). Public entities purchasing
or leasing used vehicles must demonstrate "good faith efforts" to obtain accessible vehicles.

42 U.S.C.A. § 12142(b) (West Supp. 1990). The Act provides an exception to the requirements regarding remanufactured vehicles for certain historic vehicles. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 12142(c)(2) (West Supp. 1990).
2n 42 U.S.C.A. § 12143 (West Supp. 1990).
27842 U.S.C.A. § 12146 (West Supp. 1990).
2 42 U.S.C.A. § 12147 (West Supp. 1990)-
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after August 26, 1990 must be accessible; 2 0 (2) rail systems must
have at least one accessible car per train "as soon as practicable"
but in no event later than July 26, 1995;281 (3) new rail stations
must be accessible, 282 and alterations to existing stations must
comply with accessibility requirements;283 (4) in rapid rail, commuter rail, and light rail systems, "key stations" must be made
accessible by July 26, 1993, except that the Secretary of Transportation is authorized to grant an extension of up to twenty years
for commuter rail systems, or up to thirty years for rapid or light
rail systems in certain circumstances;284 and (5) existing intercity
rail, i.e., Amtrak, stations must be made accessible by July 26,
2010.285

c. Remedies
Enforcement of the requirements of title II for public entities
is to be achieved through the "remedies, procedures, and rights
set forth in section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973."286 Section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, in turn, makes applicable the
remedies, procedures and rights available in title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.287 Among the remedies available under title
VL, 288 the courts have recognized a right of aggrieved individuals
to bring private lawsuits.2 89 The ADA committee reports indicate
a Congressional consensus that "a private right of action, with a
full panoply of remedies" is to be available to enforce the provisions of title 11.290 Committee reports also indicate that exhaustion
of administrative remedies is not intended to be a prerequisite to

so42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12142(a), 12142(c)(1), 12162(a)(2)(A), 12162(b)(2)(A), 12164(d) (West

Supp. 1990);
28142 U.S.C.A. §§ 12148(b), 12162(a)(1), 12162(b)(1) (West Supp. 1990).

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12146, 12162(e)(1) (West Supp 1990).
213
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12147, 12162(e)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1990).
-sl
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12147(b)(2), 12162(e)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1990).
n2

2

42 U.S.C.A. § 12162(e)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (West Supp. 1990).

- 42 U.S.C.A. § 12133 (West Supp. 1990) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794a).
287
29 U.S.C.A. § 794a(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990).
2n 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000e (1988).
n9 See, e.g., Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1021

(1984); Yakin v. University of Ill.,
508 F. Supp. 848 (D. I11.
1981), aff'd, 760 F.2d 270 (7th
Cir. 1985).
29 H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 52 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 485,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 98 (1990); S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 58
(1989).
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bringing such a private right of action. 291 Administrative enforcement of title II provisions is intended to parallel the federal gov292
ernment's enforcement of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Committee reports provide the following description of how the
enforcement scheme would work:
[Tlhe Department of Justice will identify appropriate Federal agencies to oversee compliance activities for State
and local government. As with section 504, these Federal
agencies, including the Department of Justice, will receive, investigate, and where possible, resolve complaints
of discrimination. If a Federal agency is unable to resolve
a complaint by voluntary means, the Federal government
would use the enforcement sanctions of section 505 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Because the fund termination procedures of section 505 are inapplicable to State
and local government entities that do not receive Federal
funds, the major enforcement sanction for the, Federal
government will be referral of cases by these Federal
agencies to the Department of Justice.
The Department of Justice may then proceed to file
suits in Federal district court. 93
Provisions of title II regarding state and local government
entities become effective on January 26, 1992.294 The Attorney
General is to issue regulations enforcing these requirements by
July 26, 1991295 and the Secretary of Transportation is to issue
regulations regarding transportation services provided by public
entities on or before July 26, 1991.296 Requirements regarding public bus and rail systems generally take effect as of January 26,
29,H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 98 (1990); S. REP. No. 116,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1989).
292The committee reports say that the enforcement of the prohibition of discrimination
in public services "should closely parallel the Federal government's experience" in enforcing the Rehabilitation Act. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1989); H.R. REP.
No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 98 (1990).

293S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 57-58 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 98 (1990).
"' 42 U.S.C.A. § 12131 note (West Supp. 1990).
29 42 U.S.C.A. § 12134(a) (West Supp. 1990).
2 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12149(a), 12164 (West Supp. 1990).
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1992,297 except for certain provisions that become effective earlier
298
as discussed above.

3. PublicAccommodations, Commercial Facilities, and
TransportationServices
a. Coverage
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act deals with
"public accommodations." Although its conceptual origins may be
traced to the public accommodations provisions of title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 99 the ADA's concept of public accommodations is much broader. 300 As introduced in the 101st Congress,
the ADA bill would have defined "public accommodation" to include all privately operated establishments whose operations affect
commerce and are either "used by the general public as customers,
clients, or visitors" or "are potential places of employment. ' 30 1 In
response to concerns expressed by the Bush Administration, this
definition was redrafted as a list of types of establishments covered
as public accommodations; the resulting list is sufficiently comprehensive as to be nearly as broad as the formulation it replaced.
As enacted, title III of the ADA declares that the following entities
are public accommodations if their operations affect commerce:

42 U.S.C.A. § 12141 note, 246(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12161 note.
29s See, e.g., supra note 280 and accompanying text; see also 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12141
note, 246(b), 12161 note (West Supp. 1990).
29942 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6. The original version of the ADA bill, as published
by the National Council on the Handicapped, prohibited discrimination by "any public
accommodation covered by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." NATIONAL COUNCIL
2"

ON THE HANDICAPPED 1986, supra note 11, at 29, § 4(A)(6).
30 Under title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, public accommodations include: any
inn, hotel, motel or other establishment that provides lodging to transient guests (except
for certain small boarding houses); facilities that sell food for consumption on the premises,
such as restaurants, cafeterias, lunchrooms, lunch counters and soda fountains; gasoline
service stations; and places of exhibition or entertainment, such as motion picture houses,
theaters, concert halls, sports arenas and stadiums. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1988).
301S. REP. No. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 401(2)(A), 135 CONG. REC. S4990 (1989).
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(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging... ;102
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food
or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or
other place of public gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware
store, shopping center, or other sales or rental
establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty
shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor,
gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy,
insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified
public transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public
display or collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of
recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or
postgraduate private school, or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless
shelter, food bank, adoption agency, or other social service establishment; and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course,
or other place of exercise or recreation. 303
The twelve categories listed cover, with a few exceptions such
as the sale or rental of housing, 3 4 almost every facet of American
life in which a business establishment or other entity serves or
comes into contact with members of the general public. It covers
302Excepted is "an establishment located within a building that contains not more than
five rooms for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the residence of such proprietor." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(7)(A) (West Supp. 1990).
This incorporates the so-called "Mrs. Murphy's Boarding House exception" established
under title II of the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1).

30342 U.S.C.A. § 12181(7) (West Supp. 1990).
30 Discrimination on the basis of disability in housing is prohibited under the Fair
Housing Amendments Act. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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all of the types of establishments that are subject to title II of the
Civil Rights Act, as well as many others, such as sales, rental,
service and social service establishments, that are not covered by
title II.
The list of public accommodations enacted does not include
the category of "potential places of employment" that was present
in the bill as introduced in 1989.305 Places of current employment
(of employers having the requisite minimum number of employees)
are subject to the requirements set out in title I of the ADA. The
legislative history indicates that the facility accessibility requirements of the statute cover areas in places of public accommodation
used by employees, in addition to areas used by patrons of such
facilities. 306 The questions about areas not in places of public
accommodation that will be used as places of employment in the
future remain unanswered. Can such facilities be constructed or
remodeled without any compliance with accessibility requirements? For example, if a company is about to construct or renovate a manufacturing plant, can it disregard accessibility requirements? If so, the company could erect a facility that is totally
inaccessible to persons with disabilities, and only later deal with
potential employees with disabilities who might wish to work
there.
Congress responded to such concerns by mandating that, in
constructing new facilities or altering existing ones, all "commercial facilities" must comply with accessibility requirements.307 The
term "commercial facilities" is defined extremely broadly as "facilities (A) that are intended for nonresidential use; and (B) whose
operations will affect commerce. '30 8 This is identical to the definition of the phrase "potential place of employment" in the bill as
originally passed by the Senate. 30 9 The House Committee on Education and Labor indicated that in substituting the term "commercial facilities" it intended to keep the broad focus of the previous terminology. Indeed, it intended this provision to apply "the
full scope of coverage under federal constitutional commerce
'310
clause doctrine.
"5 See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
306 H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 62 (1990).
30 42 U.S.C.A. § 12183(a) (West Supp. 1990).
30342 U.S.C.A. § 12181(2) (West Supp. 1990).
309 S. REP. No. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 301(2), 135 CONG. REc. 10705 (1989).
310H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 117 (1990).
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In addition to public accommodations and commercial facilities, title III regulates the activities of certain providers of transportation services. Discrimination is prohibited in regard to "specified public transportation services provided by a private entity
that is involved primarily in the business of transporting people
and whose operations affect commerce. ' 311 "Specified public transportation" refers to "transportation by bus, rail, or any other conveyance (other than by aircraft) that provides the general public
with general or special service (including charter service) on a
regular and continuing basis. '312 The "any other conveyance"
phraseology creates a very broad classification of transportation
that is subjected to nondiscrimination obligations. Conveyance
31 3
refers to any means of transportation.
b. Requirements
Title III contains a sweeping "general rule" that prohibits
discrimination "on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
'314
or accommodations of any place of public accommodation.
Subsequent provisions delineate several forms of discrimination
encompassed in the general prohibition; these include subjecting
an individual or class of individuals with disabilities, directly or
indirectly, to any of the following: (1) denying the opportunity to
participate in or benefit from an opportunity; (2) affording an opportunity that is not equal to that afforded others; (3) providing an
opportunity that is different or separate, unless such separation or
difference is necessary to provide an individual with a disability
with an opportunity that is as effective as that provided to others;
(4) providing opportunities that are not in "the most integrated
setting appropriate to the needs of the individual;" (5) using stan31" 42

U.S.C.A. § 12184(a) (West Supp. 1990).
312
42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(10) (West Supp. 1990).
313
See, e.g., Shawnee Nat'l Bank v. United States, 249 F.2d 583, 587 (8th Cir. 1918)

(construing "conveyances" to "include all means of transportation"). The exception for
transport by aircraft reflects congressional desire not to revisit in this legislation issues it
had addressed in passing the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986. See supra note 84; see also
H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 121 (1990); S.REP. No. 116, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., 72 (1989). Apart from aircraft, however, all other forms of transportation,
whether it be by automobile, submarine, dogsled, or any other means for getting people
from one place to another, may be covered by the ADA, provided they meet the other
statutory criteria, including that of offering regular and continuing service.
314
42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(a) (West Supp. 1990).
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dards or methods of administration, whether directly or through
contractual arrangements, that have the effect of discriminating or
that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to
common administrative control; and (6) excluding or denying
someone equal treatment because of that individual's
association
315
or relationship with an individual with a disability.
Title III also contains certain "specific prohibitions"3' 16 spelling
out five major components of nondiscrimination on the basis of
disability:
(1) Discriminatory eligibility criteria.Places of public accommodation are prohibited from imposing or applying "eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out" individuals or classes
of individuals with disabilities, unless these criteria "can be shown
to be necessary for the provision of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered. ' 317 This
is generally analogous to the requirements regarding tests and
selection criteria in the employment context. 38 The "necessary"
test is the analog in public accommodations to the stringent "business necessity" and "job-related" standards in employment.
(2) Reasonable modifications. Public accommodations are required to make "reasonable modifications to policies, practices, or
procedures" when such modifications are necessary to afford a
person with a disability the goods, services, facilities, privileges
or accommodations being offered; an entity need not, however,
make any modification that it "can demonstrate

. . .

would fun-

damentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, or accommodations. '319 The "reasonable modifications" requirement is equivalent to the "reasonable accommodation"
requirement in employment. 320 The fundamental alteration limit is
a much higher standard, however, than the "undue hardship" limit
in the job context. The concept of fundamental alteration originated in the Supreme Court's decision in Southeastern Community
College v. Davis.32' In Davis, the Court held that, under section
3,5
42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
316
42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2) (West Supp. 1990).

317
42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1990).
318See supra notes 217-233 and accompanying text.

3,9
42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1990).
320
See supra notes 234-250 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has used the
terms "reasonable accommodations" and "reasonable modifications" interchangeably. See,
e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299-301 (1985).
321442 U.S. 397 (1979).
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504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a college was not required to modify
its clinical nursing program by converting it to a program of purely
academic classes to accommodate a woman with a hearing impairment. "Such a fundamental alteration in the nature of a pro322
gram is far more than the 'modification' the regulation requires.
In applying the "fundamental alteration" concept, other courts
have spelled out some of its implications. Alterations are not required if they would endanger a program's viability; 323 "massive"
or "extremely expensive" changes are not required; 324 modifications involving a "major restructuring" of an enterprise or that
325
"jeopardize the effectiveness" of a program are not required;
modifications are not required if they would so alter an enterprise
as to create, in effect, a new program. 326 Two legal commentators
have suggested that "fundamental alteration" be defined as "a
substantial change in the primary purpose or benefit of a program
or activity" or "a substantial impairment of necessary or essential
components required'327to achieve a program or activity's primary
purpose or benefit.
(3) Auxiliary aids and services. Covered entities are required
to "take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated, or
otherwise treated differently ...

because of the absence of aux-

iliary aids or services. '"328 The term "auxiliary aids and services"
includes methods of making aurally or visually delivered
materials 329 available to individuals with hearing or visual impairId. at 410.
New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847, 855 (10th
Cir. 1982) (holding that the State's failure to accomodate schoolchildren with disabilities
did not constitute discrimination under section 504 if program modification would jeopardize
the overall viability of the State's educational system).
3

323

114Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 653 (2d Cir. 1982); American Pub. Transit
Ass'n v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
32s
Rhode Island Handicapped Action Comm. v. Rhode Island Pub. Transit Auth., 549
F. Supp. 592, 607, 611 (D.R.I. 1982) (ordering transit authority to include wheelchair lifts

and wheelchair bays in its purchase of 42 new buses since such a purchase would not
change the program in a fundamental way and would not jeopardize the effectiveness of
the system), modified 718 F.2d 490 (lst Cir. 1983).
326Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704, 707-09 (3d Cir. 1979); Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F. Supp.
577, 587 (D.R.I. 1982); Lynch v. Maher, 507 F. Supp. 1268, 1280 (D.Conn. 1981); Colin K.
v. Schmidt, 536 F. Supp. 1375, 1388 (D.R.I. 1982); Rhode Island HandicappedAction
Comm., 549 F. Supp. at 607 (D.R.I. 1982).
327Robert Burgdorf & Christopher Bell, supra note 98, at 70.
328 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (West Supp. 1990).
329 Qualified interpreters, readers and taped texts are included in the statute as examples
of "auxiliary aids and services." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(1) (West Supp. 1990).
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ment as well as "acquisition or modification of equipment or devices. '330 Auxiliary aids and services do not have to be provided
if the entity can demonstrate that doing so would "fundamentally
alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage,
or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue
33
burden." 1
(4) Readily achievable barrier removal in existing facilities.
Covered entities are required to remove "architectural barriers,
and communication barriers that are structural in nature, in existing facilities . . . where such removal is readily achievable. 332

"Readily achievable" is defined as "easily accomplishable and able
to be carried out without much difficulty or expense. '333 As examples of barrier removal that will usually be "readily achievable,"
the committee reports list "the addition of grab bars, the simple
ramping of a few steps, the lowering of telephones, the addition
of raised letter and braille markings on elevator control buttons,
the addition of flashing alarm lights, and similar modest
adjustments. ,,334
(5) Alternative methods. Where a place of public accommodation can demonstrate that barrier removal is not readily achievable, the covered entity must still make its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations available through
335
"alternative methods" if such methods are readily achievable.
The committee reports list several examples of such "alternative
methods," including
coming to the door to receive or return drycleaning; allowing a disabled patron to be served beverages at a table
330 Id. The committee reports indicate that the list in the statute is not intended to be
exhaustive. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 107 (1990).
33142 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (West Supp. 1990). Fundamental alteration was
discussed above in regard to reasonable modifications. See supra notes 320-321 and ac-

companying text. The concept of "undue burden" is analogous to the term "undue hardship"
in the employment context. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 63 (1989); H.R. REP.
No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 106-07 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 3, at 59 (1990).
332 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (West Supp. 1990).
33342 U.S.C.A. § 12181(9) (West Supp. 1990). The definition goes on to provide a list
of factors similar to those delineated in regard to "undue hardship" in employment that are

to be considered in determining whether an action is readily achievable. Id.

33 S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 110 (1990).
33542 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v) (West Supp. 1990).
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even though nondisabled persons having only drinks are
required to drink at the inaccessible bar; providing assistance to retrieve items in an inaccessible location; and
rotating movies between the first floor accessible theater
and a comparable second floor inaccessible theater [with
336
public notification of such rotation].
One of the most far-reaching provisions of title III is the
requirement that newly constructed facilities of public accommodations and newly constructed "commercial facilities" must be
accessible, except where an entity can demonstrate that making
'337
the facility accessible would be "structurally impracticable.
"Commercial facilities" is broadly defined as referring to all buildings intended for nonresidential use whose operations will affect
commerce. 338 The structural impracticability exception to this requirement is extremely narrow. It is meant to apply "only in rare
and unusual circumstances where unique characteristics of terrain
'339
make accessibility unusually difficult.
In addition, alterations of public accommodations and commercial facilities must be made such that the altered portions are
accessible to individuals with disabilities, including those who use
wheelchairs.3 40 Where alterations are made to an area of a facility
that contains a primary function, the covered entity must provide
an accessible path of travel to the altered area, and accessible
bathrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving the altered
336S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 66 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 110-11 (1990).

31742 U.S.C.A. § 12183(a) (West Supp. 1990). This requirement applies to facilities

constructed "for first occupancy later than 30 months after July 30, 1990 [the date of
enactment]." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12183(a)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
33842 U.S.C.A. § 12181(2) (West Supp. 1990).
339S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 70-71 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 120 (1990). The committee reports further state that "structurally

impracticable"
is intended to be a narrow exception to the requirement of accessibility. It means
that only where unique characteristics of terrain prevent the incorporation of
accessibility features and would destroy the physical integrity of a facility is it
acceptable to deviate from accessibility requirements. Buildings that must be built
on stilts because of their location in marshlands or over water are one of the few

situations in which the structurally impracticable exception would apply.
S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 70-71 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d

Sess., pt. 2, at 120 (1990).

3mo42 U.S.C.A. § 12183(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990).
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area, unless doing so would be "disproportionate" to the overall
cost and scope of the alterations. 341 While the Act calls for the
Attorney General to establish standards for disproportionality, 342
House committee reports suggest that a standard of thirty percent
of the alteration costs would be appropriate.

43

One statutory exception to the accessibility requirements imposed on newly constructed or altered buildings establishes that
an elevator is not required in facilities that have fewer than three
stories or have less than 3000 square feet per story, unless the
building is a shopping center, shopping mall, or office of a health
care provider. 44 However, the legislative history makes clear that
all buildings must have an accessible ground floor.34
Accessibility requirements in the Act are phrased in terms
of
making facilities and vehicles "readily accessible to and usable by"
individuals with disabilities. This phrase is a term of art that has
been used in prior legislation and federal regulations. 346 The ADA
committee reports summarize the basic parameters of the concept:
41Id.
342

Id.

3 H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 113 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 485,

101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 64 (1990). Surprisingly, the proposed regulations of the
Attorney General implementing this section offer three options that are being considered
to define the disproportionality standard-10%, 20%, and 30%. 56 FED. REG. 7491 § 36.403
(Feb. 22, 1991). To explain the choice of alternatives that are below the the committees'
recommedation, the Department of Justice declares only that "[s]maller percentage rates,
however, may also be appropriate." Id. at 7478.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12183(b) (West Supp. 1990).
345 136 CONG. REC. E 1919 (daily ed. June 13, 1990) (statement of Rep. Hoyer).
3" The committee reports note:
The phrase "readily accessible to and usable by" is a term of art which, in slightly
varied formulations, has been applied in the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968
("ready access to, and use of"), the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as amended ("readily
accessible to and usable by"), and the regulations implementing section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("readily accessible to and usable by") and is included
in standards used by Federal agencies and private industry, e.g., the Uniform
Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS) ("ready access to and use of") and the
American National Standard for Buildings and Facilities-Providing Accessibility
and Usability for Physically Handicapped People (ANSI A117.1) ("readily accessible to, and usable by").
S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 2, at 117 (1990).
Detailed standards, with schematic drawings, have been developed to guide its application under previous laws and regulations. See, e.g., Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards issued jointly by the General Services Administration, the Department of Defense,
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the United States Postal Service,
49 Fed. Reg. 31,528 (1984).
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The term is intended to enable people with disabilities
(including mobility, sensory, and cognitive impairments)
to get to, enter and use a facility. While the term does
not necessarily require the accessibility of every part of
every area of a facility, the term contemplates a high
degree of convenient accessibility, entailing accessibility
of parking areas, accessible routes to and from the facility, accessible entrances, usable bathrooms and water
fountains, accessibility of public and common use areas,
and access to the goods, services, programs, facilities,
accommodations and work areas available at the
facility 47
The legislative history also provides some additional guidance as
to the application of accessibility standards to particular circum348
stances and types of facilities.
Title III also establishes requirements for nonpublic entities
which furnish transportation services. These private entities must
provide to individuals with disabilities service equivalent to that
which is available to others. 349 Fixed-route vehicles seating more
than 16 passengers, solicited for purchase or lease on or after
August 26, 1990, must be accessible.350 In addition, the Act requires the elimination of readily achievable "transportation barriers in existing vehicles and rail passenger cars used by an estab' 35
lishment for transporting individuals. 1
The Act sets forth particular requirements for those private
entities that are "primarily in the business of transporting people. '352 Such entities must comply with many of the same nondiscrimination requirements that affect public accomodations generally, including those regarding eligibility criteria, reasonable
37 S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 117-18 (1990).
34

See, e.g., S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 69-70 (1989); H.R. REP. No.

485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 117-19 (1990).
149

42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1990); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(C)

(West Supp. 1990).
350 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1990). "Demand responsive systems"
are subject to a similar vehicle accessibility requirement, except that they are excused if
they "can demonstrate that such system, when viewed in its entirety, provides a level of
service to individuals with disabilities equivalent to that provided to individuals without
disabilities." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(C)(ii) (West Supp. 1990).
35142 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (West Supp. 1990).
31242 U.S.C.A. § 12184(a) (West Supp. 1990).

480

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol. 26

modifications, auxiliary aids and services and barrier removal. 353
In addition, over-the-road buses 354 solicited for lease or purchase
on or after July 26, 1996 (or one year later for "small providers")
must be accessible. 355 Other new buses and vans seating eight or
more persons that are solicited for purchase or lease on or after
August 26, 1990, must also be accessible, unless they are to be
used exclusively in a demand-responsive system, in which case
the entity can satisfy the accessibility requirement by demonstrating that the system in its entirety provides an equivalent level of
service to people with disabilities as to others. 356 Smaller vans are
required to be accessible in the same time frame unless the entity
can demonstrate that the system for which the van is being obtained (whether demand-responsive or not) provides an equivalent
357
level of service to persons with disabilities.
c. Remedies
The Secretary of Transportion must issue regulations which
35
give effect to the provisions of title III on or before July 26, 1991. 1
The Attorney General must do likewise for all other requirements. 359 The "remedies and procedures set forth" in section 204(a)
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964360 apply to any person who is being
discriminated against or has reasonable grounds to believe that
she is about to be subjected to discrimination that violates title
111.361 This authorizes an aggrieved person to initiate a court action
for injunctive relief for the cessation or prevention of discrimination. The Act expressly provides that such injunctive relief may
include orders that a facility be altered to achieve accessibility or
that an auxiliary aid or service be provided. 362

31342 U.S.C.A. § 12184(b)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 1990).

3-4 An "over-the-road bus" is defined as "a bus characterized by an elevated passenger
deck located over a baggage compartment." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(5) (West Supp. 1990).
35542 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(D)(ii) (West Supp. 1990); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12186(a)(2) (West
Supp. 1990). After completion of a study by the Office of Technology Assessment, the
President may extend these deadlines by one year. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12185(d) (Vest Supp,
1990).
35642 U.S.C.A. § 12184(b)(3) (West Supp. 1990).
35742 U.S.C.A. § 12184(b)(5) (West Supp. 1990).
35842 U.S.C.A. § 12186(a) (West Supp. 1990).
35942 U.S.C.A. § 12186(b) (West Supp. 1990).
360 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1988).
361 42 U.S.C.A. § 12188(a)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
367 42 U.S.C.A. § 12188(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990).
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In addition to providing an individual private right of action,
the Act directs the Attorney General to investigate alleged violations and to conduct compliance reviews. 363 When the Attorney
General has reasonable cause to believe that someone is engaging
in a "pattern or practice" of discrimination or that a particular
instance of discrimination raises "an issue of general public importance," the Attorney General is authorized to commence a civil
action in federal court. 364 In such an action, federal courts are
authorized to grant, in addition to the injunctive relief available in
private actions, "such other relief as the court considers to be
appropriate, including monetary damages to persons aggrieved,
when requested by the Attorney General. '365 Moreover, where the
court deems it appropriate to "vindicate the public interest" in a
case brought by the Attorney General, it may assess "a civil penalty" of up to $50,000 for a first violation, and up to $100,000 for
366
any subsequent violations.
An amendment adopted on the floor of the House of Representatives added to title III a provision that postpones the right to
file civil actions, except for those relating to accessibility of new
construction or alterations of facilities. 367 It provides that (1) no
lawsuit may be filed until July 26, 1992, against businesses with
twenty-five or fewer employees and gross receipts of $1 million or
less; and (2) no lawsuit may be filed until January 26, 1993, against
businesses with ten or fewer employees and gross receipts of
368
$500,000 or less.
4. Telecommunications
a. Coverage
Title IV of the Americans with Disabilities Act regulates two
types of telecommunications services-telephone transmissions
and television public service announcements. The former applies

3

42 U.S.C.A. § 12188(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1990).
§ 12188(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1990).

3"42 U.S.C.A.

w 42 U.S.C.A. § 12188(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1990). Such "other relief" and "monetary
damages" may not include punitive damages. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12188(b)(4) (West Supp. 1990).
m642 U.S.C.A. § 12188(b)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1990).
36 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181 note (West Supp. 1990). See also 136 CONG. REc. H2464-67
(daily ed. May 17, 1990).
w 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181 note (West Supp. 1990).
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to phone companies, defined in the statute as every "common
carrier providing telephone voice transmission services. '369 "Common carrier" is defined to include those engaged in communication
370
by wire or radio, whether it be interstate or intrastate.
The public service announcement provisions create obligations upon three categories of entities: (1) federal government
agencies that produce or fund television public service announcements (PSAs); (2) individuals or agencies who produce such PSAs
with full or partial funding provided by a federal agency; and
(3) television broadcast station licensees who broadcast PSAs.
b. Requirements
The ADA addresses the issue of telephone relay services by
amending title II of the Communications Act of 1934,371 adding a

new section entitled "Telecommunications Services for Hearing
Impaired and Speech-Impaired Individuals. '372 Currently, hearingor speech-impaired individuals can only communicate by telephone with the aid of a Telecommunication Device for the Deaf
(TDD). A TDD permits the transmission of a message over the
telephone network through the use of a typewriter-style device
with a message display. Since TDD users can communicate only
with other users of TDDs, access to the community at large is
373
significantly limited.
Telephone relay services offer a solution to this problem:
Current technology allows for communications between
a TDD user and a voice telephone user by employing a
type of relay system. Such systems include a third party
operator who completes the connection between the two
parties and who transmits messages back and forth in real
time between the TDD user and the hearing individual.
The originator of the call communicates to the operator
either by voice or TDD. The operator then uses a video

36947 U.S.C.A. § 225(c) (West Supp. 1990).
370 47

U.S.C.A. § 225(a)(1) (West Supp. 1990).

37147 U.S.C. 88 201-613 (1988).

37247 U.S.C.A. § 225 (West Supp. 1990).

373See generally S. REp. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1989); H.R. REp. No.
485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 129 (1990).
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display system to translate the typed or voice message
374
simultaneously from one medium to the other.
The new section added to the Communications Act requires that
companies offering telephone services to the public provide telephone relay services to individuals who use TDDs or similar de375
vices throughout the areas which they serve.
The need for captioning of television public service announcements also prompted an amendment to the Communications Act
of 1934. In a short and largely undiscussed provision, the ADA
amends section 711 of the Communications Act to require that
"[a]ny television public service announcement that is produced or
funded in whole or in part by any agency or instrumentality of
Federal Government shall include closed captioning of the verbal
content of such announcement. '376 The statutory provision provides that a television broadcast station is not required to supply
closed captioning for any such announcement that fails to include
it, and is not liable for broadcasting an uncaptioned announcement
unless it "intentionally fails to transmit the closed caption that was
'377
included with the announcement.
The requirements regarding federally funded public service
announcements obviously do not resolve many controversial issues regarding the closed captioning of television programs. 378 The
1988 version of the Americans with Disabilities Act bill included
a provision requiring the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) to promulgate regulations for television broadcast stations
that included "requirements for progressively increasing the pro374
S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 78 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 130 (1990).
37547

U.S.C.A. § 225(c) (West Supp. 1990).

37647

U.S.C.A. § 711 (West Supp. 1990). "Closed captioning" refers to a system that

allows only viewers with a decoder to view the captions. In contrast, in "open captioning"
subtitles appear on the screens of all viewers. See Community Television v. Gottfried, 459
U.S. 498, 503-04 (1983) (discussing closed captioning and open captioning). There is almost
no formal legislative history explaining this PSA captioning requirement.
X747 U.S.C.A. § 711(2) (West Supp. 1990).
371See, e.g., Community Television v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498; Greater Los Angeles
Council on Deafness v. Community Television, 719 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied
sub nom., Gottfried v. United States, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984) (action on behalf of the hearing

impaired against federal agencies funding television programming and against public broadcasters to compel captioning of television programs); Greater Los Angeles Council on
Deafness v. Baldridge, 827 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1987) (action against Secretary of Commerce
alleging Rehabilitation Act violation by not compelling federally funded stations to caption
entire range of broadcasting activities for the hearing impaired).
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portion of programs, advertisements, and announcements that are
captioned." 379 In addition, the 1988 bill included relatively detailed
provisions for removing "communication barriers" from all types
of programs and activities subject to the Act, including a delineation of what constitutes a communication barrier and the means
that should be used to avoid or remove them. 380 These communications provisions were deleted from the bill during its revision
prior to reintroduction in the 101st Congress in 1989.
c. Remedies
The provisions of title IV fall within the jurisdiction of the
FCC. The telephone relay services requirements take effect on
July 26, 1993.381 The FCC is directed to prescribe regulations
implementing these requirements by July 26, 1991,382 and is
charged with enforcing these provisions and resolving complaints
of violations. 383 The FCC is specifically authorized to undertake
the certification of state programs for meeting the relay services
requirements, 384 and to refer complaints to states for resolution in
385
certain circumstances.
The provisions of title IV regarding captioning of PSAs take
effect immediately upon enactment. The ADA does not include
any specific provisions regarding regulations under or the enforcement of this requirement, but simply amends the Communications
Act of 1934 to make the public service captioning requirement part
of the overall regulatory scheme, enforcement process, and licensing procedures of that Act. 386 The provision creates obligations
for all federal agencies that produce or fund public service announcements and for individuals or agencies that produce such
announcements with full or partial federal funding, as well as
establishes an additional criterion for television broadcast station
7
licensees. 38
379 S. 2345, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 8(g), 134 CONG. REC. S5113 (daily ed. April 28,

1988).
S. 2345, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 8(h), 134 CONG. REC. S5113 (daily ed. April 28,
1988).
38147
38247
38347

U.S.C.A.
U.S.C.A.
U.S.C.A.
- 47 U.S.C.A.
38547 U.S.C.A.
36 47 U.S.C.A.
37

Id.

§ 225(c) (West Supp. 1990).
§ 225(d) (West Supp. 1990).
§ 225(e) (West Supp. 1990).
§ 225(f) (West Supp. 1990).
§ 225(g) (West Supp. 1990).
§ 711 (West Supp. 1990).
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5. Congress and Legislative Branch Agencies
a. Coverage
Title V of the Americans with Disabilities Act includes, inter
alia, section 509, which establishes nondiscrimination provisions
covering the United States Senate, the House of Representatives,
and "instrumentalities of the Congress. ' 388 In the Senate, nondiscrimination obligations are imposed upon the Senate body itself
and each "member, officer, or employee" of the Senate. 389 Coverage of the House of Representatives includes the House itself,
and, for the employment provisions, "any employing authority of"
the House. 390 While title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expressly covered the Library of Congress, 391 and nondiscrimination
provisions of the General Accounting Office Personnel Act of 1980
applied to the General Accounting Office, 392 the ADA's expansive
coverage of Congress and its instrumentalities is unprecedented.
b. Requirements
The provisions of title V of the ADA regarding coverage of
the legislative branch declare that the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the instrumentalities of Congress are each subject
to "the rights and protections under this Act. '393 This applies both
to rights and protections regarding employment and to "matters
other than employment. '394 The statutory language also subjects
the Senate, with respect to employment, to the "rights and protections provided pursuant to" the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the

3 42 U.S.C.A. § 12209(c) (West Supp. 1990). The "instrumentalities of Congress" are
specified to include the Architect of the Capitol, the Congressional Budget Office, the
General Accounting Office, the Government Printing Office, the Library of Congress, the
Office of Technology Assessment, and the United States Botanic Garden.

389
42 U.S.C.A. § 12209(a) (West Supp. 1990).
390
42 U.S.C.A. § 12209(b) (West Supp. 1990).

391
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1982).
392
Pub. L. No. 96-191, 94 Stat. 27 (1980). Section 3(a)(B) of that statute incorporates
by reference the prohibitions of discrimination on the bases of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, age, handicapping conditions, marital status or political affiliation that are
contained in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (1982).
393
42 U.S.C.A. § 12209(a)(2), (a)(6)(A), (b)(2)(A), (b)(3)(A), and (c)(1) (West Supp.
1990).
314
42 U.S.C.A. § 12209(a)(2), (a)(6)(A), (b)(2)(A), (b)(3)(A), and (c)(1) (West Supp.
1990).
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Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, and "the Civil Rights Act of 1990 (S. 2104, 101st
Congress).

' '395

c. Remedies
The effective dates and implementation deadlines of other
provisions of the ADA will apply to the legislative coverage as
well. 396 The enforcement of such rights and protections is assigned,
however, to agencies and instrumentalities within the legislative
branch.
The investigation and adjudication of alleged violations of the
Act's requirements relating to employment practices in the Senate
are delegated to the Select Committee on Ethics or to "such other
entity as the Senate may designate. '397 For Senate matters other
than employment, the Architect of the Capitol is to establish and
submit to the Committee on Rules and Administration "remedies
and procedures" for violations of the Act's requirements. Such
remedies and procedures shall become effective upon approval by
398
the Committee.
Employment practices in the House of Representatives are
subject to "the remedies and procedures" established in the Fair
Employment Practices Resolution, or its successor. 39 9 For matters
in the House other than employment, the Architect of the Capitol
is to establish "remedies and procedures" and submit them to the
Speaker of the House. Upon approval by the Speaker and "after
consultation with the House Office Building Commission," the
40
remedies and procedures shall take effect. 1
For other instrumentalities of Congress, the "chief official of
each instrumentality" must establish remedies and procedures for
enforcing the requirements of the Act. 401 The Act declares that
39- 42 U.S.C.A. § 12209(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990). The Civil Rights Act of 1990 was
vetoed by President Bush. This statutory cross-reference to unenacted legislation raises
significant questions ofjudicial implementation.
39 42 U.S.C.A. § 12209(a)(2), (a)(6)(A), (b)(2)(A), (B)(3)(A), (c)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
The Act does not specify deadlines for the establishment of the various "remedies and
procedures" called for in the legislative coverage provisions.
39742 U.S.C.A. § 12209(a)(3) (West Supp. 1990).

39342 U.S.C.A. § 12209(a)(6)(B), (C) (West Supp. 1990).

399 42 U.S.C.A. § 12209(b)(2)(B) (citing House Resolution 558 of the 100th Congress,
as agreed to Oct. 4, 1988) (West Supp. 1990).

4w 42 U.S.C.A. § 12209(b)(3)(B), (C) (West Supp. 1990).
40142 U.S.C.A. § 12209(c)(2) (West Supp. 1990).
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"[s]uch remedies and procedures shall apply exclusively. ' 402 The
chief official is also required to submit a report to Congress de40 3
scribing the remedies and procedures that have been established.
6. Insurance
a. Coverage
Among the public accommodations listed in title III is an
"insurance office."'404 The public accommodations provisions make
it unlawful for such an entity to deny opportunities to individuals
with disabilities or otherwise treat them unequally in regard to any
of the "goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations" provided. 405 Manifestly, this would include insurance coverage-the principal good, service, privilege and advantage provided by an "insurance office."
The Act delineates prohibited insurance practices somewhat
obliquely through its description of certain protected insurance
activities. Thus, the ADA expressly shields insurance entities from
potential liability to the extent they act in accordance with state
law and insurance practices regarding administration of insurance
risks. 40 6 This protection is afforded to: "an insurer, hospital or
medical service company, health maintainence organization, or
any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or similar organizations," creating a clear inference that such entities are cov407
ered by the Act.
b. Requirements
The Act imposes requirements on insurance companies to the
extent that insurance entities are covered by the nondiscrimination
provisions of the legislation. While worded as statements of protected practices, the insurance provisions of ADA have converse
consequences-they establish that insurers and administrators of

402 Id.

40 42
41"42
40542
42
406
407
Id.

U.S.C.A. § 12209(c)(3) (West Supp. 1990).
U.S.C.A. § 12181(7)(F) (West Supp. 1990).
U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1990).
U.S.C.A. § 12201(c)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
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insurance are subject to potential liability if they do not act consistently with state law or proper insurance underwriting practices.
That these provisions impose restrictions upon insurance
practices was expressly noted in the committee reports. The Senate report provides some examples of the application of the provisions regarding insurance:
For example, a blind person may not be denied coverage
based on blindness independent of actuarial risk classification. Likewise, with respect to group health insurance
coverage, an individual with a pre-existing condition may
be denied coverage for that condition for the period specified in the policy but cannot be denied coverage for
illnesses or injuries unrelated to the pre-existing
condition. 408
The House report, in addition to closely tracking the language of
the Senate report, explicitly noted that the ADA "requires that
underwriting and classification of risks be based on sound actuarial
principles or be related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience. ' ' 40 9 This requirement of strict adherence to "sound actuarial
principles" had never been achieved prior to the ADA.
In addition, underwriting, classification or administering of
risks not based on or inconsistent with state law exposes the entity
to liability under the provisions of the ADA as well as under
applicable state law. 410 Further, insurance plans must be "bona
fide. ' 41 Finally, the Act explicitly states that the exemption of
40' S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 85 (1989); See also H.R. REP. No. 485,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 71 (1990). Both reports also included the following analysis:

Moreover, while a plan which limits certain kinds of coverage based on classification of risk would be allowed under this section, the plan may not refuse to
insure, or refuse to continue to insure, or limit the amount, extent, or kind of
coverage available to an individual, or charge a different rate for the same coverage
solely because of a physical or mental impairment, except where the refusal,
limitation, or rate differential is based on sound actuarialprinciples or is related
to actual or reasonably anticipatedexperience.

S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 85 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 3, at 71 (1990) (emphasis added).
409 H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 71 (1990).
410
411

42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(c)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
42 U.S.C.A. § 12202(c)(1), (2) (West Supp. 1990). Although the Act does not define

the term "bona fide," the language in the committee reports would seem to indicate that
only plans based on "sound actuarial principles" qualify as "bona fide" plans.
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legitimate insurance plans "shall not be used as a subterfuge to
evade the purposes" of the prohibitions against employment and
412
public accommodation discrimination.
Since the ADA prohibits discrimination "on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,...
privileges, [or] . . . advantages" of an insurance office, 413 the
importance of the Act with respect to guaranteeing nondiscriminatory treatment of persons with disabilities is clear. The general
public is offered insurance based on sound actuarial principles,
and the ADA requires that insurance companies provide the same
service to persons with disabilities or face potential liability. 41 4
c. Remedies
Direct coverage of insurance practices is accomplished
through the public accommodations provisions of the Act, which
list "insurance office" as a covered entity. 415 As such, the enforcement provisions and implementation deadlines governing the insurance industry will be those described for public accommodations generally, including private rights of action and enforcement
416
by the Attorney General.
In addition to directly regulating insurance companies, the
ADA also indirectly protects against insurance discrimination
through its provisions regarding employment "fringe benefits" 417
418
and state and local regulation of insurance providers.
412

42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(c) (West Supp. 1990).

41342 U.S.C.A. § 12182(a) (West Supp. 1990).
424 This conclusion is supported by the committee reports. See supra notes 408-410.
41s42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(7)(F) (West Supp. 1990).

426 42 U.S.C.A. § 12188 (West Supp. 1990).
417
The nondiscrimination requirement in employment expressly applies to all "terms,

conditions, and privileges of employment" and to "fringe benefits." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a),
(b)(2) (West Supp. 1990). The prohibition of discrimination applies to "fringe benefits
available by virtue of employment, whether or not administered by the [employer]." S.
REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 25 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 2, at 55 (1990). 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(6) (1991). Insurance is one of the benefits or privileges
of employment covered by these provisions. S.REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 85
(1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 136-37 (1990); H.R. REP. No.

485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 71 (1990).

41AThe coverage of all instrumentalities of state and local government would include
"insurance commissions" or other agencies by which state and local governments regulate

the practices of insurance providers and administrators. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12131(1)(B) (West
Supp. 1990).
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7. Examinations and Coursesfor Educational,Professional,
or Trade Credentials
The House Committee on the Judiciary adopted an amendment to the ADA that created a new section in title III dealing
with examinations or courses related to applications, licensing,
certification, or credentialing for professional, educational, or
trade purposes. 4 19 Any person offering such courses or examina-

tions must do so in "a place or manner" that is accessible to
persons with disabilities or must offer alternative accessible arrangements. 420 The Committee explained that the purpose of the
section was to fill a gap in coverage of such examinations and
courses that occurred when exams or courses were offered by
someone who was neither a recipient of federal financial assistance, and thus subject to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
nor an agent of the state or local government, and thus subject to
title II of the ADA. 42' The accessibility requirement applies to both
the ability physically to get to the examination or course site and
the rendering of accommodations in the way in which the course
or test is administered to permit individuals with disabilities an
equal opportunity to participate. 422 Given the prevalence of courses
and examinations as gateways to educational, trade, and professional opportunities, this section of the Act has far-reaching
implications .423

419 42 U.S.C.A. § 12189 (West Supp. 1990).
420

Id.

421 H.R.

REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 68 (1990).

422Id. 56 Fed. Reg. 7488-89 § 36.310 (Feb. 22, 1991) (proposed rule of the Department

of Justice).
423Bar examinations and review courses, medical boards, CPA examinations, college
entrance and law school admission tests, and professional continuing education courses
come readily to mind. On October 27, 1990 the National Conference on Bar Examiners
added the following to its Code of Recommended Standards for Bar Examiners:
Without impairing the integrity of the examination process, the bar examining
authorities should adopt and publish procedures allowing applicants with documented disabilities to have assistance, equipment, or additional time as is reasonably necessary under the circumstances to assure their fair and equal opportunity
to perform on the examination.
Standard 22. The Conference also adopted a statement of "Consideration in Testing Candidates with Disabilities" that provides additional guidance for testing persons with various
types of disabilities.
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8. Miscellaneous Enforcement Provisions
Title V of the ADA contains several additional provisions
relating to procedural and enforcement issues. One noteworthy
provision authorizes the court or agency, in any action or administrative proceeding pursuant to the Act, to award the prevailing
party "a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses,
and costs. '424 This provision is innovatively broad, both because
it is available in administrative proceedings as well as court suits,
and because it includes litigation expenses, such as fees of expert
witnesses and consultants, in addition to attorney remuneration
and costs.
Another important section explicitly abrogates states' immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment. 425 Pursuant to the
Supreme Court's decision in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 426 Congress may, pursuant to legislation adopted under section
five of the fourteenth amendment, abrogate state immunity from
suits but only if such abrogation is effected by "the most express
language" and an "unequivocal expression of Congressional intent. ' 427 The language of the ADA satisfies this standard: "A State
shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State
court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of the Act." 428 The
Act makes legal and equitable remedies available from states on
the same basis as they are available from other persons. 429
Other provisions of title V prohibit retaliation, interference,
coercion or intimidation against a person for exercising rights under the Act, aiding or encouraging a person to exercise rights under
the Act, or participating in an investigation, hearing or other pro430
ceeding under the Act.

42442 U.S.C.A. § 12205 (West Supp. 1990).

42 42 U.S.C.A. § 12202 (West Supp. 1990).
426473 U.S. 234 (1985).

427473 U.S. at 240. A plurality of the Court recently held that Congress may also
abrogate states' immunity pursuant to legislation adopted under the Commerce Clause.

Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
42 42 U.S.C.A. § 12202 (West Supp. 1990).
429 Id.
41042 U.S.C.A. § 12203 (West Supp. 1990).
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D. Entities Exempted from Coverage
In addition to delineating who is covered by the Act and
subject to its nondiscrimination requirements, the Act also exempts certain entities from statutory coverage. In title I the United
States, United States government-owned corporations, and Native
American tribes are not included in the definition of "employer. ' 43t
Also exempted from the employment requirements of the ADA
432
are private membership clubs.
Private clubs and religious organizations are also exempt from
the public accommodations provisions of the ADA. The private
club exemption applies to "private clubs or establishments exempted from coverage under title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964." 433 The exemption for religious organizations applies to such
organizations themselves and to "entities controlled by religious
organizations, including places of worship. '434 The committee reports indicate that this exemption is modeled upon a similar exemption in title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, as
amended, and should be interpreted similarly. 435 The title IX provision exempts institutions controlled by a religious organization
from the sex nondiscrimination requirements of that Act "if the
application of this subsection would not be consistent with the
43 6
religious tenets of such organization.
III. Implications for Future Civil Rights Laws
This Part examines the broader ramifications of the Act as a
harbinger of possible approaches for future civil rights laws. The
43142 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1990). Identical exemptions appear in the
definition of "employer" in title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(1988). The ADA does not, however, incorporate an exception for departments or agencies
of the District of Columbia as is established in the Civil Rights Act. Id. Executive agencies
of the United States are subject to the disability nondiscrimination requirement of section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
43242

U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1990) excludes "a bona fide private

membership club (other than a labor organization) that is exempt from taxation under
section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986." This language closely tracks the
language of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(2) (1988).
43342 U.S.C.A. § 12187 (West Supp. 1990).
434 Id.

43 S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 125 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 66 (1990).
436 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (1988). Assuming interpretation of the ADA adheres to
existing interpretation of title IX, the exemption would be available only to the extent that
a religious organization could point to a specific tenet of its faith that would be violated by
compliance with the Act.
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ADA differs from prior civil rights laws in several significant respects. The ultimate issue is whether these differences represent
improvements that should be incorporated into future legislation
safeguarding civil rights, or pitfalls and weaknesses that should be
avoided.
A. Scope of Activities Covered
A prominent innovative feature of the ADA is the unprecedented scope of activities and entities it regulates. The statute
breaks new ground through its broad coverage of public accommodations and its regulation of Congress and the insurance
industry.
1. Public Accommodations
a. Under Title II
The list of establishments covered by title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 focused on the businesses that had generated the most
serious problems of segregation. 437 Although early versions of the
Act included broad coverage provisions, 438 the Act as passed regulated a much narrower range of public facilities.
The list of public accommodations covered by title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 as enacted contrasts sharply with the
original concept of public accommodations President Kennedy
discussed when he first proposed such a law during his civil rights
message of June 19, 1963. He declared that:

437 Title II of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion or national origin in places of public accommodation. The Act defined "public
accommodation" to include inns, hotels, motels, and other lodging establishments; restaurants, cafeterias, lunchrooms, lunch counters, soda fountains, and other facilities selling
food for consumption on the premises; gasoline stations; and motion picture houses,
theaters, concert halls, sports arenas, stadiums, and other places of exhibition or entertainment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1988).
438An earlier version of the Civil Rights Act included a provision that would have
covered "any other establishment where goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations are held out to the public for sale, use, rent, or hire, if... a substantial
portion of any goods held out to the public by any such place or establishment for sale,
use, rent, or hire has moved in interstate commerce." Hearingson Civil Rights Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary,88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 653 (1963), quoted in Miller
v. Amusement Enterprises, 391 F.2d 86, app. at 90 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd 394 F.2d 342 (5th
Cir. 1968) (en banc).
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Federal action is needed now to secure the right of all
citizens to the full enjoyment of all facilities which are
open to the general public .... For these reasons, I am

today proposing, as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1963,
a provision to guarantee all citizens equal access to the
services and facilities of hotels, restaurants, places of
439
amusement, and retail establishments .
In his testimony on the bill before the House Committee on the
Judiciary, Attorney General Robert Kennedy offered reasons for
a more narrow approach to coverage of public accommodations.
He began by declaring that "[t]he basic purposes of title II are to
embody in legislative form a strong expression of the American
people's disapproval of racial discrimination in places open to the
general public and to eliminate the significant sources of this daily
insult to millions of our fellow citizens. '440 He acknowledged that
all business enterprises would have to be included to achieve this
purpose, but declined to go so far because, in his view, a broad
conception of public accommodations would include establishments that did not customarily discriminate and because passage
of the Act would induce nondiscrimination on a voluntary basis.441
b. Under the ADA
The ADA extends the list of public accommodations beyond
those covered by the 1964 Civil Rights Act and takes a much
broader view of the concept, akin to President Kennedy's suggestion of civil rights protection for "all facilities which are open to
the general public." The list of covered entities contained in the
ADA442 is much more comprehensive than that of title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. With the exception of sales or rentals of
residential housing, the twelve categories include almost every
type of operation which is open to business or contact with the
general public.
439
Id. pt. 2, at 1448-49, quoted in Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, 391 F.2d at 90.
440Id.

pt. 4, at 2653, 2655, quoted in Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, 391 F.2d at 91.
Id. pt. 4, at 2653, 2655-56, quoted in Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, 391 F.2d at
91. Senator Humphrey's remarks in Congress underscore this reduction in the scope of the
original proposal. 110 CONG. REc. 6533 (1964).
442
42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(7) (West Supp. 1990); see supra notes 302-303 and accompanying text. Entities must also "affect commerce" to come under the provisions of the
44

Act. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181 (West Supp. 1990).
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Earlier versions of the ADA legislation did not include a specific list of categories of public accommodations. When the bill
was reintroduced in the 101st Congress in 1989, it covered privately owned establishments "whose operations affect commerce"
and were "used by the general public as customers, clients, or
visitors or were potential places of employment." 443 Attorney General Thornburgh expressed to Congress the Administration's concerns regarding the broad scope of its coverage of public accommodations and its extension beyond the types of businesses
covered in title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 444
Prior to the Attorney General's appearance, the author testified before Congress, advocating a broad concept of public accommodations extending beyond the title II model:
There is no sense to having certain facilities that are more
needed by people with disabilities be closed off, when
other facilities are open to them.
For example, it makes no sense to bar discrimination
against people with disabilities in theaters, but not in
shops; or restaurants, and not in stores; or by places of
entertainment, but not in regard to such important things
as doctors' offices. It makes no sense that you can't be
discriminated against on the basis of disability of [sic] you
want to buy a pastrami sandwich at the local deli, but
at the
that you can be discriminated against next door
445
prescription.
a
fill
to
need
pharmacy where you
In his questioning of Attorney General Thornburgh during the
Committee hearings, Senator Harkin quoted from this testimony
and from President Bush's call for "meaningful access to all aspects of society," and got the Attorney General to concede that
the President's remarks were consistent with a broad concept of

441S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(2)(A), 135 CONG. REC. S4990 (daily ed. May 9,

1989).
44 Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the Subcomm.
on the Handicappedof the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong.,

Ist Sess. 200, 206 (1989).
44S
Id. at 100 (statement of Robert Burgdorf).
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public accommodations.4 6 The author's testimony regarding the
irrationality of differential treatment of pharmacies vis-a-vis eating
places was quoted in the final ADA committee reports in both the
Senate and the House, 447 and, capsulized as "pastrami sandwiches
but not prescriptions," became a rallying cry for broad coverage
of public accommodations. 448
Subsequent negotiations between representatives of the disability community and the Bush Administration resulted in the list
of specified entities covered by the Act. The Administration agreed
to a broad list in return for concessions reformulating the remedies
available under the Act. 449 The final formulation of places of public
accommodations appears to equal the breadth of scope of the more
generic approach it supplanted.
c. An Alternative ConstitutionalTheory for Congressional
Authority to Regulate Businesses Open to the Public
With the exception of title II of the ADA, which regulates the
"state action" of state and local governments pursuant to Congress' power to enforce the fourteenth amendment, each of the
remaining titles of the Act explicitly regulates activities that "affect
commerce." Although the first federal law broadly proscribing
discrimination in public accommodations was invalidated in 1883
by the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases,450 that decision
left open the question whether laws regulating places of public
accommodation could validly be enacted by Congress pursuant to
its powers to regulate commerce. 451

446 Id. at 206 (quoting remarks of then Vice President Bush on March 31, 1988). In
regard to the narrower concept of public accommodations in title II, the Attorney General
added: "It is not that we are necessarily drawing the line there, but that is an area I think
is appropriate for further discussion to make sure that when we are sailing into unknown
waters we have a clear notion of what our direction is and what perils may be there." Id.
447S. REP. No. 101-116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1989); H. REP. No. 101-485, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 35 (1990).
44 Yost, Tedious Meetings, Testy Exchanges Produced Disability-Rights Bill, Wash.
Post, Aug. 7, 1989, at A4, col. 1.
49 BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: A
PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE TO IMPACT, ENFORCEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 40-41

(1990).
450109 U.S. 3 (1883) (Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional since congressional
power under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment was confined to enforcing prohibitions of
"state action" under § 1).
451109 U.S. at 19.
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Subsequent decisions, especially those upholding title II of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, made it clear that congressional power
under the commerce clause is exceedingly broad. 452 Nevertheless,
in framing title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress was aware
of "what was thought to be the obstacle of the Civil Rights
Cases.'' 453 Given the broad scope of congressional authority under
modem interpretations of the commerce clause, particularly in
prohibiting discrimination, restrictive conceptions of congressional
authority to guarantee equal access to public accommodations are
454
anachronistic.
Although the Civil Rights Cases decision stands for the proposition that federal regulation of public accommodations was not
authorized under the fourteenth amendment unless "state action"
was implicated, 455 some members of the Supreme Court have subsequently disagreed with this premise. 45 6 This subsection advocates an alternative font of congressional authority to regulate
businesses open to the public that is latent in the opinions of some
later members of the Court. Such an alternative approach is motivated in part by a belief that freedom from discrimination in
public accommodations, in the words of Justice Douglas, "occupies a more protected position in our constitutional system than
does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state
lines ."47

In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court assumed, but found it
unnecessary to decide "that a right to enjoy equal accommodation
and privileges in all inns, public conveyances, and places of public
amusement is one of the essential rights of the citizen ... ."458
Some seven years prior to the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme
4S2 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach
v. MeClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
413 Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 284 (Douglas, J., concurring) (referring to S. REP.
No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13). See also id. at 273 (Black, J., concurring) (Congress
excluded some establishments from title II "because it believed its powers to regulate and

protect interstate commerce did not extend so far").
454 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-8, at 316

(2d ed. 1988) (noting that "[c]ontemporary commerce clause doctrine grants Congress such
broad power that judicial review of affirmative authorization for congressional action is
largely a formality").
45s 109 U.S. at 22-24.
456See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 279-81 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at
290-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
417 Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 279 (Douglas, J., concurring), quoting Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring).
458109 U.S. at 19.
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Court declared in Munn v. Illinois that "when private property is
devoted to a public use, it is subject to public regulation. '459 The
Court traced the concept of "public use" to ancient common law
and argued further that
property does become clothed with a public interest when
used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and
affect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an
interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in
that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public
for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has
thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing
the use; but, so long as he maintains the use, he must
460
submit to the control.
In Munn, the Court was addressing the propriety of state
regulation of public use establishments, but given the extensive
authority Congress has come to wield in regulating commerce,
there is little doubt that commercial establishments serving such
a "public use" are within the ambit of federal regulation to the
extent that they affect interstate commerce, and thus are subject
to the public use analysis in Munn.461 The conceptual underpinnings of President Kennedy's call in 1963 for federal action "to
secure the right of all citizens to the full enjoyment of all facilities
which are open to the general public" can thus be viewed as
consistent with the Munn analysis of federal authority to regulate
establishments devoted to a public use, coupled with the tremendous expansion of congressional power over commerce in Court
decisions in the years since Munn.
Twelve days before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was signed
into law, the Supreme Court of the United States announced its
45

9 94 U.S. 113, 130 (1876).
"0Id. at 126. Expanding upon the common law conception of the rights and responsibilities of innkeepers and common carriers, the Court in Munn considered various types
of establishments and professions as constituting public uses subject to governmental
regulation: ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers,
chimney sweeps, cartmen, wagoners, carmen, draymen, auctioneers, mills, bridges, turnpikes and warehouses (the business at issue in Munn). Id. at 125-31.
461Indeed, in a somewhat different context Chief Justice Burger writing for a plurality
,of the Court in Richmond Newpapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), recognized that
there is a "right of access to places traditionally open to the public" that arises from first
amendment rights of assembly, speech, and freedom of the press. Id. at 576.
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decision in Bell v. Maryland.462 In their concurring opinions in that
case, Justices Douglas and Goldberg discussed their views about
the rights of citizens to have access to places of public accommodation. Justice Douglas declared: "We deal here with public
accommodations-with the right of people to eat and travel as they
like and to use facilities whose only claim to existence is serving
the public. '463 This right, concluded Justice Douglas, is one of the
464
"incidents of national citizenship."
In an opinion in which he was joined by Justice Douglas and
Chief Justice Warren, Justice Goldberg argued that a right of equal
access to public places was fundamental and that "[tihe constitutional right of all Americans to be treated as equal members of the
community with respect to public accommodations is a civil right
granted by the people in the Constitution. '465 He suggested further
that this right could be protected by Congress pursuant to its
authority under both the commerce clause and section five of the
fourteenth amendment. He added that "[i]n the give-and-take of
the legislative process, Congress can fashion a law drawing the
guidelines necessary and appropriate to facilitate practical administration and to distinguish between genuinely public and private
accommodations. ' 466 Justice Goldberg reviewed the concepts of
common carriers and public accommodations in "the good old
common law" and "ancient Anglo-American tradition," 467 and the
public use analysis of Munn v. Illinois, concluding that the framers
of the fourteenth amendment and the congressional enacters of
prior civil rights legislation were "not thinking only in terms of
existing common-law duties but were thinking more generally of
customary expectations . . . with respect to places which were
'468

considered public.
When, in the same year it decided the Bell case, the Supreme
Court addressed the constitutionality of the public accommoda- 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
461 Id. at 247 (Douglas, J., concurring).
"
4

Id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 317 (Goldberg, I., concurring).
Id.

Id. at 296-97.
378 U.S. at 298 n.17. "[Tihe 'Fourteenth Amendment makes no attempt to enumerate the rights it was designed to protect,' for those who adopted it were conscious that
a constitutional 'principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth."' Id. (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) and
47
46

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1909)).
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tions provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States469 and Katzenbach v. McClung,4 0 it was
faced with a statute that regulated a relatively narrow category of
public accommodations. Consequently, in upholding title II as a
valid exercise of the congressional power to regulate interstate
commerce, the Court had no occasion to consider how far the
right of equal access could extend. Both the Court's opinion in
Heart of Atlanta and the concurring opinion of Justice Goldberg
do, however, quote the statement of the Senate Commerce Committee that the basic purpose of title II was to address "the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal
access to public establishments. '471 Certainly, nothing in the Heart
of Atlanta, McClung or other decisions of the Court suggests that
Congress may not, if it chooses, regulate a much broader range of
"public accommodations" so long as the regulated entities are
deemed by Congress to affect interstate commerce, or such regulation is authorized by some other constitutional font of federal
legislative authority, such as section five of the fourteenth amendment. Accepting the approach of Justices Goldberg and Douglas,
the fourteenth amendment alone would give Congress sufficient
authority to pass a law mandating equal treatment of citizens in
places open to the public.
d. Implicationsfor the Future
Extending the coverage of the ADA far beyond the public
accommodations covered under title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 represents a congressional acceptance of a straightforward
principle that places that are open to the public should be equally
open to all segments of the public without discrimination. Most
lay people and attorneys not closely familiar with federal civil
rights statutes assume that grocery stores, bakeries, hardware
stores, drug stores and other retail establishments open to the
public are covered by such laws and are prohibited from discriminating. The limited concept of public accommodations under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was dictated not by logic and reason but
by the constraints of legal false starts and historical accident.
- 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
410379 U.S. 294 (1964).

471
Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 250 (quoting S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
16 (1964)); id. at 291-92 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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The "pastrami sandwich but not prescriptions" argument for
expansive coverage of public accommodations during congressional consideration of the ADA echoed sentiments expressed by
Justice Douglas in 1964, when he argued that principles of equal
access to places open to the public applied not just to denials of
interstate transportation or to a restaurant refusing service to black
persons, but also to a hospital refusing admission, to "a drugstore
refusing antibiotics," or to a telephone company refusing to install
a telephone. 472 "Constitutionally speaking, why should Hooper
Food Co., Inc., or Peoples Drug Stores . . .stand on a higher,

more sanctified level than Greyhound Bus when it comes to a
473
constitutional right to pick and choose its customers?"
Title III of the ADA embodies Justice Douglas' approach in
favor of a broad concept of public accommodations and offers a
promising model for expanding the scope of other nondiscrimination provisions-prohibiting establishments in business that serve
the public from picking and choosing their customers on discriminatory grounds.
2. Coverage of the Congress
a. The "Last Great Plantation"
In informal conversations among themselves, congressional
staffers sometimes refer to Capitol Hill as the "Last Great Plantation" because Congress has not subjected itself to most civil
rights statutes that it imposes on other spheres of society. Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies to employees in the
legislative branch who are in the "competitive service" and those
who are employed by the Library of Congress or the General
Accounting Office. 474 But approximately half of congressional employees-including all staff members of Representatives and Senators and employees of congressional committees-have not been
protected by title VII. 475 Both the House and Senate have promulgated rules of conduct that prohibit discriminatory employment

472Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 252-53 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
473
Id. at 254-55 (Douglas, J., concurring).
47442 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1988).
475U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EXTENDING EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY LAW TO CONGRESS 5 (1980) (hereinafter EXTENDING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LAW).
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practices, but these rules are not enforceable in court and admin476
istrative enforcement has been very limited.
b. The ADA
When first drafted, the ADA did not cover Congress. On
September 7, 1989 Senator Grassley offered an amendment that
would expand the ADA's coverage to include Congress. While on
the floor, Senator Grassley recited fifteen different laws "imposing
substantial obligations on the American public," but from which
"Congress has exempted itself. '477 He argued that the coverage of
the ADA "should not exempt this little enclave up here on Capitol
Hill. '478 His amendment, which passed after brief debate stated:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or of Law, the
provisions of this Act shall apply in their entirety to the Senate,
the House of Representatives, and all the instrumentalities of the
'479
Congress, or either House thereof.
When the bill was being considered in the House of Representatives, concerns about the prudence and constitutionality of
authorizing court suits against members of Congress and their
staffs led the House to add language providing that enforcement
of the requirements of the Act as it would apply to the House of
Representatives should be accomplished through existing internal
administrative mechanisms. 480 The Senate subsequently agreed to
replace judicial enforcement with internal administrative processes, but approved a last-minute amendment by Senator Ford
which provided that the Senate subject itself not only to the coverage of the ADA, but also to the obligations of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,

476 Id. at 5-6. Although the United States Commission on Civil Rights proposed to
amend title VII to cover employees in the legislative branch, the 10 years following the
Commission's report saw little congressional action towards accomplishing its
recommendations.
47 135 CONG. REC. S 10780-81 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989). Senator Weicker had originally
proposed such an amendment, but his subsequent election defeat made it impossible for
him to carry through on his pledge. See Discriminatingon the Basis of Handicap:Joint
Hearing on S. 2345 Before the Sitbcomn. on the Handicapped of the Senate Coinn. on
Labor and Human Resources and the Subcommn. on Select Education of the House Conln.
on Education and Labor, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
411Id. at 10781.
479Id. at 10780.
410H.R. REP. No. 101-485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 20 (1990).
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and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.481 As a result, under the final
language of the Act, both the House and Senate are subject to the
rights and protections of the ADA, with enforcement retained in
the legislative branch; the Senate, but not the House, is bound to
482
comply with the other three laws.
c. Constitutional Considerations
During the final consideration of the bill, considerable attention was devoted to whether separation of powers and speech or
debate clause problems would be created by permitting alleged
victims of discrimination by members of Congress or individuals
on their staffs to file suit in federal court. To avoid possible constitutional problems, the ADA provides no cause of action in
federal court for those who have suffered from discrimination at
the hands of the legislative branch. Rather, internal administrative
relief is provided.
Contrary to the views of Congress, however, granting a right
to congressional employees to file a claim under the ADA in federal
court does not implicate separation of powers concerns. The fact
that the judicial branch might sit in judgment over persons in the
legislative branch would not result in undue interference with the
483
functions constitutionally assigned to Congress or the President.
Judging cases or controversies is precisely the role of the judicial
branch under the Constitution and is routinely exercised by the
courts in cases involving either executive or legislative branch
personnel alleged to have violated legal or constitutional
mandates 484

Nor does granting a right to sue to persons alleging discrimination by congressional officials run afoul of the principles of
legislative immunity guaranteed by the speech or debate clause.
41 136 CONG. REC. S9528, 9556 (daily ed. July 11, 1990).
48242 U.S.C.A. § 12209(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990). In a quirk of timing and legislative
drafting, the Act also declares that the Senate is also bound by the rights and protections

provided by the "Civil Rights Act of 1990 (S. 2104, 101st Congress)." Id.

483See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988) (finding the independent
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 constitutional); United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (addressing a claim of executive privilege).
48 The ADA might have raised serious separation of powers problems if the agencies

responsible for enforcing the other provisions of the Act-the EEOC, Attorney General,
FCC, or Secretary of Transportation (all executive branch officials or agencies)-had been
given administrative enforcement authority over alleged violations of the Act by members

of Congress or thcir staffs.
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Article 1, section 6, of the United States Constitution provides
that Senators and Representatives "shall not be questioned in any
other place" for "any speech or debate in either house." The scope
of immunity under the clause has not been limited only to speeches
or debates in the Senate or House, but has been confined by the
courts as applying to "legislative" acts, rather than the broader
range of "political" actions engaged in by legislators. 485 In applying
this legislative/political dichotomy, the Supreme Court has said
that the immunity applicable to legislative activities of Senators
applies to statements on the floor of the Senate and to other
conduct that is "essential to the deliberations of the Senate" or is
"part of the deliberative process. '486 "That Senators generally perform certain acts in their official capacity as Senators does not
necessarily make all such acts legislative in nature. '48 7 Similarly,
in contexts where legislative immunity is conferred to government
officials through the common law, the Supreme Court has applied
a "functional" approach: it is "the nature of the function performed, not the identity of
the actor who performed, that inform[s]
488
our immunity analysis.
The conduct regulated by the Americans with Disabilities
Act-discrimination against individuals with disabilities-is not the
type of activity that is integral or essential to the deliberative or
legislative processes. Therefore, such actions are not within the
scope of activities protected by immunity under the speech or
debate clause. Discrimination in the hiring and treatment of staff,
accessibility of congressional facilities and public functions, and
similar obligations are the focus of the Act. It is hard to see how
the obligations of the ADA would interfere with the legislative
process;489 arguably, they should enhance the proper functioning
of open and fair lawmaking.
41.5
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 528 (1972) (holding that the clause does

not protect "activities that are casually or incidentally related to legislative affairs
[those] not a part of the legislative process itself").
4, Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
487Gravel v. United States. 408 U.S. 606, 624 (1972).
4m Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988) (holding that judicial immunity does
not attach to a judge's staff employment decisions since such decisions are administrative

or managerial in nature).
419 L. TRIBE, supra note 454, at § 5-18 ("[T]here is no reason to suppose that members
of Congress are free to ignore civil rights statutes in hiring and firing staff members ....

[Djiscrimination in hiring seems clearly divorced from any legislative act; judicial inquiry
into such decisions would, it seems, invade no province the Speech or Debate Clause is
designed to protect").
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In an analogous context, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has held that the speech or debate clause does not immunize a member of Congress from suits arising out of staff dismissals
because staff decisions are not legislative tasks. 490 Likewise, if the
Supreme Court were to apply the "functional" approach developed
in the context of governmental immunities under common law
doctrines to the context of congressional immunity under the
speech or debate clause, members of Congress and their staffs
would not be granted immunity from violations of the ADA, for
hiring and firing decisions have been held to be unimmunized,
491
administrative tasks.
d. Implicationsfor the Future
The provisions of the ADA regarding the coverage of Congress represent a major breakthrough-the first time in modern
history that our nation's civil rights statutes have covered federal
lawmakers themselves. Moreover, the Senate has used the ADA
as a vehicle for subjecting itself to the requirements of three other
19 Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding an implied cause of action
under the fifth amendment for a woman who claimed that she was discriminated against
on the basis of her sex by her employer, a United States Congressman). On review, the
Supreme Court did not reach the speech or debate clause issue, but Chief Justice Burger
wrote, in an opinion joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, that in the "performance of
constitutionally defined functions, each member of the House or Senate occupies a position
in the Legislative Branch comparable to that of the President in the Executive Branch; and
for the limited purpose of selecting personal staff, their authority should be uninhibited
except as Congress itself, or the Constitution, expressly provides otherwise." Id. at 250.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has taken a somewhat different
approach to whether the speech or debate clause provides immunity to a member of
Congress who dismisses an employee for illegitimate reasons. It has inquired into whether
the employee's duties were directly related to the due functioning of the legislative process;
hence, a Congressman was granted immunity from suit arising from the dismissal of an
Official Reporter of the United States House of Representatives, Browning v. Clerk, U.S.
House of Representatives, 789 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1986), but was denied immunity from a
suit arising from the dismissal of the House restaurant manager, Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d
923 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
49, Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 538 (1988). Courts have suggested that immunity
analysis in one context may inform immunity analysis in another context. See Supreme
Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 732 (1980) (interpreting limits of state
legislative immunity as analogous to limits on Speech or Debate Clause immunity). In Gross
v. Winter, 876 F.2d 165 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit applied the "functional test" and held that a legislator's employment decisions are
not entitled to legislative immunity. Gross, however, involved a member of the D.C.
Council, and the court expressly reserved its judgment as to whether "special considerations
applicable to members of Congress, such as separation of powers concerns, continue to
justify the absolute immunity standard for congressional personnel decisions .... " Id. at
172.
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civil rights laws-the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973-and one bill that was not enacted-the Civil Rights Act of
1990. This addendum to Senate coverage indicates that the newfound congressional willingness to apply civil rights obligations to
itself is not limited to the disability area.
Perhaps more importantly, the ADA provisions dealing with
congressional coverage have created a precedent for such coverage
in future civil rights legislation. The current exclusion of the House
from civil rights measures other than the ADA has no justification.
It can be understood only as an embarrassing statutory anomaly.
The disparate treatment of the House and the Senate can be expected to generate pressure upon the House to "equalize equality"
by subjecting itself to the requirements of the same civil rights
responsibilities that are now binding upon the Senate. In drafting
future legislation, congressional officials and civil rights advocates
should consider the coverage of Congress and congressional entities as a normal aspect of applying legislative standards to the
nation generally. The notion of a sacrosanct congressional enclave
is obsolete.
Finally, future legislation should revisit the issue of judicial
remedies for violations of statutory obligations applicable to persons in the legislative arm of the United States, and should make
such a remedy available for congressional violations to the same
extent that it is made available to private citizens and to other
branches of the government. Congress is constitutionally permitted
to allow the courts to review the conduct of congressional members and staff to determine whether they have complied with legal
mandates arising under the ADA. Moreover, except in extraordinary or partisan circumstances, Congress may be reluctant to
punish its own through internal mechanisms like those established
in the ADA. 492 The expansion of coverage under the ADA to
include Congress and its agencies was premised upon the unfairness of excepting legislative officials from legal obligations imposed upon other Americans. It is equally unfair to provide most
alleged victims of discrimination the right to a day in court to
establish their claims, while denying such an opportunity to individuals whose claims may be equally just and deprivations equally

492See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 519-20 (1972).
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severe, but who have been the victim of unlawful discrimination
by those who work within the hallowed halls of Congress or one
of its related legislative agencies.
3. Regulation of Insurance
a. PriorCongressionalDeference to the Insurance Industi-y

Prior to the ADA, insurance companies had been exceedingly
successful in lobbying Congress not to regulate the insurance industry, in part because of the early history of judicial limitations
upon such regulation. In 1869, in Paul v. Virginia,493 the Supreme
Court held that insurance contracts did not involve "articles of
commerce," so that even if they were interstate transactions they
were not subject to federal regulation. This holding precipitated
pervasive state regulation of the insurance industry, which continues today despite the fact that Paul v. Virginia was eventually
overruled in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Asso-

ciation.494 When the latter decision generated fears that it might
undermine the legal validity of the thick and complex web of state
laws and regulations governing insurance, Congress responded by
passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 495 which states that "the business of insurance

. . .

shall be subject to the laws of the several

states which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business,"
and that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose
of regulating the business of insurance, .

.

. unless such Act

specifically relates to the business of insurance. ' 496 The Court
subsequently upheld the McCarran-Ferguson Act against constitutional challenge. 497 Since the enactment of McCarran-Ferguson
and prior to the ADA, the Congress had pursued a relatively
consistent policy of leaving regulation of the insurance industry
498
entirely to the states.
493
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).

194
322 U.S. 533 (1944) (applying the Sherman Antitrust Act to insurance companies).

495
Act of Mar. 9, 1945, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988)).
4- 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) & (b) (1988).
491
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
491
Congress, however, has not shied away from taxing certain insurance proceeds.
See, e.g., The National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, 38 U.S.C. §§ 701-724, 781788, as amended by Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 728, §§ 1-14, 60 Stat. 781; the Life Insurance
Company Income Tax Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-69, 73 Stat. 112 (codified as amended

in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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b. The ADA
The ADA departs significantly from Congress' conventional
deference to state regulation of insurance by explicitly placing
federal constraints upon the writing and selling of insurance. Some
federal requirements had previously been imposed upon the insurance industry indirectly by regulating the practices of employers
regarding the health, life, medical and other insurance benefits
they offer, but, under the ADA, providers of insurance are directly
499
covered as one type of public accommodation.
The original concept of the ADA as envisioned by the National
Council on the Handicapped in 1986 incorporated prohibitions on
discrimination by the insurance industry.5 0 The Council recommended such coverage as a result of its finding that "individuals
with disabilities have encountered discrimination in the availability
of insurance; frequently individuals are denied certain types of
insurance coverage because of presumptions about their increased
risks and deficits, even though there may be no adequate actuarial
data supporting such presumptions." 50 1 Disability lobbyists and
congressional staff convinced the Council to remove this provision
from its draft bill prior to its publication in 1988. Such coverage,
albeit not so comprehensively worded,502 was reinserted without
fanfare when the listing approach to public accommodations was
introduced into the bill in the Senate.
c. Implicationsfor the Future
The ADA may offer a useful precedent for federal statutory
proscription of other types of discrimination in regard to insurance,
or for other kinds of federal regulation of the insurance industry.
499
The ADA also establishes indirect obligations regarding insurance by prohibiting
employers from engaging in discrimination regarding "terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment," 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West Supp. 1990), and by prohibiting employers

from participating in contracts with any "organization that provides fringe benefits to an
employee" if such contracts are discriminatory. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b) (West Supp. 1990).

.00
The ADA would cover "faIll persons, companies, and agencies that make use of
the mails or interstate communications and telecommunications services for the business
of selling, arranging, or providing insurance." NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED,
1986, supra note 15, at 19.
501 Id. at A-14 (citing Larry D. Baker & Catherine Karol, Employee InsuranceBenefit
Plansand Discriminationon the Basis of Handicap, 27 DEPAUL L. REV, 1013 (1978)).
'0 42 U.S.C.A § 12181(7)(F) (West Supp. 1990) includes "insurance offices" among the
"service establishments" category of public accommodations.
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Perhaps the time has come for national directives as to how such
issues as a person's race, gender, color, ethnicity, religion, and
other factors may be permitted to affect the availability or price
of various kinds of insurance. Prohibiting discrimination in regard
to insurance has two dimensions: (1) forbidding the denial of insurance or increased cost of insurance because of illegitimate assumptions or stereotypes that are not supported by adequate actuarial data, and (2) forbidding higher rates or denials of insurance
based upon restricted factors-disability, race, sex, ethnicity,
etc.-even when supported by adequate actuarial data.
In certain contexts, Congress may choose to require a particular factor not to be used to differentiate insurance benefits even
though there is a statistical justification for doing so. For instance,
in the context of title VII, the Supreme Court ruled in Arizona
Governing Committee v. Norris5 3 that actuarial differences based
upon gender could not lawfully be used to impose differences in
benefits. Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Marshall
observed that "'[e]ven a true generalization about [a] class' cannot
justify class-based treatment. ' '5°4 Thus, in circumstances it deems
appropriate, Congress may decide that our nation will not allow
the use of real actuarial data to justify discriminatory distinctions
in the availability of insurance.
B. Level of Statutory Specificity
1. Specificity as a Modern Trend
One feature which makes the ADA stand out from prior federal civil rights laws is the extensive statutory language devoted
to defining discrimination and establishing standards to prohibit it.
Members of Congress were apparently unwilling to leave the development of legal standards under the Act to the vagaries of the
regulatory and judicial processes, and preferred to provide extensive guidance as to how the requirements of the Act were to be
- 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (holding that benefit plan that paid lower monthly retirement
benefits to women on the basis of their statistical longevity violated title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964).
4

Id. at 463 (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,

709 (1978)).
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interpreted and applied. 50 5 The desire for more detailed provisions
also reflects congressional dissatisfaction with administrative and
judicial interpretations and applications of prior federal disability
rights provisions that had been broader and more abbreviated in
their wording. Finally, the impetus for statutory specificity stems
from idiosyncrasies of disability discrimination, which demand
more statutory guidance than general mandates not to
506
discriminate.
ADA's specificity in delineating nondiscrimination standards
may be seen not as a revolutionary departure but rather as a more
extreme example of a tendency toward increasing detail in civil
rights legislation generally. Thus, although the Civil Rights Restoration Act, the Fair Housing Amendments Act, and the vetoed
Civil Rights Act of 1990 all deal with relatively narrow issues of
coverage, remedies and standards under prior civil rights laws,
each addresses the issues it covers in a detailed and thorough
manner, leaving little margin for administrative and judicial interpretation. However, the ADA takes the degree of specificity in
civil rights statutes to a new level. As such, it offers a possible
model for future civil rights legislation-to spell out in elaborate
detail what kinds of actions do and do not constitute unlawful
discrimination, and what legal framework of procedure and analysis should be applied to instances of alleged discrimination.
2. The Double-Edged Sword of Specificity
Unfortunately, statutory specificity can be a two-edged sword,
and it should be used only after careful consideration of its dangers
and shortcomings. One downside of very detailed statutes is their
rigidity. It takes a new Act of Congress to amend statutory language to correct problematic wording or unanticipated difficulties

501A lack of trust by lawmakers in the regulatory process to flesh out the skeleton of
broad proscriptions of discrimination may be explained to some degree by the situation of
"divided government," wherein for the past decade the Congress and the Administration
have not been in the control of the same political party. See N.L. JONES, Overview and
Essential Requirements of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, in ADA IMPLEMENTATION

REPORT 3 n.8 (1991). One ADA commentator has written that "[tihe increasing tendency
of Congress to 'micromanage' and be extremely specific in its statutory requirements may
be explained by the increasing antipathy of the judicial branch to expansive readings of
civil rights statutes as well as the party split between the congressional and executive
branches." See id. at 8 n.23.
'0 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 149-58.
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in its application. Regulatory change, while also somewhat cumbersome, can ordinarily be achieved more easily and expeditiously
than a statutory amendment. Conversely, another danger of statutory specificity is that particular provisions may arouse sufficient
opposition that they will be amended to be less stringent or to take
a contrary position, or they may be entirely deleted. In each of
these circumstances, there will be much less room to seek favorable regulatory or judicial positions on the particular issue than
there might have been if the proposed statute had not originally
addressed the issue or had done so in a more general way. The
hope of subsequent success in regulations or in the courts based
upon "wiggle-room" in the statute may outweigh the chances of
obtaining a positive, explicit outcome on an issue in the words of
the statute itself.
In some circumstances the issues involved in fine tuning statutorily imposed standards and concepts may be beyond congressional expertise; the regulatory notice of proposed rulemaking and
public comment processes may be much better adapted to producing a careful, comprehensive and systematic analysis of input
from affected industries, technical experts and members of the
public prior to establishing detailed standards.
Specificity of a statute can, in some circumstances, be a disadvantage to its passage. Members of Congress (and their constituents) may find it much easier to agree upon broadly worded
statements of principle and direction than upon the precise details
of legal standards and administrative processes for applying such
principles and directions. When a sufficient consensus on an issue
is available, however, to get it written into statutory language and
enacted, the ADA suggests the advantages of having express,
detailed wording in a civil rights law, rather than counting on the
judiciary or federal executive agencies to reach a desired result in
interpreting and applying less than crystal clear statutory language.
C. Rehabilitationof the Reasonable Accommodation Concept
1. Reasonable Accomodation as a Legal Concept
The ADA gives more guidance than was previously available
regarding the meaning and application of, and the limits upon, the
concept of "reasonable accommodation"-a central conceptual
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component in disability nondiscrimination laws. 07 Apart from the
disability rights area, however, the words "reasonable accommodation" have been used in at least two other, very different contexts. In some usages, "reasonable accommodation" is not a term
of art at all but merely an ordinary expression occasionally used
in legal oration and writing. Thus, in his partial concurrence in
Arnett v. Kennedy, 5 8 Justice Powell stated that "the present statute and regulations comport with due process by providing
a rea509
sonable accommodation of the competing interests.
More significantly, the use of the term "reasonable accommodation" in disability nondiscrimination provisions has resulted
in confusion because of its analytically distinct usage in the context
of discrimination on the basis of religion. In 1972 Congress added
section 7010) to title VII, thereby establishing an employer's duty
reasonably to accommodate religious observances and practices.
The duty to provide reasonable accommodation was limited to
accommodations which could be made without undue hardship to
the employer's business. 510 The uncertainty about the validity of
the EEOC Guidelines generated by the Sixth Circuit's dicta in
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co. 51 1 prompted Congress to add section 7010) to title VII in 1972 to codify the EEOC's language
concerning an employer's duty to "reasonably accommodate" religious observances and practices.512 In 1977 the Supreme Court's
decision in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison513 interpreted the
"undue hardship" limitation as not requiring employers to accommodate workers' religious beliefs if doing so would impose more
-0 In the disability rights area, the term "reasonable accommodation" was first used
in regulations issued in 1976 by the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs (OFCCP) for the implementation of section 503 of the Rehabilitation
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1988). The OFCCP regulations required federal contractors having
contracts or subcontracts of $2,500 or more to "make a reasonable accommodation to the
physical and mental limitations of an employee or applicant unless the contractor can
demonstrate that such an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the conduct
of the contractor's business." 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1976). In 1977, the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare included a similarly stated "reasonable accommodation"
requirement in its regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1977), to implement section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).

s416 U.S. 134 (1974).
'09
Id. at 171.

51o
29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(1)(b) (1967).
511
429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970) (declaring that the EEOC lacked statutory authority to
establish a duty to accommodate religious beliefs).
512

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(j) (1988).

513432

U.S. 63 (1977) (finding that requiring TWA to give an employee Saturdays off
constitutes an "undue hardship" and is not required).
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than a de minimis cost. The de minimis limit on the "reasonable
accommodation" duty in regard to religious beliefs and practices
has proven to be a serious, continuing obstacle in establishing
meaningful accommodation standards in the area of religious
514
discrimination.
In analyzing the Hardison de minimis interpretation of the
obligation to make "reasonable accommodations" to religious practices, the United States Commission on Civil Rights observed:
"The Court's restrictive ruling was motivated in part by a desire
to avoid first amendment problems concerning the Constitution's
protection of the free exercise of religion and its prohibition against
establishing a religion. '515 The Commission added that "[t]hese
principles do not apply in the context of discrimination on the
'516
basis of handicap.
In establishing a "reasonable accommodation" requirement in
the ADA, Congress was clearly aware of the de minimis approach
employed in the religious discrimination area and clearly rejected
that approach. The report of the House Committee on Education
and Labor declares:
The Committee wishes to make it clear that the principles
enunciated by the Supreme Court in TWA v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63 (1977), are not applicable to this legislation.
In Hardison, the Supreme Court concluded that under
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 an employer need
not accommodate persons with religious beliefs if the
accommodation would require more than a de minimis
cost for the employer. By contrast, under the ADA, reasonable accommodations must be provided unless they
rise to the level of "requiring significant difficulty or expense" on the part of the employer, in light of the factors
noted in the statute-i.e., a significantly higher standard
than that articulated in Hardison. This higher standard is
necessary in light of the crucial role that reasonable ac5,4 Current EEOC regulations have had to incorporate the Hardison de minimis limitation. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(1). The regulations have, however, created presumptions that
certain types of costs, such as infrequent substitute wages and administrative costs, will
not exceed the de minimis standard. Id.
5' U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
516

1981)).

supra note 15, at 104 n.1.

Id. (citing Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 308 n.22 (5th Cir.

514
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commodation plays in ensuring meaningful
employment
517
opportunities for people with disabilities.
2. Reasonable Accomodation in the Future
By reinforcing the notion that "reasonable accommodation"
in disability nondiscrimination law is a much more substantial
requirement than it has been held to be in connection with religious
discrimination, the ADA has solidified the distinction between the
two concepts. The fortified version of "reasonable accommodation" is not only applicable in the disability rights area, but also
provides a conceptual option in other civil rights areas. For instance, the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988518 broke new
ground by adding "familial status" to the grounds of discrimination
prohibited under the Fair Housing Act. 51 9 It may be that future
legislation addressing this ground of discrimination may want to
impose an obligation to make "reasonable accommodations" to
permit children to use and enjoy the covered services, premises,
etc. Or the drafters of bills relating to gender discrimination might
wish to consider incorporating provisions requiring "reasonable
accommodations" to the special circumstances of pregnant
women. These are but a few examples of the constructive potential
uses of an invigorated "reasonable accommodation" concept made
possible by the ADA.
D. Relative Degrees of Obligation
1. Relative Degrees of Obligation within Civil Rights
Statutes
Most civil rights standards are established in a yes-or-no fashion-an obligation either applies or it does not; there are no "degrees" of requirements. Although numerous problems may arise
in determining the underlying facts and circumstances, the un517 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 68 (1990); see also H.R.
REP. No. 101-485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 40 (1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, 101st
Cong., 1st sess. 36 (1989).
5-18Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 36013631 59(1988)).
42 U.S.C. § 3602(k) (1988) (defining "familial status" as having children living
in the
dwelling).
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equivocality of most civil rights provisions gives relatively clear
guidance to those covered and protected by such laws, as well as
to administrative agencies and the courts as to what conduct is
prohibited or required. Where protracted conflict arises over civil
rights obligations, it ordinarily involves disputes about such issues
as the meaning of the standard, the extent of its coverage or the
means for enforcing it, rather than controversy about relative degrees of obligation expressly imposed in the statutes themselves.
A small number of civil rights statutes are not stringent and
absolute, but rather flexible and relative. For instance, title VII
establishes the bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") defense to the use of criteria of religion, sex or national origin in the
employment context. An employer's use of these criteria can be
upheld only if the employer can demonstrate that the criterion is
"a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise .... -520
Likewise, the Supreme Court has held that "business necessity"
is a defense to an alleged violation of title VII under a disparate
impact theory. 521 To be a "business necessity," a facially neutral
employment criteria which has a disproportionate effect on a protected class under title VII must have "a manifest relationship to
the employment in question. ' 522 The religious accommodation/
undue burden concept discussed above is another "relative" standard in civil rights laws, as is the "reasonable accommodation"
concept as clarified and fortified in the ADA.
As the application of these intermediate nondiscrimination
standards involves the weighing of factors deemed legally relevant,
determining whether compliance is required or not depends upon
the facts and circumstances in each situation. Generalizations
based upon comparisons of the standards must, therefore, be
viewed with caution.5 23 Yet, courts and regulatory agencies have
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988). There is no BFOQ for race discrimination.
See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (finding that using a
standardized test and high school diploma as employment criteria adversely affected blacks
and constituted a violation of title VII that could not be justified as a "business necessity").
5 Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1982); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321, 329 (1977).
52 A comparative analysis of relative degress of obligation within various civil rights
520

521

statutes raises empirical problems. What is "readily achievable" for a General Motors may
far outstrip what is the "maximum extent feasible" for a struggling Mom-and-Pop coffee

shop. Yet if one postulates similar circumstances and resources, and similar costs of some
change or modification at issue, one can meaningfully consider the various degrees of

obligation in such statutes.
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applied each standard so as to impose low, moderate and high
degrees of obligation upon covered entities. The courts and the
EEOC have construed the BFOQ as being a very narrow defense. 524 "Business necessity" also has been construed to be a
stringent standard. 525 However, the religious accomodation standard has been interpreted to impose only a de minimis obligation
upon employers. Finally, courts and regulatory agencies have interpreted the "reasonable accomodation" standard within the context of disability discrimination as imposing a moderate obligation.
2. Relative Degrees of Obligationwithin the ADA
The ADA incorporates the low, moderate and high degrees of
obligation which exist in other civil rights statutes. At the relatively
low end of the scale, the ADA requires certain modifications to
be made if they are "readily achievable. '526 As noted previously,
these are changes that can be accomplished without much difficulty
or expense. The ADA Committee reports indicate that readily
achievable is "a modest requirement" 527 that exceeds the Hardison
de minimis approach but that is "a significantly lesser or lower
528
standard" than the undue burdens/undue hardship limits.
At the high end of the scale, the ADA imposes some very
stringent (though not unavoidable) requirements, usually stated in
terms of very narrow exceptions or very high levels of performance. These include requirements that are imposed: "to the maximum extent feasible ; 529 unless "structurally impracticable ; 53 0 except where it would "fundamentally alter the nature" of the goods,
services, facilities, etc.;531 "to the extent practicable;"53 2 or (bor-4

See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) ("should be interpreted narrowly"); Diaz v. Pan

Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971)

("discrimination based on sex is valid only when the essence of the business operation
would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively") (emphasis in original).
521
See Williams v. Colorado Springs School Dist. #11, 641 F.2d 835, 841-42 (10th Cir.
1981) (discriminatory practice must be "of great importance to job performance").
-2642 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (West Supp. 1990).
521
S.RE'. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 65 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,

2d Sess., pt. 2, at 109 (1990).
528
S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 65 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2,at 109 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt, 3, at 40 (1990).
529
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12142(c)(1), 12147(a), 12162(d)(1), 12162(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii),
12183(a)(2), 12184(b)(7) (West Supp. 1990).
530
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 12183(a)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
51'
42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii) (West Supp. 1990).
5132
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 12143(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12162(a)(4)(A)

(employs the phrase "[u]nless not practicable").
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rowing from title VII) except where shown to be "consistent with
business necessity. ' 533 The ADA Committee reports indicate that
these concepts are to be applied very strictly to permit extremely
limited exceptions from the norm of compliance with the Act's
mandates, e.g., where "virtually impossible," 534 or creating "a narrow exception that will apply only in rare and unusual
circumstances. 535
In the middle the ADA establishes the reasonable accommodation/undue burdens/undue hardship concepts, and an obligation
to undertake accessibility changes that are "not disproportionate."
While the upper-end standards can be characterized as almost
always imposing a high degree of compliance, and the lower-end
standards as imposing an obligation to do something (although
often not very much), the middle-level standards are more difficult
to capsulize. Congress offered some guidance when it rejected an
amendment that would have imposed a ceiling of ten percent of
the annual salary for the position in question as the upper limit for
"reasonable accommodations. '536 The Committee reports declare
that a standard of thirty percent is an appropriate interpretation of
the disproportionality concept. 537
3. A Variety of Standardsfor Future Civil Rights Statutes
With the example of the ADA, drafters of future civil rights
legislation have many more options than yes or no in crafting
statutory language to impose requirements. Obviously, an absolute, no-exceptions standard is the strongest approach. But if such
a standard is unattainable either politically or equitably, the variety
of degrees-of-obligation standards within the ADA and those such
as BFOQ and "business necessity" that pre-dated the ADA creates
a menu of legislative language for imposing flexible, relative requirements in future civil rights statutes. Some of the alternatives
identified are useful in particular circumstances only. Thus "structurally impracticable" is meaningful only in connection with phys51 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12112(b)(6), 12112(c)(4)(A), 12113(a) (West Supp. 1990).
514 S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 114 (1990) (construing the phrase "to the maximum extent feasible").
"I S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 120 (1990) (construing the phrase "structurally impracticable").
536See supra note 247.

13 See supra note 343.
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ical changes to facilities or equipment; BFOQ is applicable only
in the context of employment; the disproportionality standard
makes sense only in the context of comparing a requirement to
some larger project otherwise being undertaken; and business necessity obviously has reference to a business context. As such,
comparing them is something of an apples-to-oranges proposition.
Others, such as "readily achievable," to the "maximum extent
feasible," and "reasonable accommodation" lend themselves more
easily to uses in a variety of contexts.
The less-than-full requirements have their dangers and should
only be employed after careful consideration. Weighing of factors
may lend much less certainty to the determination of what is
required than does a more inflexible standard. There is much more
"wiggle room" in the intermediate degrees of requirements than in
a statutory "Thou shall" or "Thou shalt not." If a relative standard
of nondiscrimination is not carefully worded, a "slippery slope"
may be created where it is difficult to prevent "a little discrimination" from becoming a lot of discrimination. Where a blanket
approach is workable, then a carefully articulated absolute standard will generally be preferable. But where a more particularized
inquiry is appropriate to measure the applicability of a nondiscrimination requirement-as when an individualized determination is
called for, which is usually the case in regard to many disability
rights issues-one of the intermediate standards of nondiscrimination found in the ADA may be a highly useful tool of statutory
language.
E. Statutory Exceptions and Exemptions
1. Failed Compromise?
One discordant note in the ADA statutory scheme is the presence of several provisions that expressly exempt certain types of
enterprises from the obligations imposed by the Act or that exclude
certain classes of individuals with disabilities from the protection
of the ADA. Examples of the former include the exemption of
private clubs from the coverage of the employment and public
accommodations provisions,538 the exemption of entities controlled
38 See supra text accompanying note 433.
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by religious organizations from the public accommodations requirements, 5 9 and the exemption of two-story buildings and taller
buildings with under 3000 square feet per story from the require540
ment that elevators be installed in newly constructed facilities.
Examples of the latter include the list of eleven conditions
excluded from the ADA's protection at the insistence of Senators
Helms and Armstrong.5 41 The Supreme Court has struck down
governmental restrictions upon persons with mental retardation
under the equal protection clause on the ground that these restrictions were based upon "negative attitudes," "fear" and "irrational
prejudice. '542 The Court has acknowledged that prior disability
nondiscrimination legislation was motivated by a congressional
desire to condemn the effects of "negative reactions,". "prejudiced
attitudes," "ignorance," "myths and fears," "public fear and misapprehension" and "irrational fear. '543 No evidence suggests that
Congress investigated such conditions, except, perhaps, for the
problem of illegal drug use. Consequently, it is arguable that the
members of Congress relied upon nothing other than their own
negative reactions, fears and prejudices in fashioning the list of
excluded classes.
None of these exemptions and exceptions was part of the bill
as originally introduced; each was added to the ADA with the
agreement of the bill's sponsors in the name of compromise. The
exemptions from the ADA's obligations were accepted principally
as a concession to obtain the support of the Bush Administration
for the bill. The exceptions from the ADA's protected class were
accepted without a fight to placate vocal critics of the legislation
and to avoid some potentially embarrassing roll-call votes threatened by these opponents. The success of such compromises may
help to explain the legislation's relatively quick enactment, its
bipartisan support, and its overwhelming support by majorities in
various committees and on the floor in both Houses of Congress.
In the situation of "divided government" that has existed over the
last decade, a degree of bipartisanship is essential to the passage
of federal legislation.
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See supra text accompanying note 434.

See supra text accompanying note 344.
541See supra text accompanying notes 193-194.
3o

M2 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 448, 450 (1985).
53 School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283-84 (1987).
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Though a product of "political compromise," some of the
provisions creating exemptions and exceptions within the ADA
are manifestly inconsistent with the spirit of the statute. These
provisions call into question the wisdom of accepting countervailing limitations to garner the support of potential opponents of
legislation. Legislating "by consensus" can mean the political
equivalent of reduction to the lowest common denominator. Legislative language can become the minimum approach accepted by
everyone rather than the highest standard acceptable to the majority. Moreover, some opponents of civil rights legislation are not
going to support any measure, other than feeble pious platitudes,
no matter how many compromises or deals are offered. Thus, in
spite of concessions resulting in the list of eleven exceptions to
coverage of persons with disabilities, both Senators Armstrong
and Helms voted against Senate passage of the ADA.5 44 Senator
Armstrong eventually voted in favor of the final conference report
on the bill, 545 but is such an eleventh-hour jump onto the bandwagon by a consistent opponent of the bill throughout its progress
through the Congress worth a list of concessions?
Administration support of the bill was certainly helpful, but
the concessions demanded may not have been commensurate with
the vigor of support supplied by the Administration. For example,
the Administration did not provide much leadership in last-second
wrangling over the "food-handlers" amendment that nearly sidetracked the legislation. And while some degree of Administration
approval was necessary at some stage in the process (certainly in
signing the legislation if not earlier), the price paid for such participation may have been too high, given that the Administration may
not have withheld its support in the absence of such concessions.
Would the Administration truly have withheld support for the
legislation, after President Bush had called for such legislation
during his Presidential campaign, solely because the bill did not,
for example, exempt private clubs?
Other legislation has brought into question the importance of
having early Administration support of civil rights initiatives as
they move through Congress. The Fair Housing Amendments Act
of 1988 moved through Congress with very little involvement by

'"
54S

135
136

CONG. REC.
CONG. REC.

S10803 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989).
S9695 (daily ed. July 13, 1990).
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the Reagan Administration. At the last minute, the Administration
did support the legislation and tried to claim major credit for its
passage. Yet the provisions of that Act were crafted by civil rights
advocates and congressional leaders and their staffs, and owed
virtually nothing to White House involvement.
2. The Place of Compromise in Future Civil Rights
Legislation
The ADA precedent suggests the advantages of not trying too
hard to obtain the Presidential imprimatur on pending civil rights
legislation early in the process, but of waiting until later stages
until the White House is faced with a more constricted, take-it-orleave-it choice of supporting the legislation or taking the political
heat incident to opposing it publicly. In caving in too easily to the
demands for exceptions and exemptions, the sponsors of the ADA
actually undermined the position of those within the President's
circle who were less conservative, less attuned to commercial
interests and more sympathetic to the premises and purposes of
the Act. A less accommodating stance might have forced the President to make hard decisions about priorities and the defensibility
of taking public stands against the ADA.
Legislative negotiation and compromise are, of course, integral parts of the American lawmaking process. Advocates of civil
rights laws, like all other promoters of legislation, must engage in
give-and-take and hard political decision making about deals and
trade-offs. But the ADA precedent suggests that compromises and
deals that run counter to the spirit of a piece of legislation should
be countenanced warily and only accepted when the benefits to
be gained clearly outweigh the losses of coverage or diminutions
of standards. For while the ADA represents a huge advance for
people with disabilities, those of us who worked on the bill will
continue to cringe when we focus on provisions of the Act that
exclude from protection those individuals having real and difficult
psychological and psychiatric disorders such as compulsive gambling, kleptomania and pyromania. It detracts from the principle
underlying the Act that such people were denied protection because of stereotypes, ignorance and prejudice toward them and
that their exclusion was permitted primarily because they had no
organized representation present during the negotiations and no
congressional champion arose to their defense.
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The ADA also deviates from its principles in permitting the
construction of new buildings that are inaccessible because they
happen to be too short or too skinny. Private clubs that could have
been covered to the extent that their operations affect interstate
commerce are not subject to ADA requirements; likewise an exemption for entities controlled by religious organizations is broader
than necessary to protect religious freedom. These last two exemptions have precedents in other types of civil rights statutes,
but their historical existence and rationales are dubious justification for their replication.
All of these statutory exemptions and exceptions in the ADA
are deviations from the central impetus of the Act; all were inserted
in return for support for the overall Act or to mollify potential
opposition. In the heat of legislative conflict, they appeared to be
worthwhile compromises. In hindsight, it is doubtful that legal
commentators will deem them worth the limited returns they
brought. Advocates and drafters of future civil rights laws should
note the dangers of allowing exceptions and exemptions to be
carved out of the statutory scheme, and to be vigilant and stingy
about making compromises that limit coverage or permit discrimination by certain entities that the Act would otherwise prohibit.
The term "loopholes" refers to gaps and ambiguities inadvertently
written into statutes that permit someone to wiggle out of a requirement that would otherwise be imposed. If drafters of civil
rights laws should be vigilant to avoid loopholes, advocates of
such laws and their friends in the halls of Congress should be even
more watchful and reluctant to accept holes that are knowingly
cut into the statutory fabric.

